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Abstract 
Tobacco-smoking is by far the biggest single killer of Tasmanians, exceeding all motor 
vehicle accidents, illicit drugs, alcohol, suicide, homicide, fires and assaults combined. 
The tobacco industry is the vector of multiple chronic and deadly diseases caused by 
smoking, which can affect every organ of the body. Tasmania has higher smoking rates 
than all other states in Australia, and for a decade in the 2000s, the smoking rate in 
Tasmania did not fall at the same speed as other states. Tobacco control in Tasmania has 
been characterised by a strong legislative reform agenda, but weak commitment to 
allocation of resources for mass-media campaigns and cessation-support services. 
This thesis was triggered by professional concerns about these issues, and examines 
barriers to the funding of evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania. The hypothesis 
is that there are specific barriers to implementing evidence-based tobacco-control 
measures in Tasmania. 
The initial proposal and research questions related to: evidence transfer to politicians 
and bureaucrats, and how such evidence is used and influenced; the role of policy 
entrepreneurs; factors influencing resource allocation; and does it matter if a politician 
is a smoker? The theoretical framework used was that of Kingdon, and agenda setting. 
The work began with a literature search focusing on evidence and knowledge transfer, 
and then progressed to requests for documents from the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) and other relevant agencies. In the early stages there was 
considerable cooperation from the DHHS, including access to files. In the later stages, 
with follow-up as the documents were read and analysed and more questions arose, 
DHHS and other departments insisted on formal requests in conformity with the 
relevant right to information legislation. A 1970s case of corruption and cronyism 
involving the tobacco industry was discovered at an early stage, and recently released 
archived files were examined to give a historic context to recent issues. 
Initially it had been intended to conduct interviews with bureaucrats, politicians and 
non-government leaders. However, as the researcher and all supervisors were embedded 
in the Tasmanian health community, it became clear that the small-scale nature of 
Tasmania meant that the answers given would almost certainly be confounded by 
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familiarity. Further, a vast amount of information was available in documents. 
Therefore, it was decided to examine what people said and did as documented 
contemporaneously.  
The first major finding was that crony capitalism involving the tobacco industry was 
deeply embedded in the Tasmanian political system, and had been for decades. In the 
1970s a tobacco company had managed, through corrupt processes, to eject an 
unsupportive Tasmanian government from office. No noteworthy ideological 
differences between the major political parties on tobacco control were found, as their 
actions appeared to be personality-driven. “Conservative white males” dominated 
governments, and it was not until 2013 that a bloc of progressive female political 
leaders finally broke the impasse, and allocated adequate funding to tobacco control. 
Senior politicians were poorly informed about the importance of tobacco control, and 
the evidence on how to reduce smoking rates. Many of the significant politicians who 
rejected the evidence were smokers. Politicians and bureaucrats refused to allocate 
earmarked funding to tobacco control in the years when states controlled taxation 
revenue streams, which perpetuated disadvantage in Tasmania. 
The myriad bureaucratic barriers to effective tobacco control were substantial, and 
included primacy of the “rescue culture” that prioritized acute care and illicit drugs use. 
There were silo effects in resource allocation; confused accountability, with complex 
internal committee systems; failure of key public servants to believe the evidence; 
failure to transfer evidence to Parliament and ministers; and importantly, a lack of 
resources for support, monitoring and evaluating anti-smoking services. 
It was found that although there were a number of anti-smoking non-government 
organisations (NGOs) active in Tasmania, these were small, under-resourced, and 
lacking research and advocacy expertise. There were individuals who lobbied hard, but 
no policy entrepreneurs of the stature of leaders in some other Australian states. 
Small jurisdictions are vulnerable to crony capitalism and tobacco industry interference, 
and national governments, the World Health Organisation (WHO), philanthropists and 
national NGOs have a responsibility to provide assistance to achieve and implement 
evidence-based tobacco-control measures. To be effective bureaucrats need to 
streamline their operations and consultations. Accountability mechanisms need to be 
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unambiguous. Decision-making structures, which incorporate illicit drug and alcohol 
policy-making, overwhelm tobacco control as a priority. Tobacco control requires 
persistence and planning. Governments that do not adopt a priority approach for tobacco 
control across all agencies and ministries will find that internecine spats strangle reform. 
The apparent success of progressive women in breaking through these barriers needs to 
be tested in other contexts. 
Evidence is vital to underpin policy, but opportunities to develop new charismatic 
tobacco-control endgame ideas should not be dismissed, simply because the evidence is 
minimal at the start of a new initiative. There are times when executing rational ideas 
can gain traction, while evidence can only be ultimately gained through implementation. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that there are barriers to evidence-
based tobacco control in Tasmania. 
This thesis addresses the failure of governments to keep pace with evidence about 
effective measures to improve public health. It provides a study of Tasmania, and 
tobacco control public policy and implementation in that state. It is a not-uncommon 
phenomenon in public health that a government might, as Fafard observes, “routinely 
reject the best available evidence and prefer other considerations and concerns” (Fafard 
2015, p.1). 
Fafard expands on this: 
“Evidence-based public health (EBPH), how could it be otherwise? The 
claim that practices, programmes and policies in public health should be 
based on the best available evidence seems like an obvious and self-
evident claim. Yet we routinely observe that public health decisions are 
made that do not reflect the best available scientific evidence” (Fafard 
2015, p.1). 
The thesis examines the main barriers that existed within the context of Tasmania and 
provides three case studies to illustrate the theoretical considerations. The first is 
described in Chapter 5 and surrounds the events of the demise of a Tasmanian 
government in the 1970s, engineered by British Tobacco. The second and third case 
studies are more recent, since the 1990s, and deal with political and bureaucratic 
barriers to effective evidence-based tobacco control, and are explained in Chapters 6 
and 7.  
It is somewhat frustrating for scientists who conduct a carefully crafted study to find 
that their work, and that of colleagues producing similar results, is apparently ignored. 
Indeed scientists’ “… belief in rational decision making may lead them to mistakenly 
believe that simply providing more data or citing more scientifically credible studies 
will be more persuasive when communicating information to audiences” (Nelson 2009, 
p.15). The processes for implementing evidence-based practice in clinical medicine 
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should not be dictated by politicians, except where economic decisions about public 
purchase and availability of equipment or approval of drugs are a consideration. 
However, although the politician is peripheral in clinical medicine, politicians and 
bureaucrats are central to the practice, approval and implementation of public health 
measures. For clinicians the process of public policy-making is mysterious, because 
there is sometimes no resemblance to the evidence, and occasionally policy takes 
different directions in separate jurisdictions, in response to the same evidence (Dobrow 
2006). To political scientists the phenomenon of divergence of policy from scientific 
evidence is quite explicable, and unfortunately all too normal. 
Public health action has been “nominally” based on epidemiological principles for well 
over a century, and a sound scientific evidence base has been fundamental to sending 
signals to the polity about what action should take place. However, politics and public 
health are inextricably linked, and public health officials are subject to political 
influences. As a 2007 editorial in the Lancet pointed out, even such eminent authorities 
as the US Surgeon-General are subject to political “interference” (The Lancet 2007, p. 
193). 
When Dr John Snow, in 1854 discovered that a group of deaths from cholera had 
occurred within a short distance of a pump in Broad Street, Soho, London, he went to: 
 “…the Board of Guardians of St. James parish on the evening of 7th inst 
[Sept 7] and represented the above circumstances to them. In 
consequence of what I said, the handle of the pump was removed on the 
following day” (Brody et al. 2000, p65).  
Snow thought that cholera was transmitted by drinking water. This was not the 
prevailing view at the time. Snow did not conduct randomized double-blind clinical 
trials. He did not have a microscope to be able to demonstrate the existence of 
pathogens. He simply made careful observations about patterns of disease, locations and 
sources of water supplies, and locations and timing of deaths. 
In this historic case the route from hypothesis to action was swift, even if the evidence 
available to him was not that which would stand up to modern independent scientific 
scrutiny, but Snow had “good science” for the time. It was well educated guesswork. In 
fact the cholera epidemic was abating before the pump handle was removed, but 
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political action promptly followed scientific identification of a problem and effective 
advocacy from a credible scientist. 
How would John Snow’s approach have fared in the 21st Century, and especially in 
Australia? It is possible that the route from hypothesis to action could be much longer. 
In a recent case where an outbreak of the potentially fatal Legionnaires’ disease in 
Rapid City, South Dakota was found to have been transmitted by a decorative fountain 
in a restaurant, investigative action was careful, meticulous and painstaking, before the 
fountain was shut down, as reported by O’Loughlin et al. (2007). 
“We conducted a case-control study that included the first 13 cases and 
52 controls randomly selected from emergency department records and 
matched on underlying illness. We collected information about activities 
of case-patients and controls during the 14 days before symptom onset. 
Environmental samples (n = 291) were cultured for Legionella. Clinical 
and environmental isolates were compared using monoclonal antibody 
subtyping and sequence based typing (SBT)” (O’Loughlin et al. 2007, 
NP). 
Public health action is informed by evidence, but the bar has been lifted considerably 
since 1854. The speed at which public health officials can act has been curbed, and the 
administrative and political processes are immensely complex. The possibility of a 
single doctor, in one meeting, being able to persuade an administrative authority to 
instantly take action, which may upset local business or the community, is unimaginable 
in modern industrial societies. In the case of tobacco, the evidence about the adverse 
health effects has been available for many years. However, only one country, the tiny 
kingdom of Bhutan, with a similar population to Tasmania, has seen fit to shut down the 
tobacco industry and ban the sale of tobacco (Ahmad 2005; Ferrence 2003; Ugen 2003). 
Closing down tobacco sales is a far cry from removing a pump handle or turning off a 
fountain. Yet these issues are all about public health, and about preserving, maintaining 
and protecting the populace from illness and disease. The action required is ultimately 
political. The debate on phasing out tobacco sales is developing and endgame proposals 
are proliferating (Malone 2013). However, this thesis is concerned with the historic 
response to the scientific evidence about effective measures to reduce tobacco 
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consumption, which have been within the control of the Tasmanian government, and 
indeed other state and territory governments in Australia. It addresses the issue of the 
vagaries of transfer of scientific evidence through various channels, and political 
processes, to eventual action. The thesis considers the issues of policy failure and 
nondecision-making. The argument advanced is that there has been a failure to transfer 
evidence into action on tobacco control in Tasmania. 
“The clear message from the literature is that research evidence must 
compete with individual, organisational, institutional, political, 
economic, and ideological factors for the attention of policy-makers and 
practitioners” (Lewig, Avery & Scott 2006, p18). 
Whilst the focus is on the Tasmanian government, nevertheless divergence or lag effects 
from evidence-based public health policy is a phenomenon observed in many countries, 
including the United States, as McGinnis observes: 
“Despite compelling evidence of the potential for many preventive 
interventions to reduce the occurrence of disease, thwart needless 
suffering and improve the health and vitality of populations, the uptake 
of these interventions often lags far behind the potential” (McGinnis 
2001, p391). 
Comprehensive tobacco control policies are recognised as those which include a 
number of measures, and ideally should be implemented together (Joossens & 
Raw, 2006, p. 247). Referring to the World Bank (World Bank, 2003) list of 
effective interventions Joossens and Raw itemize the six key interventions as, 
 “price increases through higher taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco 
products 
 bans/restrictions on smoking in public and work places 
 better consumer information, including public information campaigns, 
media coverage, and publicising research findings 
 comprehensive bans on the advertising and promotion of all tobacco 
products, logos and brand names 
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 large, direct health warning labels on cigarette boxes and other tobacco 
products 
 treatment to help dependent smokers stop, including increased access to 
medications. (Joossens & Raw, 2006, p. 247)” 
Australian state and territory jurisdictions do not control price (since 1996) nor 
packaging, and share with the Commonwealth responsibilities for consumer 
information, mass media campaigns, advertising and promotion (states/territories 
control point of sale only) and treatment through cessation services and access to 
medication (although the Commonwealth controls the cost of medication). The 
only intervention controlled almost exclusively by states/territories is bans on 
smoking in public places and work-places (although the /Commonwealth has sole 
jurisdiction over federal properties such as airports). See Table 9. Tasmanian 
governments have acted on smoking bans in public places, and were the first 
Australian jurisdiction to ban smoking in pubs and clubs. Secondly, Tasmania 
pioneered bans on advertising and display of tobacco products at point of sale 
(Laugesen et al, 2000). However, Tasmania failed, until 2010 to adequately fund 
cessation support services (see Chart 18) and until 2013, to implement sufficient 
evidence-based mass media campaigns. The Commonwealth undertook some 
overarching mass media campaigns across the nation, but all other states 
implemented their own supplementary campaigns. These two gaps in program 
delivery and funding in Tasmania are the missing links in a comprehensive 
program of tobacco control. Without both these interventions, a state tobacco 
control program does not meet the standard of being ‘comprehensive’. 
One of the most important areas of public health in the US where patient advice and 
counselling has gone undelivered relates to smoking. McGinnis outlines the reasons 
why he considers that the “bar is higher for prevention”. McGinnis describes: the 
invisibility of public health measures, and the public focus on high-power technical 
interventions; the “primacy of rescue”; short time horizons; the need for immediate 
expenditure outlays versus long-term gains; double standards about low-cost health 
interventions; disease complexity; multiple loci of control and multiple funding streams; 
“lifestyle drift” and emphasis on individual rather than corporate responsibility; a 
technophilic culture; and counterveiling economic interests. This set of ideas is outlined 
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in more detail in Chapter 2 on policy typology and literature, as it provides a useful set 
of explanations that prima facie are similar to what has prevailed Tasmania (McGinnis 
2001). 
The vexed question of what effective “evidence” entails in the public health context is 
one of the central themes of this thesis. There is a great deal of literature on this issue, 
particularly emanating from Canada, and a large portion is devoted to finding ways of 
improving the communication between scientists or researchers, and those who would 
implement policies related to the evidence that is produced. A Canadian “Systematic 
review of conceptualizing and combining evidence for health system guidance” 
conducted by Lomas et al. found three types of evidence: 
“There are differing views on what the “evidence” in evidence-based 
healthcare should be. This systematic review uncovered three categories 
of evidence: medical effectiveness research (context-free scientific 
evidence); social-science oriented research (context sensitive scientific 
evidence); or the expertise, views, and realities of stakeholders 
(colloquial evidence). These views of evidence are not incompatible and 
each has a role to play in producing evidence-based guidance for the 
health system” (Lomas et al. 2005, p5). 
This is a useful frame of reference for the examination of the ways in which “evidence” 
has been used, absorbed, considered, and deliberated on in relation to the development 
of tobacco-control policy. Chapter 2 provides a detailed examination of the policy 
typology and literature relating to evidence-based research and policy transfer or 
utilisation. 
Tasmania is not unique in the world in having a government or health department, 
which is oriented to acute care, and which struggles to find funding for public and 
population health and disease prevention strategies. In their review of the role of 
government in public health Lin et al. identify the comments of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), which criticises ministries of health world-wide as;  
“… being too oriented to short-term results, having a narrow focus, and 
giving insufficient attention to policy implementation. Governments are 
said to be more focused on the public hospitals and medical care, rather 
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than other health-care providers or the health needs of patients and the 
population in general” (Lin, Smith & Fawkes 2007). 
The methodology for this thesis as set out in Chapter 3 was primarily based on analysis 
of documents. These included internal documents from government agencies sought and 
obtained under freedom of information provisions, as well as public documents on 
websites and hard copies in libraries and disseminated to the public and those interested 
in health and tobacco control. Newspapers records, archive documents from both the 
Tasmanian and national libraries were accessed. Parliamentary transcripts, called 
Hansards, both online and hard copies, and older documents from the Tasmanian 
Parliamentary Library were examined and analysed. Where it was possible to digitize 
documents these were entered into QSR International NVivo and sorted and coded to 
enable more detailed analysis and comparison of themes, processes, political and 
bureaucratic policies and programs.  
Initially it was planned to conduct interviews; however, as the accessing of documents 
proceeded and the politicians and bureaucrats became aware of the study, the likelihood 
of extracting meaningful unbiased information from the actors in Tasmania became 
more remote. The author and all supervisors were at various points involved in the 
processes of policy-making as observers, advisors, clinicians, critics or advocates. 
Therefore, the probability of “participant observer bias” was deemed to be too likely to 
conduct effective interviews. Tasmania is so small that all the researchers, physicians, 
politicians, public servants and health organisation officials are well known to one 
another, their views, ideologies and biases understood, and therefore any interviews 
would almost certainly have been tainted by participants saying what they thought the 
interviewer wanted to hear, or would find acceptable. Retrospective self-justification of 
past actions (or inaction) was inevitable in this environment. A study in NSW by 
Hooker and Chapman encountered a similar difficulty, but the researchers were able to 
conduct interviews because the first author and interviewer was a non-activist impartial 
historian, even though the second author was a well-known public health professional 
academic and activist (Hooker & Chapman 2006). By 2010 the amount of material, data 
and documentation amassed was so enormous that it was considered unnecessary, and 
almost certainly counter-productive to proceed with interviews. The thesis therefore 
relies on what actually happened, according to the record, what was in documents and 
what was said publicly and on the record.  
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The history of what has happened in Tasmania in relation to tobacco control is outlined 
in Chapter 4, and that chapter also provides many visual guides to events over time 
through the use of charts, graphs, figures and tables. The story of smoking rates and 
interventions is described so that the reader can gain an impression of the events in the 
context of the timeframe of several decades. Whilst the focus of the thesis is mainly on 
the period since 1997, nevertheless previous important events shaped Tasmania’s 
tobacco control history, particularly the relationship of governments to tobacco industry 
executives and companies from the late 1960s: these have coloured more recent events 
and influenced politicians in their approach to challenging the tobacco industry. The 
fact that a tobacco company was able to destroy a Tasmanian government using bribery 
has left its mark on the Tasmanian political psyche, and may have contributed to 
defensive legislation such as that which prohibits the tobacco industry from telling lies 
about the health effects of its products and about tobacco-related legislation more 
generally (Public Health Act 1997, Sections 74 and 74AA).  
The political environment in Tasmania and the way it impacts on public policy and its 
processes is a central theme. Tasmania has a very small economy, vulnerable to being 
influenced by large powerful corporations. This is not unique to Tasmania and is a 
characteristic of many jurisdictions, although Aligica and Tarko (2014) argue that it 
takes different forms in wealthy countries to that which operates in emerging 
economies. “Crony capitalism” can flourish in such an environment and has done so in 
Tasmania, but this is not confined to small economies and Macey argues that it is even a 
threat to the USA (Macey 2014). Macey defines crony capitalism as:  
“… an economic and political environment in which pursuing and 
obtaining government favors is part of everyday life and a necessary 
protocol for succeeding in business. Where crony capitalism exists, 
notions of meritocracy have been displaced by notions of cronyism or 
kleptocracy or something similar” (Macey, 2014 p5 
The question of crony capitalism is explored in a detailed case study of the events of the 
1960s and early 1970s in Tasmania, Chapter 5, and relates to the close relationship 
between the tobacco industry and its front organisations, politicians and senior 
bureaucrats. 
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Crony capitalism, described by Aligica and Tarko as essentially a corruption of the 
political process by business interests:  
“… is not just a redundant term, a mere substitute for “rent seeking” or 
just a vague, ethically charged label. It designates a sui generis 
phenomenon, a polymorphic, elusive but powerful reality. Its features 
suggest that it has a real potential for expansion, consolidation, and 
relevance in the contemporary world. As such, it may be emerging as one 
of the most important challenges to democratic market capitalism (be it 
in the neoliberal or social democratic form)” (Aligica & Tarko 2014, 
p173). 
Crony capitalism differs from normal interest group politics in that it is an economic system 
in which the profitability of business “depends on political connections” (Holcombe, 2013 
p.542), not on its own merits, nor its competence, nor its entrepreneurial ability, nor the 
competence of its work-force, nor its business acumen.  
“Firms increase their profits through government favors, and in exchange 
they support the politicians who provide the favors. That relationship is 
cronyism” (Holcombe, 2013 p.544) 
In this thesis the term crony capitalism means excessively close and inter-dependent 
relationships between business and politicians to the detriment of the community, the 
exclusion of minority ‘outsiders’ and harm to democracy. The term crony capitalism does not 
imply an exchange of money to politicians, such as overt bribery, more accurately designated 
as corruption. However, crony capitalism can lead to corruption, as the exchange of favors 
between business and government leaders’ borders on, or leads to the exchange of resources. 
The structure of the Tasmanian economy makes it vulnerable to both crony capitalism and 
institutional corruption (Petrow, 2006). 
As crony capitalism is a potential serious threat to ethical governance everywhere, it is 
important to devote some efforts to examine its existence, pervasiveness, social 
construction and the fact that it appears to be tolerated. It is also argued, 
 “….that nations decline when interest groups become well established in 
the political process so that firms gain more from their political 
connections than their economic productivity” (Holcombe, 2013, p 546) 
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United States legal expert Jonathan Macey is convinced that crony capitalism is rife in 
his country and he puts forward the notion that, “Crony capitalism has ebbed and 
flowed in our history, and it seems as though today it is on the rise” (Macey 2014). 
Even more disturbing is that according to Kurer (2001) and Hay (1976), corrupt 
politicians are often re-elected.  
The next subject to be considered is what exactly is evidence and how is it transferred to 
policy makers and implemented? In Chapter 6 the political barriers to evidence-based-
policy in tobacco control Tasmania are closely examined and analysed. The issues 
examined are: crony capitalism; corruption; cognitive dissonance of smoking politicians 
and the activities of various ministers and other politicians in relation to agenda setting; 
and the failure of crucial aspects of tobacco control to gain the attention of decision-
makers. Paradoxically, in some areas, Tasmania was a leader in legislative reforms and 
several politicians were at the forefront of these reforms. However, other politicians 
were “blockers” and prevented or delayed reforms from moving forward. The entire 
decade of the 1980s was marked by a complete lack of innovation in tobacco control in 
Tasmania, and this can be attributed to close relationships with the tobacco industry. 
The chequered history of tobacco taxation and business franchise fees is discussed in 
Chapter 6, with some extraordinary stories of events in the 1970s engineered by state 
politicians seeking revenue sources, but entirely disinterested in tobacco control or 
reducing smoking rates. Some politicians seemed to be unaware of the evidence around 
tobacco control, whilst others were well informed. Some were driven by libertarian 
ideology and concerned about over-regulation, with “nanny-state” perceptions and 
beliefs about an individual smoker’s “right to choose”, whilst others were motivated by 
a truly altruistic desire to improve the health of the population. The tobacco industry’s 
effective use of front organisations such as the Australian Hotels Association (AHA) 
and retailer organisations to lobby politicians is discussed, including some vitriolic 
exchanges that were recorded in the early 2000s. 
The concept of the “conservative white male” as a blocker for tobacco-control reform is 
outlined in the chapter about political barriers, and the development of the notion that 
women politicians are more successful reformers on tobacco control, as has been found 
elsewhere in Australia (Hooker & Chapman 2006), is explored.  
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The bureaucratic barriers to tobacco control are discussed in Chapter 7. This chapter 
contains the most discussion derived from a forensic examination of many hundreds of 
pages of documents provided by various government agencies, as well as analysis of 
other papers and reports. The chapter investigates and describes: the structural barriers 
and confusion about accountability; lack of skills and priorities within one of the key 
government service-delivery sections; the lack of evidence transfer to ministers and 
Parliament; irrational and prejudicial disbelief amongst senior decision-makers that 
mass-media campaigns would be effective, despite considerable evidence to that effect; 
complex delaying processes with excessive internal iterative “consultation”; “primacy 
of rescue” culture oriented towards immediate-lifesaving acute service delivery, rather 
than preventative programs; indifference and active obstruction from other government 
agencies and a “siloed” and isolated health department.  
A short Chapter 8 on the role of NGOs is included, as these organisations played an 
important role in tobacco-control reforms in Tasmania but were constrained by lack of 
resources, and in many cases dependency on government for funding. Despite these 
obstacles many NGOs have been active over the last two decades in moving the 
tobacco-control agenda forward. Perhaps if they had more tobacco-control expertise, 
funding, resources and staff, these organisations would have been able to overcome 
some of the resistance within the political and bureaucratic spheres to providing 
adequate funding to tobacco-control measures, in particular mass media and community 
education campaigns. The role of advocacy of NGOs in tobacco control nationally and 
especially in Tasmania has declined since 2014 with the abolition of the national 
organisation Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) and the merger of Quit with the 
Tasmanian Cancer Council. Tasmania has never had policy entrepreneurs operating in 
tobacco control of the calibre of Nigel Gray in Victoria, nor NGOs as well funded as the 
Cancer Councils and Heart Foundations in other states. Whilst there have been 
intermittent sporadic advocacy efforts by individual physicians and occasionally the 
Australian Medical Association (AMA), the culture of advocacy by local physicians is 
not on a par with Victoria and NSW, and one can only assume that this is a product of 
Tasmania’s small size, and the fact that local physicians are fully engaged in clinical 
work, including private practice, and have little free time to spend on advocacy.  
The final chapter sets out the conclusions to this study and sums up what was found in 
the process of looking at tobacco control, and barriers to reform in Tasmania. The role 
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of bureaucrats, politicians, the media, the tobacco industry and advocates and the 
influence of structures and the “windows of opportunity” that were opened and those 
that remained firmly shut, are discussed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 2   Policy Typology 
Introduction 
This chapter will primarily examine the literature relating to policy decisions, the use of 
research evidence, knowledge transfer, knowledge utilisation, the role of advocates or 
“policy entrepreneurs”, and the public policy-making process. The first area discussed is 
various aspects of policy typology, theory, knowledge transfer, access to evidence, how 
it occurs, and whether or not knowledge is used. Having access to evidence is not 
enough to ensure that it is utilized and adopted by policy-makers. The thesis considers 
the issues of policy failure, in particular failure of some evidence-based policies to gain 
traction on the political agenda, and nondecision-making. 
The theoretical framework adopted is that of Kingdon, in particular the role of agenda 
setting, and how issues attract the attention of policy-makers. The idea of “windows of 
opportunity” will be examined in this chapter and guided the collection of data for this 
thesis (Kingdon 1995).  
Secondly, the literature on policy entrepreneurs is considered, as these individuals may 
have an important role in tobacco control. Internationally and in Australia some key 
individuals have been influential in tobacco control and therefore the literature on such 
involvement is worthy of examination. 
Finally, the role and importance of structural arrangements and policy processes on 
tobacco control is considered, as the ways that government and relevant departments are 
organised can make a difference to how issues are dealt with. 
Tobacco control is recognised by the Australian government as a “wicked problem”, i.e. 
one that has complex issues, and is beyond the capacity of any individual organisation 
to resolve (APSC 2007b). There may be disagreement about the causes and solution to 
the problem. A wicked problem is not inherently ‘evil’ but more like ‘tricky’ (Gibson 
2003b). Whilst tobacco control is a wicked problem, there is actually evidence and 
agreement about what is effective in reducing smoking prevalence, which ought to 
make decision-making easier (WHO 2003). An unpublished Australian Government 
Report says:  
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“In reality, many policy problems lie somewhere on a continuum 
between tame and wicked. They may display some but not all of the 
characteristics of wicked problems. Some policy problems move along 
the continuum over time. Tobacco control is a good example. In 
Australia, there is broad agreement among all levels of government and 
NGOs on the scope of the problem of tobacco use and the shape of the 
comprehensive strategy that needs to be implemented to successfully 
control it” (APSC, 2007). 
This chapter considers advocacy coalition framework (ACF), which explains policy 
stability, and policy entrepreneurship (PE) model, which explains dynamic policy 
change (Mintrom & Vergari 1996).  
Policy typology  
Little attention has been given to a theoretical approach in tobacco control. Donley 
Studlar is one of the few who has addressed the issue, and he asserts that “…..tobacco 
control has never been categorized in a policy typology” (Studlar 2002, p.199). He also 
notes that, “Political science research in health policy more broadly has almost 
completely ignored tobacco” (Studlar 2002, p. 62) 
Despite an extensive literature on tobacco control, little attention has been paid to 
evaluating failures to implement policy. Most literature on tobacco-control policy in the 
USA, for example, explains the failure of governments to implement effective evidence-
based policy in terms of the influence of the tobacco industry (Dearlove & Glantz 2000; 
Givel 2006, 2006a & 2006b; Givel & Glantz 1999, 2001, 2004 & 2004-5; Glantz 1996).  
There are two separate bodies of literature on tobacco control science and public policy, 
which Larsen examines and compares (Larsen 2008). 
 “It is very obvious that the actual development of tobacco control has 
not followed automatically from scientific facts, a situation which makes 
it all the more difficult to understand why the literature has not 
conceptualized the intermediaries of this long process more thoroughly” 
(Larsen 2008, p. 760). 
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There is an obvious gap between the emergence and publication of scientific ‘facts” and 
their implementation through political processes, the “lag effect” referred to by Davies 
and Nutley (Davies & Nutley 1999; Lin 2003). Case studies that looked at policy 
transfer across countries have noted that geographical proximity, policy entrepreneurs 
and informal policy communities are important in facilitating and sponsoring or 
encouraging the transfer of science into policy (Mossberger & Wolman 2003).  
Cost benefits – and economic approaches  
The lack of political typology attention occurs despite the economics of tobacco control. 
It would seem obvious that the adverse economic effect of smoking would spur 
governments to implement effective tobacco-control measures. The costs of smoking in 
Australia far exceed the costs of other drugs such as alcohol and illicit drugs. Work by 
Australian health economists Collins and Lapsley (2008) has evaluated the costs to the 
community, and estimated that the social costs of tobacco use/abuse represent 56.2% of 
the proportion of all drugs, a total of just over $31 billion per annum. 
Table 1 Total social costs of drug abuse, 2004/05  
 Alcohol 
($m) 
Tobacco 
($m) 
Illicit 
drugs 
($m) 
Alcohol and 
illicits 
together 
($m) 
All 
drugs 
($m) 
All drugs 
adjusted 
for health 
interaction 
($m) 
Tangib
le 
10,829.5 12,026.2 6,915.4 1,057.8 30,828
.9 
30,48
9.8 
Intangible 4,488.7 19,459.7 1,274.5  25,222
.9 
24,68
3.0 
Total 15,318.2 31,485.9 8,189.8 1,057.8 56,05
1.8 
55,1
72.8 
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 Alcohol 
($m) 
Tobacco 
($m) 
Illicit 
drugs 
($m) 
Alcohol and 
illicits 
together 
($m) 
All 
drugs 
($m) 
All drugs 
adjusted 
for health 
interaction 
($m) 
Proportion 
of 
unadjusted 
total 
 
 
27.3% 
 
 
56.2
% 
 
 
14.6% 
 
 
1.9% 
 
 
100.0
% 
 
Source: Collins and Lapsley 2008, p 65. 
Societal costs of smoking include not only health and productivity costs, but also the 
serious impact of involuntary or passive smoking on children. For children under 15 in 
2004/05, involuntary smoking accounted for 25 per cent of deaths, 96 per cent of 
hospital bed-days and 91 per cent of hospital costs (Collins & Lapsley 2008, p.54). 
The effective measures needed by governments and communities to reduce smoking 
rates through tobacco control are not mysterious or even especially difficult, and can be 
implemented with some confidence based on well-researched evidence. Economic 
evaluations of tobacco control have demonstrated a range of interventions that are 
effective in reducing smoking rates, including mass media: raising taxes (not an option 
open to the Australian states); bans on advertising and the promotion of tobacco; 
publishing and disseminating research results on the adverse health effects of tobacco; 
and improving cessation-support programs (Chaloupka et al. 2005; Dilley et al. 2007; 
Grosse, Teutsch & Haddix 2007; Jha et al. 2006; Murphy-Hoefer, Hyland & Higbee 
2008; Stephen 2003). 
Given the benefits, why have even greater political moves towards tobacco 
control not eventuated? 
The Tasmanian government has recognised that smoking rates in Tasmania are not 
declining in line with other Australian states, and one government Health Minister 
expressed some frustration at the lack of progress. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 32 
 
 “In many respects we are at our wits' end as to how you [can]. We have 
been putting more funding into this area but we have not seen the 
decrease” (Hansard 2009).  
Whilst the government expresses concern about smoking rates in Tasmania, 
nevertheless all the effective, evidence-based measures to control tobacco have not been 
put in place. 
Evidence, knowledge transfer and knowledge utilisation  
A central theme of this thesis is that evidence or knowledge transfer has not occurred, 
and that the evidence has been at least partly ignored or rejected in Tasmania. Research 
knowledge or information is evidence. Defining any barriers to evidence acceptance and 
then transfer is essential to the understanding of why evidence about effective tobacco-
control initiatives has not been adopted and implemented.  
There may be a different focus of researchers and policy-makers, and positive efforts 
are needed to effect action. Lin says:  
“Researchers are often interested in cause and effect, while policy-
makers may be more focused on means and ends. While research results 
may help raise awareness and understanding of issues, they may be met 
with denial and indifference as well as with concern by policy-makers. 
Where concern is raised, action may or may not be taken. More active 
approaches are required for research to be translated into policy action” 
(Lin 2003). 
The role of politics in implementing policies on tobacco control is important as 
scientists cannot effect the change on their own. Thus, key mechanisms for policy 
action lie within the realm and control of politicians. Unless politicians are prepared to 
act, smoking rates will continue to rise. Oliver explains that politics is essential to the 
process: 
“Science can identify solutions to pressing public health problems, but 
only politics can turn most of those solutions into reality” (Oliver 2006, 
p. 195).  
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There is a fundamental value judgment aligned with this theme: that it is better for 
governments to adopt evidence-based policies in public health. Whilst this may seem an 
obvious statement to those operating from a scientific, rational perspective, to those 
with a political science perspective it is a more problematic question. Fafard suggests 
that political science offers explanations that help us understand the paradoxes of the 
gaps between evidence and policy (Fafard 2015). 
Not only should policy be based on sound evidence and lead to more effective 
outcomes, it should also avoid unintended or adverse outcomes (Lewig, Arney & Scott 
2006). But there have been cautionary notes sounded about the use of evidence-based 
policy in funding medicine, suggesting that there can be attempted power plays by 
epidemiologists and managerialists to control public policy and funding arrangements, 
thus enabling greater control of medical professionals (Willis & White 2003). Others 
have suggested that the evidence-based movement is an example of “microfascism” 
(Holmes 2006). 
Nevertheless, this thesis is informed by the value perspective that application of 
evidence will lead to reductions in smoking prevalence and the belief that sound 
evidence should be the primary motivator of a decision-maker expending public funds 
on tobacco control.  
Policy-making is bound up with values and pressures on those in decision-making 
positions, as well as the ideas in the community, commercial pressures and interests, 
and other external demands. The question of what is “evidence” is different for policy-
makers and researchers. The importance of evidence in health care generally has risen 
as a dominant paradigm over the last 50 years (Davies & Nutley 1999). Knowledge 
transfer is the process by which information, evidence or knowledge travels from a 
researcher to use by a health professional or policy-maker. This thesis considers the 
utilisation of evidence on populations, not individuals.  
There are a number of terms used to describe the transfer of knowledge, including 
knowledge utilisation, knowledge diffusion, evidence transfer and research utilisation, 
and the boundaries of these concepts are unclear (Graham et al. 2006; Thompson, 
Estabrooks & Degner 2006). These concepts are based on the idea that personal contact 
facilitates information exchange and knowledge transfer (Thompson, Estabrooks & 
Degner 2006).  
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Some writers have suggested that research utilisation is too narrow a term confined to 
science, whereas knowledge utilisation is a wider concept and includes other sources of 
data and information Dobrow, Goel & Upshur 2004. This thesis looks at and explores 
differences in ways that evidence is used in the process of policy-making. The 
“evidence” that is used by politicians may be entirely different to the scientific evidence 
used by researchers. It may be that the quality of that evidence, its sources and the 
subjective weight put on it by policy-makers are the key to decisions to take action on 
tobacco control.  
The use of research is highly dependent on the user’s effectiveness in finding 
information, researchers’ ability to adapt their research to a form that is useful to the end 
user, and the personal contact and relationship between the researcher and the end user 
(Landry, Lamari & Amara 2003; Landry et al. 2006).  
The role of a knowledge broker may be important in ensuring that knowledge is 
“translated” into a usable form for consumers – in this case, policy-makers. If it is true 
that knowledge utilisation is to a certain extent dependent on its clear understanding by 
users, then the need for simplification is crucial (Dobbins, DeCorby & Twiddy 2004; 
WHO 2004; Lin, Smith & Fawkes 2007; Oh 1996).  
In recommending systematic reviews as a way of overcoming some of these knowledge 
utilisation problems Dobbins et al. say: 
“The most significant barriers to incorporating research evidence into 
public health decision-making include limited time, expertise, and 
resources to identify, retrieve, read, synthesize and translate the best 
available evidence into practice” (Dobbins, DeCorby & Twiddy 2004, 
p.121). 
Significant barriers within public sector policy-making might mean that there are 
insufficient people with the right skills, or it could be lack of time allocated to the issue, 
as well as the priority placed on it by management in the allocation of policy-making 
resources. The accessibility of evidence to policy-makers and bureaucrats is clearly 
important in whether or not evidence is recognised and utilized. How has research in 
Australia about effective tobacco-control policies and programs, been disseminated and 
to whom? A comprehensive study to try and provide some answers to this question was 
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conducted by Cherney (2015) and found that in Australia accessibility of academic 
research is dependent on a number of factors, including: the culture of the organisation 
and whether research is valued; the ease of access “and the level of association with the 
agency, entity or individual from whom information is accessible matters a great deal”; 
and the existence of a knowledge infrastructure within the agency (Cherney 2015, 
p.176). Clearly organisational culture is a vital ingredient. 
In addition to these organisational barriers, local level policy-making in tobacco control 
can be influenced by political polarizing and local political orientation. Whether or not 
policy-makers are smokers can have an important adverse impact on tobacco-control 
policy-making (Satterlund et al. 2010).  
Evidence-based public health 
Utilisation of evidence is important in public health – however, it is not as simple as it 
seems, as there are often complex social and behavioural dimensions that do not lend 
themselves easily to more traditional quantitative scientific measures such as clinical 
trials. Some important writers such as McDonald prefer to use the term “evidence-
informed” rather than evidence-based (McDonald et al. 2009).  
Kohatsu et al. proposed a new definition of evidence-based public health (EBPH) as 
 “… the process of integrating science-based interventions with 
community preferences to improve the health of populations” 
(Kohatsu, Robinson & Torner 2004, p.417).  
The Kohatsu model integrates the role of the community and politicians into the 
process. 
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 Table 2 Comparisons of EBPH  
Definition 1 
Jenicek (1997) 
Definition 2 
Brownson (1999,2003) 
Definition 3 
(Kohatsu, Robinson & 
Torner 2004) 
EBPH is the 
conscientious, explicit, 
and judicious use of 
current best evidence 
in making decisions 
about the care of 
communities and 
populations in the 
domain of health 
protection, disease 
prevention, health 
maintenance and 
improvement (health 
promotion) 
EBPH is the 
development, 
implementation, and 
evaluation of effective 
programs and policies 
in public health 
through application of 
principles of scientific 
reasoning, including 
systematic uses of data 
and information 
systems and 
appropriate use of 
program planning 
models. 
EBPH is the process of 
integrating science-
based interventions 
with community 
preferences to improve 
the health of 
populations. 
Source: Kohatsu, Robinson & Torner 2004, p418-419 
 
The Kohatsu et al definition of evidence-based public health is also useful in thinking 
about tobacco control. Kohatsu et al. said “Decisions and policies in public health are 
frequently driven by crises, political concerns, and public opinion” (Kohatsu et al. 2004, 
p. 417). Kohatsu et al. also recognised the importance of sciences other than 
epidemiology, to the development of evidence-based public health, and they included 
“political science” as one of those sciences (Kohatsu et al. 2004).  
The integration of evidence-based clinical and community strategies to improve health 
was examined by Ockene et al. 2007. Tobacco provides an example of where both 
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clinical and community strategies have strong evidentiary support. The Massachusetts 
tobacco control program (MTCP) 1993-2002 provided an example of best practice in 
tobacco control (Ockene et al. 2007).  
The MTCP included  
“(1) an innovative media campaign to change public opinion and 
community norms around tobacco use, (2) community mobilization to 
change local laws and health regulations and (3) comprehensive tobacco 
treatment programs based in clinics and community settings modelled 
after CDC and PHS guidelines to reduce tobacco use” (Ockene et al. 
2007). 
Evidence-based public health policy can be influenced by health impact assessments, 
systematic reviews or a portfolio of tools to improve community “fit” and feasibility. 
For example, systematic reviews in the US showed that providing effective cessation 
therapies improved smoking quit rates, and this strategy was recommended by a 
government task force (Fielding & Briss 2006).  
Political ideology 
Research evidence does not necessarily “speak for itself” and the deliberations that lead 
to public policy are especially political and relate to values and ideology (Lawrence 
2002, p. iv). The political ideologies of governing parties in OECD countries affect 
some indicators of population health. It has been found that political parties with 
egalitarian ideologies tend to implement redistributive policies, and that this has a 
marked influence on health indicators (Navarro et al. 2006). The role of politics in 
public health in the USA has historically been so important that widespread effective 
public health programs have been curtailed because of the prevailing political values, 
particularly as public health has been seen in conservative quarters in the USA as 
“socialistic” and even part of a communist conspiracy (Fee & Brown 2002). Ballard 
explored the differences between political ideologies on tobacco in Victoria and NSW 
(Ballard 2004), and it would be useful to look at this issue in Tasmania. Ballard found 
that NSW had a more libertarian culture, whereas Victoria had a progressive social and 
political establishment, in which physicians are prominent in public health advocacy. 
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McGinnis identifies that the bar is higher for prevention (than treatment). 
Evidence does not necessarily lead to action. In the case of smoking-cessation aids, a 
large minority of smokers do not receive any support (McGinnis 2001).  
 “Despite the fact that prevention was the major contributor to the health gains of the 
last century, with only 5 of the century’s 30 added years of life expectancy attributable 
to advances in clinical medicine, most studies of health expenditures indicate that less 
than 5% are devoted to prevention” (McGinnis 2001, p. 392).  
First, there is the invisibility of results with prevention, what McGinnis called “stealth 
results”. For example, many people are alive because of various public health measures, 
such as reduction in heart attacks dues to management of blood pressure, yet the public 
is mesmerized by such interventions as heart transplants, which have high-cost, long-
term high failure rates. 
Second, the “primacy of the rescue” focuses our attention on rescuing victims in crisis. 
Attention is given to rescuing someone from a diabetic coma, yet little attention is given 
to the obligation to promote dietary and physical activity programs that would reduce 
diabetes and coma. This particular focus is discussed in later chapters in more detail, 
and in an article on bureaucratic barriers to tobacco control (Barnsley, Walters & Wood-
Baker 2015).  
Third, our “blunted time horizons” mean that we are impatient and cannot wait for the 
years of effort to produce beneficial results. The benefits of dietary change or quitting 
smoking may not be observable for some months or years. Short time horizons are 
compounded by the “tyranny of electoral cycles” (Van Der Weyden 2008), which are 
notoriously short for outcomes of public policy-making and planning purposes.  
Fourth, the expenditure immediately on preventative measures is visible and imminent, 
whereas the results are not, so the perceived “opportunity costs” are visible from the 
outset. Future benefits may accrue to others, and existing ministers gain no credit from 
actions or expenditure with long-term health benefits.  
Fifth, there are “double standards” applied to life-saving treatments for individuals 
versus preventative measures.  
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“Application of a life-saving cardiac pacemaker for a heart attack victim 
coming through the emergency room doors with a serious arrhythmia 
may need to meet the test of safety and effectiveness, but not cost-
effectiveness. On the other hand, a smoker coming in for a routine 
checkup may well be greeted with a blind eye and a deaf ear when it 
comes to assistance. The fact that smoking cessation programs may have 
effectiveness rates of greater efficacy that treatment rates for many 
chronic relapsing conditions is often disregarded unless some economic 
advantage is also manifest for the providing institutions. Prevailing 
standards put this potentially life-saving service in the discretionary 
column” (McGinnis 2001 p. 393).  
Sixth, the complexity of diseases targeted by prevention measures means multiple 
causes of disease must be targeted, and in the “fog of complexity” (McGinnis 2001, p. 
393) it is easier to focus on a single disease, its treatment and outcome.  
Seventh, there are multiple loci of control in prevention issues. For example in 
preventing road trauma, many institutions and individuals are involved, such as road 
safety experts, traffic engineers, law enforcement agencies, schools, car manufacturers, 
community organisations, the media, health-care providers and insurance companies. It 
is difficult for any particular politician at a particular time to claim credit. However, for 
the individual traffic accident victim, there is a potential immediate high-profile 
therapeutic gain. 
Eighth, there can be multiple funding streams. In Australia the mix of federal and state 
funding is complex, and not easily accessed by those promoting preventative activities. 
Furthermore, national political changes in recent years have initially emphasised and 
then downplayed prevention efforts. This is discussed in later chapters, as it is 
particularly relevant to states such as Tasmania. A good example at a national level was 
the high-profile National Health Promotion Commission set up by the Rudd 
Government, which was recently scrapped by the Abbott Government. 
Ninth, there is a “paradox of self-responsibility” in health promotion and prevention. 
Smokers individually can quit and improve their health and are blamed if they don’t or 
cannot. However, their individual circumstances may conspire to work against such 
efforts to quit. They may live in a household with many other smokers, may be 
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homeless or suffering a mental disorder, have other risk factors or illnesses and the 
attention given to quitting smoking is far from their minds, as the problems caused by 
smoking are more distant that their day to day anxieties and immediate problems. The 
issue of the social determinants of health is recognised in Tasmania (Taylor 2013), yet 
the tendency of policy slippage towards individual responsibility, and what has been 
labelled “lifestyle drift” (Glasgow & Schrecker 2015) is related to this paradox, or as 
Popay, Whitehead and Hunter describe it, 
“‘lifestyle drift’—the tendency for policy to start off recognizing the 
need for action on upstream social determinants of health inequalities 
only to drift downstream to focus largely on individual lifestyle factors” 
(Popay, Whitehead & Hunter 2010, p. 148).  
This “lifestyle drift” can be seen in some Tasmanian Department of Health and Human 
Services population health documents where there is sometimes no mention of 
corporate regulation or responsibility and all the emphasis is on encouraging healthy 
individual behaviour and healthy lifestyles, for example Taylor and Frendin (2010).  
Tenth, the emphasis on a “technophilic culture” means that society is more interested in 
gadgets and innovations that can be applied to such individuals, rather than those 
interventions that concentrate on broad populations groups. The humorous example of 
this is the “machines that go ping” popularized in a comedy program, Monty Python, 
where machines are revered ahead of patients. Politicians, clinicians and hospital 
managers can be dazzled by new technology, and ignore individual patients as well as 
population needs (Lothian & Grauer 2003).  
Eleventh, the counterveiling economic interests working against population health 
measures are a key problem in prevention in general and tobacco control in particular. 
The tobacco industry has been identified many times as a key barrier to focusing 
attention on tobacco control, and the World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (WHO 2003) devotes an entire section to it. In 
politics, most decision-making for prevention lies outside medical care and is 
determined by politicians (McGinnis 2001).  
All of these points outlined by McGinnis are significant, and might help to explain the 
problem of barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania. 
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Forms of evidence 
Another issue is the type of evidence that is available and that will be seriously 
considered by policy-makers. The idea of “colloquial evidence” is quite a foreign 
concept to most scientists undertaking research in tobacco control. Individuals 
expressing ideas/experiences and anecdotal story telling becomes a form of evidence. It 
has been argued that it is reasonable and proper to consider this type of evidence in 
“political” decision-making processes. Lomas et al. suggest that there are 
 “… three forms of evidence: 
 Medically oriented effectiveness research (context-free scientific 
evidence); 
 Social science-oriented research (context-sensitive scientific 
evidence): and 
 The expertise, views, and realities of stakeholders (colloquial 
evidence). 
We argue that each form of evidence has a role to play in producing 
context-sensitive, evidence-based guidance for the health system” ( 
Lomas et al. 2005, NP).  
Another way of looking at evidence transfer is the “diffusion model” of uptake of 
evidence, or “diffusion of innovations” (Nutley & Davies 2000, p. 35), which identifies 
health advocates as critical to the success of initiatives across jurisdictions. This is 
consistent with consideration of policy entrepreneurs as important to the process 
(Shipan & Volden 2004).  
However, the classical diffusion model is a centralized one, where innovation flows 
down the system in a relatively hierarchical way. It can range on a continuum from 
centralized to decentralized and will be influenced by personal characteristics (such as 
innovators, early adaptors and laggards), social networking of the adopters, innovation 
attributes (such as adaptability, compatibility, complexity) and the leadership 
characteristics of those who are promoting an innovation. This particular model does 
not appear to be useful in identifying barriers or blockers. It seems more of a linear 
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approach, and is essentially rationalist. This may not be particularly helpful in the 
Tasmanian context (Nutley & Davies 2000). 
What variables do policy-makers consider? 
Researchers and clinicians often focus on the effectiveness of a particular measure to 
inform the debate on health policy. However, policy-makers will take into account other 
variables, such as “…cost effectiveness, feasibility to implement, cultural 
appropriateness and effects on health inequalities” (WHO 2004, p. 113).  
Other influences on tobacco control are policy copying, policy learning, policy 
emulation, policy convergence, policy transfer, policy borrowing and lesson drawing 
(Studlar 2006, 2007). These terms can be applied to the transfer of policy from one 
country to another, or across jurisdictions within a country. Globalisation has been 
important in transferring ideas, policies and programs, thus facilitating some measure of 
policy convergence in tobacco control (Studlar 2006).  
In community health decision-making, decision-makers need access to appropriate 
information as policy-makers may be physically and intellectually far removed from 
research settings. An important writer on knowledge transfer, Maureen Dobbins, says 
that 
“…consistent barriers to knowledge transfer in all settings are: 
 Lack of access to current research literature, 
 Limited critical appraisal skills, 
 Excessive literature to review 
 Work environments that do not support research transfer and 
uptake, 
 Lack of decision-making authority to implement research results, 
 Organisational decision-making processes that are not conducive 
to research transfer and uptake, 
 Resistance to change, and 
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Limited resources for implementation”  
(Dobbins et al. 2007 p. 2). 
Policy-makers will be looking for broader population health gains, but will also be 
strongly influenced by policy copying (Sheldon, Guyatt & Haines 1998) especially from 
influential jurisdictions. 
How is this evidence brought to bear on policy decisions? 
A study conducted in a clinical setting in Wales showed that whilst there is often good 
will towards using the best evidence available, and to transfer that knowledge, there 
continues to be, in some circumstances, excessive caution about implementing them in 
practice. Fears about bureaucracy, and time and money to learn new skills act as barriers 
to implementation (Surender et al. 2002).  
It has been argued in Australia by Brian Head that there are three lenses of evidence-
based public policy: political knowledge, scientific knowledge and practical 
implementation knowledge (Head 2008). Political knowledge includes the know-how of 
political actors: tactics, strategies, agenda setting, advocacy, political spin, building 
support, and negotiating trade-offs. Scientific knowledge is the systematic analysis of 
data. Practical implementation knowledge is that gained from the day to day 
experiences of those in the communities of practice. 
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Chart 1 The three lenses of evidence-based public policy in Australia 
 
Source: Head 2008, p 6. 
Sometimes scientific evidence is ignored because of the way the government has chosen 
other priorities or values. Head explains, 
 “….some policy positions are ‘data-proof’ or ‘evidence-proof’, in the 
sense that their evidence ‘base’ has been narrowed and buttressed by 
political commitments, perhaps closely linked to the values and 
ideological positions of political leaders or parties. Some policy 
preferences allow only certain kinds of ‘evidence’ to be noticed.” (Head 
2008, p5).  
The presentation of clear concise executive summaries is important to public health 
decision-makers, who have little time to read original research. In fact decision-makers 
rarely read scientific journals (Rich & Oh 2000; WHO 2004).  
“In this national study, public health decision-makers indicated that what 
they needed most from public health researchers were two-page 
executive summaries that clearly communicated the issue from a local 
context, highlighted available evidence, and identified specific practice 
and policy implications for each evidence point” (Dobbins et al. 2007, 
p10). 
Political 
Judgement
Professional 
Practice
Scientific 
Research
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 Even then, its use is influenced by policy-makers who occupy different cultures and 
have different world views and priorities from researchers (Lin 2003). Furthermore, 
individual attitudes, defensiveness and negativity are “as common as cooperation” 
(Head 2008, p.9).  
Reasons outlined by Black and Donald as to why research evidence may not be utilized, 
and why it may have “little influence on service policies” include: 
 Policy-makers have goals other than clinical effectiveness (social, 
financial, strategic development of service, terms and conditions of 
employees, electoral); 
 Research evidence is dismissed as irrelevant (emanates from different 
sector or specialty, practice depends on tacit knowledge, not applicable 
locally); 
 Lack of consensus about research evidence (complexity of evidence, 
scientific controversy, different interpretations); 
 Other types of competing evidence (personal experience, local 
information, eminent colleagues’ contradictory opinions, medicolegal 
reports); 
 Social/political environment not conducive to policy change; and  
 Poor quality of “purveyors” (Black & Donald 2001, p. 276).  
Overlying all of these issues 
 “ ….some policy positions are ‘data-proof’ or ‘evidence-proof’, in the 
sense that their evidence ‘base’ has been narrowed and buttressed by 
political commitments, perhaps closely linked to the values and 
ideological positions of political parties or leaders” (Head 2008, p 5).  
If this is true, then it would not matter what the scientific evidence base is, politicians 
are not going to listen to the arguments or proposals couched in terms of the evidence if 
there are strongly conflicting values, and especially if the field is contentious. Head 
(2008) gives the example of climate change in relation to this notion. Marshall puts 
forward a similar view in relation to the way many of us ignore climate change 
(Marshall 2014).  
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Acknowledging the importance of knowledge transfer, the WHO initiative of its 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) has a strong emphasis on 
information sharing and exchange. Article 20 sets out the undertakings of Parties 
(mostly governments) to  
“….develop and promote national research and to coordinate research 
programmes at the regional and international levels in the field of 
tobacco control” (WHO 2003). 
Temporal effects 
A further complication of the transfer of scientific knowledge is the impact of time. 
Evidence-based practice may have a delay of up to ten years before it comes into 
common usage, even when the evidence is absolutely clear (Davies & Nutley 1999).  
Perhaps the best example of this comes from the 200 years from the time James 
Lancaster observed that lemon juice prevented scurvy, and when the British Navy made 
citrus fruits available on its ships. In the meantime, two million sailors died of scurvy 
(WHO 2004).  
A lag effect is seen in evidence-based population health initiatives such as tobacco 
control, as in clinical interventions. The evidence about tobacco-related harm was 
published by Sir Richard Doll and others in the 1950s, but it was not until the 1970s and 
1980s that serious tobacco-control action was taken in Australia (Lin 2003).  
Good-quality versus poor-quality studies 
A further difficulty for public health decision-makers is sorting out the high-quality 
studies from those of poor quality, or even elucidating what the results mean in terms of 
practical applications (Fahey, Griffiths & Peters 1995). It is not enough to have access 
to evidence, if the decision-makers are unable to distinguish between those studies that 
are of high quality and really mean something, versus those that are poorly designed or 
have other methodological faults. The implications are that sound evidence will not 
always be followed, and decision-makers may be side-tracked or confused by poor-
quality research work. If the decision-makers do not even read journals, then the 
problem is compounded. 
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These issues were reflected in clinical practice. By the 1980s it was estimated that “only 
about 15% of medical practice was based on sound scientific evidence”. However, there 
is now keenness to absorb science and research into clinical practice and to follow what 
has become known as evidence-based practice (Greenhalgh 1996, p. 957).  
Determinants of knowledge utilisation 
While some writers have asserted that health policy is more ideologically than evidence-
based driven, others say this assertion does not seem to have been tested (Ham, Hunter 
& Robinson 1995).  
Attempts to analyse the determinants of knowledge utilisation use the following model, 
adapted from Belkhodja et al. (2007):  
Table 3 Determinants of Knowledge Utilisation 
The Determinants of Knowledge Utilisation  
Model Key 
attributes 
Criticisms Utilisation 
Determinants 
Past 
studies 
Science 
push 
model 
Researchers 
are the source 
of ideas. 
Users are the 
receptacles of 
research. 
Linear 
sequence from 
supply to 
utilisation. 
Transfer 
of 
knowledge 
not 
automatic. 
No-one 
responsible for 
transfer. 
Raw 
research 
not usable. 
Content attributes 
efficiency, compatibility, 
complexity, observability, 
trialabilty, validity, 
reliability, divisibility, 
applicability and 
radicalness. 
Types of research include 
basic/applied, 
general/abstract, 
quantitative/qualitative, 
particular/concrete, 
research domains and 
disciplines. 
No relation between 
technical quality of 
Edwards, 
Lomas, 
Dearing and 
Meyer, 
Machlup, 
Huberman and 
Thurler, Rich, 
Oh, Dunn, 
Huberman, 
Lomas, 
Landry. 
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The Determinants of Knowledge Utilisation  
Model Key 
attributes 
Criticisms Utilisation 
Determinants 
Past 
studies 
research results and 
utilisation. 
 
Demand 
Pull 
model 
Users are the 
major source 
of ideas for 
directing 
research. 
Linear sequence 
starts with the 
identification of the 
research problems by 
users. 
Focus on the 
instrumental use 
of research. 
Too much 
stress on 
users’ 
interests. 
Omits the 
interaction 
between 
producers 
and users. 
Organisational 
structures, rules and 
norms. 
Yin and 
Moore, 
Rich and 
Oh, 
Landry. 
Dissemination 
model  
Dissemination 
mechanisms 
used to 
identify useful 
knowledge 
and transfer it 
to potential 
users. 
Potential users 
are neither 
involved in the 
selection of the 
transferable 
information, nor 
in the 
production of 
the research 
results. 
Types of research 
results and the 
dissemination effort. 
Maclean, Oh 
and Rich, 
Lomas, 
Huberman, 
Leung, 
Landry. 
Interacti
on 
model 
Interaction 
and 
relationships 
Can lead to a 
selective use of 
research. Can be 
Explanatory factors 
identified in the prior 
models. 
Dunn, 
Yin and 
Moore, 
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The Determinants of Knowledge Utilisation  
Model Key 
attributes 
Criticisms Utilisation 
Determinants 
Past 
studies 
existing 
between 
researchers 
and users at 
different 
stages of 
knowledge 
production, 
dissemination 
and 
utilisation. 
difficult to 
establish due to 
time and 
turnover issues. 
Overcomes the 
criticism of 
previous 
models.  
Four categories of 
actors are: 
Types of research 
and scientific 
disciplines, needs 
and organisational 
interests of users, 
dissemination, and 
linkage mechanisms. 
Huberma
n and 
Thurler, 
Nyden 
and 
Wiewell, 
Oh. 
Landry 
Adapted from page 382 Belkhodja et al. (2007) 
This interactive model is useful in unravelling knowledge utilisation and has been part 
of the well-constructed Canadian attempts to deal with research and policy gaps. 
Health researchers are urged to involve decision and policy-makers in the process of 
developing and implementing programs, and to pay attention to context and external 
validity. By external validity, Glasgow et al. mean moderating factors that potentially 
limit the robustness of interventions in particular circumstances (Glasgow, Lichtenstein 
& Marcus 2003). For example, the social factors that influence behaviour and behaviour 
change such as ethnicity and social status can influence the outcomes. Local decision-
makers need to feel that a study will have local relevance, and yield results that will fit 
their situation, while policy-makers at a more macro level will be looking at wider 
applicability of the evidence (Glasgow & Emmons 2007).  
Research evidence has to compete with a range of other “evidence” to gain the attention 
of policy-makers. There are also “individual, organisational, institutional, political, 
economic and ideological factors”, which influence the policy process (Lewig, Arney & 
Scott 2006, p. 18). But first, policy makers have to be able to access the evidence to use 
it and this is not easy when so many journals charge fees to access an article, which may 
turn out not to be relevant to a time-poor and budget-conscious public servant. 
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Accessibility of scientific evidence and journals to policy-makers 
An Australian study by Cherney et al. (2015) found that whilst it was important for 
researchers to make their key messages available, nevertheless it is also important that 
the information be physically and cognitively accessible. They concluded that, “If 
academics are interested in ensuring their research has an influence, they need to build 
close relationships with public officials” (Cherney et al. 2015, p. 183). This has been 
emphasised many times in the literature, but it seems a somewhat “big-city centric” 
interpretation in that outlying states and territories such as Tasmania and the Northern 
Territory, which have the highest smoking rates and small bureaucracies, are unlikely to 
be closely engaged with key researchers on issues affecting policy-making. 
Researchers are urged to ensure that; 
“….the research they produce is accessible, in the sense that it can be 
comprehended by public officials, is transferable, and also searchable and 
accessible through open access repositories and via web-based search 
engines” (Cherney et al. 2015, p. 184).  
The accessibility of research and evidence through open-access repositories and via 
web-based search engines is especially crucial for low-income jurisdictions, with poor 
bureaucratic policy infrastructure, such as Tasmania, and would be even more important 
in Oceania, many other developing countries and small states and provinces throughout 
the world. In 2004 Africa only had 1% of global internet access, most of which was in 
South Africa (WHO 2004).  
The research-policy divide 
In Canada there has been much interest and research into knowledge and evidence 
transfer, into collaboration between research and practice, including the role of NGO 
activists, advocates and policy entrepreneurs (Anderson 2000; Denis et al. 2003; 
Dobbins, DeCorby & Twiddy 2004; Dobrow et al. 2006; Lavis 1999; Lavis et al. 2000; 
Lavis, Robertson et al. 2003; Lavis, Ross et al. 2003; Lavis et al. 2004; Lavis et al. 
2006; Lomas 2000b; McDonald & Viehbeck 2007; Nathanson 2005; Ouimet et al. 
2007; Pralle 2003; Richard et al. 2004; Simpson & Lee 2003; Studlar 1999, 2002; 
Thompson, Estabrooks & Degner 2006).  
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 51 
 
The Canadian literature tends to focus on the ‘two communities’ concept, that 
researchers and policy-makers occupy essentially different environments, and that a 
major barrier to knowledge transfer is communication between the two. However, 
Australian health policy writer Gibson says that the ‘two communities’ notion is 
inadequate to explain knowledge/research transfer, and that the situation is even more 
complex. Gibson believes public health policy in Australia has three theoretical lenses, 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), the Policy-making Organisation Framework 
(PMOF) and the Governmentality Framework (GF) (Gibson 2003c). In a book chapter 
on a similar theme Gibson (2003a) explains that the ‘two communities’ model has 
descriptive but not explanatory power. Similarly, one of the key writers on knowledge 
transfer, John N Lavis, observed that: 
“Rarely do processes exist that can get optimally packaged high-quality 
and high-relevance research evidence into the hands of public policy-
makers when they most need it, which is often in hours and days, not 
months and years” (Lavis et al. 2006, p. 37).  
But Canadian researchers have suggested that knowledge brokers or translational 
scientists can help bridge these gaps. Whilst scientists are concerned about evidence 
from studies, policy-makers will also look at:  
“… poll results, opinion surveys, focus groups in marginal electorates, 
anecdotes and real life stories” (Choi et al. 2005, p. 633).  
Furthermore, sometimes a tension and lack of respect between these two communities 
exists, resulting in mutual blame allocation. Policy-makers accuse researchers of 
producing irrelevant or overly complex products, lacking patience with legislative 
processes, while researchers worry about political expediency, “irrational outcomes”, 
and what they see as uninformed political hacks, incapable of comprehending technical 
issues (Coburn 1998; Lomas 2000a, 2000b). The differing world views of these two 
communities may be due to the cultures in which they operate (Lin 2003). Choi et al. 
argue for greater cooperation between scientists and policy-makers and suggest that 
organisations might need a “Chief Knowledge Officer”, as well as chief administrative 
officer or chief executive officer to act as a go-between for the two communities (Choi 
et al. 2005, p. 635).  
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The context of decision-making 
In addition to the presence or absence of evidence, it has been suggested that the context 
of the decision-making process is important and itself may lead to different outcomes. 
This has been noted in cancer-screening programs across different countries where the 
same evidence resulted in different policy approaches. A study by Dobrow et al. in 
Canada looked at the development of policy recommendations for breast, cervical, 
colorectal and cancer prostate screening in Ontario. They found that the: 
“… [the] central challenge for evidence-based policy is not to develop 
international evidence, but rather to develop more systematic, rigorous, 
and global methods for identifying, interpreting and applying evidence in 
different decision-making contexts …. The application of evidence must 
also acknowledge different policy objectives, appropriately employing 
rule-based grading schemes and agreement-based consensus methods that 
are sensitive to the nature of the evidence and contexts involved” 
(Dobrow et al. 2006, p. 1811).  
Dobrow’s solution was to suggest the application of more rigorous technical approaches 
to decision-making. Whilst this may be a useful tool for sound evidence-based policy-
making, it seems unlikely that this could overcome the political, financial and other 
pressures and contexts in which governments and bureaucrats make decisions, as 
discussed above.  
Similarly, in Europe, an examination of the use of health technology assessment (HTA) 
and health policies in eight countries in relation to screening for breast cancer, prostate 
cancer and routine use of ultrasound in pregnancy, found that; 
“In fact, policy is often made with little or no reference to assessment and 
to a scientific analysis of benefits, risks and costs … 
“As illustrated by the cases of ultrasound screening in pregnancy and 
PSA screening, the public seeks technologies that are not proven to be of 
benefit” (Banta, Oortwijn & Cranovsky 2001, p. 416).  
Decision-making in health policy is not a linear rational process, because people who 
make the decisions are also influenced by subjective processes and public demand. 
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Thus, other factors such as “groupthink”, individual biases, personal experience, 
positive or negative attitudes to risk-taking and heuristics can all influence public health 
policy-making (McCaughey & Bruning 2010). McCaughey and Bruning explain 
‘heuristics’ thus,  
“Heuristics are cognitive processes where full information processing 
requirements are bypassed and mental shortcutting occurs. Heuristics are 
mental 'rules of thumb' that make decisions easier by reducing the 
complexity of information processing. They operate through the use of 
categorization to interpret information. New information is categorized 
based on familiar knowledge drawn from memory bins and results in 
more automatic processing than would normally be required” 
(McCaughey & Bruning 2010 p. 8).  
The Banta et al. study recommended a more rational objective approach to decision-
making ensuring public access to high-quality information, to ensure the general public 
does not continue to seek technologies that are not beneficial (Banta, Oortwijn & 
Cranovsky 2001).  
But clear evidence of a failure to use evidence includes the Ottawa Charter (WHO 
1986), which is familiar to anyone working in the field of health promotion, but is rarely 
cited, often unknown, and sometimes “derided” by those in positions of power to make 
decisions about public funding of prevention activities and programs. The Ottawa 
Charter is designed to provide health for all and to promote social justice. Even the 
National Tobacco Strategy does not mention it (Lin & Fawkes 2007).  
In Australia, health systems organisation, federal and state responsibilities, and 
complicated funding arrangements may also complicate policy (Lin & Fawkes 2007). It 
seems that in Australia as elsewhere, those involved in health promotion activities, such 
as tobacco control, struggle to be heard at the policy-making table. Lin discussed the 
social determinants of health, and observed that; 
“…health promotion practitioners are seldom at the centre of policy 
development” (Lin & Fawkes 2007).  
The role of the general community in determining what happens in public health cannot 
be under-estimated. Politicians and policy-makers take into account the views of the 
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community in determining policy, and in making decisions. The political dimension to 
public health policy-making means that,  
“Decisions and policies in public health are frequently driven by crises, political 
concerns, and public opinion” (Kohatsu, Robinson & Torner 2004, p. 417).  
Leapfrogging 
Studlar, one of the few writers who have written extensively on the politics and policy 
of tobacco control, says that more attention needs to be paid to “leapfrogging”; 
“…..that is, the tendency of jurisdictions either within one country or 
across countries not only to adopt each other’s policies, with some 
reinvention, but also to achieve similar ends – in this case, the reduction 
of tobacco consumption” (Studlar 1999, p. 77).  
Diffusion of tobacco-control ideas seems to occur through scientific findings and their 
communication within the tobacco control community nationally and internationally, 
but politics is a variable that “intervenes” and can stop or distort the process” (Studlar 
1999, p. 77).  
It is sometimes difficult to adhere to the evidence, when adapting to local 
circumstances, because of the tension between a central and idealized “norm” of 
conforming to the evidence-base (Nutley & Homel 2006, p. 23). Furthermore, 
sometimes there is uninformed transfer of evidence, sometimes incomplete transfer and 
sometimes inappropriate transfer, leading to policy failure in the adopting jurisdiction 
(Dolowitz & Marsh 2000).  
Understanding the flow of ideas through systems is important to understanding of the 
direction of evidence-based policy in public health. The impediments and barriers 
include lack of “….contact between researchers and policy-makers, lack of timeliness of 
research, mutual mistrust, power and budget struggles, poor quality of research, political 
instability and debates about what constitutes evidence” (Armstrong et al. 2006, p. 386).  
Evidence-agenda map 
Work by Rychetnik and Wise in Australia proposed an “evidence-agenda map” to assist 
advocates of evidence-based policy to link policy goals to the evidence (Rychetnik & 
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Wise 2004 p. 254). The map is useful for areas of health policy-making where the 
evidence is somewhat confused or lacking, although in the case of tobacco control that 
is not the case. Tobacco control evidence is quite strong. Rychetnik et al. observe that 
scientific evidence is: 
“… used in policy settings like any other type information: to argue 
prevailing agendas and justify ideological positions” (2004, p. 254)  
Furthermore, Rychetnik and Wise say that advocacy is more effective and evidence is 
more likely to be used if it coincides with a ‘window of opportunity’ when politicians 
suddenly become interested in a topic, after a media outcry or some other ‘focusing 
event’ (Rychetnik & Wise 2004, p. 254). This fits with Kingdon’s theory of agenda 
setting (Kingdon 1995).  
The “shield” model of knowledge transfer 
Another model proposed by Gano et al. 2007 is that of a merging of the engineering 
(science “push”) and socio-organisational models of knowledge transfer into a model 
that “shields” the knowledge production and transmission process from political 
interference. The authors found that their respondents, who were researchers within 
government organisations, academic institutes, budgetary agencies and non-government 
organisations, but not final decision-makers, placed a high value on the quality of the 
research, and the engineering model. However, these decision-makers reported some 
influence of inter-personal contact with other researchers (Gano, Crowley & Guston 
2007).  
The “shield” model suggests,“…that a strong network of shared professional values 
shelters the research arena from political pressures” (Gano, Crowley & Guston 2007, p. 
57).  
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Table 4 Three models of knowledge transmission 
Three models of knowledge transmission 
Framework Defined 
Action 
Catalyst Output 
 
Engineering or 
“science-push” 
When the 
imperatives of 
technological 
advance are too 
great to ignore, 
new knowledge 
transmission 
occurs. 
Progress, 
technical 
virtuosity 
High-quality 
scientific 
advice 
Socio-
organisational 
Positive oral 
and written 
communication 
between 
individuals and 
groups 
facilitates 
knowledge 
transmission. 
Social linkages, 
engagement 
Social capital 
Shield Commonly 
valued norms 
about objective 
research shelter 
knowledge 
transmission. 
Impartiality, 
objectivity, and 
productive 
tension 
between 
Continuity (for 
research and 
social 
programs) 
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Three models of knowledge transmission 
Framework Defined 
Action 
Catalyst Output 
 
technical and 
social goals. 
Adapted from Gano, Crowley & Guston 2007 
A problem with the shield model is that it does not seem to deal with situations where 
the end-user or decision-maker is a completely political operator, with no research 
skills, background or networks. However, in terms of closed systems where higher 
political levels of decision-making are not required, the model might work quite well, 
but this is speculation. 
Other writers have identified risks to evidence-based policy through efforts to politicize 
or silence objective scientific research (Rosenstock & Lee 2002). 
“In their efforts to squelch unwanted scientific findings, vested interests 
have also been known to harass investigators, federal agencies, and even 
the scientific and policy-making processes themselves” (Rosenstock & 
Lee 2002, p.16).  
Despite tobacco industry efforts over many decades to recruit scientists, and to 
influence or discredit research this appears less of a problem for tobacco-control-based 
research, and the evidence around effective measures to reduce smoking. The tobacco 
industry has largely accepted that smoking is damaging to health, and has recognised 
this on its websites, although it still entertains contrary arguments about the dangers of 
passive smoking. 
Policy entrepreneurs, champions, charismatic leaders and 
advocates 
In his discussion of the “policy primeval soup”, Kingdon (1995) talks about the role of 
policy entrepreneurs. These are influential, often prominent, people who can drive the 
agenda forward and advocate for particular policy positions. They may be in 
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government, the non-government sector or research (Kingdon 1995). The concept as 
Kingdon generally used it is in relation to those who are seeking change as a force for 
progress. However, it may be that key individuals amongst the pro-tobacco forces 
should also be considered policy entrepreneurs as they propose and advocate from their 
perspective. Heroic or charismatic leaders are often needed in order to articulate ideas 
and mobilise opinion and action (Nadler & Tushman 1990).  
“While various words have been used to portray this type of leadership, 
we prefer the label ‘charismatic’ leader. It refers to a special quality that 
enables the leader to mobilise and sustain activity within an organisation 
through specific personal actions combined with perceived personal 
characteristics.” (Nadler & Tushman 1990, p. 82).  
Dr John Snow is an early example of a public health policy entrepreneur, who was 
effective in working at all levels of the policy, research and implementation process. 
Policy entrepreneurs in tobacco control have been both energetic and often charismatic. 
Charismatic leaders can mobilise tobacco-control directions with new ideas (Fafard 
2015; Smith 2013). Policy entrepreneurs can be advocates, health bureaucrats or 
ministers (Hooker & Chapman 2006). As has been said earlier in this chapter, the 
advocacy coalition framework (ACF) usefully explains policy stability, and the policy 
entrepreneurship (PE) model explains dynamic policy change (Mintrom & Vergari 
1996).  
The use of the term “policy entrepreneur” is to distinguish it from the more limiting 
term of “advocate”. For this thesis, the term policy entrepreneur means a person who is 
able to meld a number of roles of advocacy: leadership, political persuasion, 
interpretation of scientific literature, framing of arguments. A policy entrepreneur has a 
research background, understands universities and other research institutions, but also 
understands how policy processes work and can work well with policy-makers and 
community groups (Lomas 2000; Oliver 2006; Oliver & Paul-Shaeen 1997).  
The policy entrepreneur can work at several levels in the process of transforming 
tobacco control literature into public policy, from working with advocates and 
researchers, to public sector policy-makers and politicians. Policy entrepreneurs can 
also “sell” a policy across the world (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). A leading Australian 
example of an effective policy entrepreneur in tobacco control is Dr Nigel Gray, whose 
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close working relationship and understanding of political processes, as well as a medical 
background in tobacco control, led to the establishment of VicHealth in the 1980s. This 
is an important health promotion foundation, which has provided a strong support for 
tobacco-control research and advocacy not only in Victoria, but in Australia more 
generally, and has provided a valuable hub of research and advocacy support 
internationally. Dr Gray went on to work with WHO, and remained influential 
internationally until his death in 2014 (Ballard 2004, Cancer Council Victoria 2014).  
The tobacco-control policy entrepreneur needs knowledge of the literature and research, 
the ability to keep up to date with it, as well as ability to “work” the political and 
bureaucratic processes. Such an entrepreneur networks at several levels: good contacts 
with researchers are essential, and links to international thinking through conferences, 
and tobacco-control organisations as well as access to electronic sources are essential to 
the process of keeping abreast of the evidence. Policy transfer from one country to 
another or one jurisdiction to another is accelerated by use of the internet (James & 
Lodge 2003). Exchange of information in Australia, and with other English-speaking 
countries with similar systems of government such as Canada and New Zealand is 
accelerated by “Globalink”, a tobacco-control network established by the WHO, and 
more recently transformed into a Facebook social media networking group (Ballard 
2004).  
While an advocate may take a similar path, they will often be more time-constrained, 
and less multi-dimensional in their approach. The policy entrepreneur is utterly 
embedded in the process of moving from research to policy, while an advocate is on the 
outside looking in; a policy entrepreneur has cachet in policy-making circles and is 
consulted. 
The term “knowledge broker” seems to convey a similar meaning to policy 
entrepreneur; however, it implies a more passive stance than that of policy entrepreneur, 
who would be a person driven on a crusade or quest for outcomes (Choi et al. 2005). 
The existence and role of policy entrepreneurs, not only acting as knowledge brokers, 
but as advocates and have the ability to work at all levels of government, could be a key 
to success or failure of knowledge utilisation. However, it may also be that middle-
ranking bureaucrats are acting as knowledge brokers, but have not been acknowledged 
as part of the process. For example, it is common for government reports or discussion 
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papers in Australia to have no mention of the name of the writer(s). The name of the 
sponsoring senior public official may be given in a foreword, and that person has 
accepted responsibility for the document, but they have not written the paper (APSC 
2007a, 2007b; Taylor 2006).  
 It is possible that there is a “third community”, in that middle-level public servants act 
as knowledge brokers, are essentially invisible to those externally viewing the policy 
process. It may be that the ‘two communities’ model is missing this link, that of the 
middle range bureaucrats.  
The role of policy entrepreneurs in knowledge transfer has been important in the 
development of tobacco control, and global leadership by such people as Dr Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, Director-General of WHO for one term until 2003, has been essential to the 
process internationally in recent years (Lee 2006). Dr Witold Zatonski is recognised in 
tobacco-control circles as having been immensely influential in bringing effective 
tobacco-control measures to Poland. He is an experienced medical practitioner, an 
epidemiologist and a talented political activist in an exceedingly difficult political 
climate (Malinowska-Sempruch, Bonnell & Hoover 2006; Zatonski 2003).  
In Australia, tobacco-control entrepreneurial leaders such as respiratory physician Dr 
Cotter Harvey in NSW, Dr Nigel Gray and Professor David Hill in Victoria and 
Professor Mike Daube in WA, Anne Jones (ASH) and Professor Simon Chapman in 
NSW, have been important in penetrating the bureaucracy, and working with 
politicians, and non-government organisations to advance the messages about effective 
tobacco-control mechanisms. 
In a negative vein, it has also been suggested that the activities of policy entrepreneurs 
can undermine democratic accountability. It is argued that key actors, who have power 
and authority, can shape agendas and policy to suit their own ideas and plans. Where 
there is centralized power, elite domination and fragmentation of responsibility the 
opportunities for policy entrepreneurs certainly exist. These elite policy entrepreneurs 
can close out other approaches through: 
“… the exclusion of rivals, and tight control of information flows 
within and between networks – in short, efficient political 
management” (Greenaway, Salter & Hart 2007, p. 734).  
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On this basis, policy entrepreneurs can potentially be a force for harm if their ideas are 
“bad”, creating a playing field that is neither level nor democratic. The policy 
entrepreneur in a powerful position can drive the policy through various veto or 
clearance points, irrespective of the views of others who might otherwise have been 
consulted (Greenaway, Salter & Hart 2007). Greenaway et al. caution about the role of 
policy entrepreneurs seems to be more applicable when the powerful policy 
entrepreneur is embedded in the bureaucracy itself, and not when the individual is 
located outside the system. 
In order to integrate evidence-based clinical and community strategies to improve health 
measures such as reducing tobacco consumption, leaders must advocate for more 
effective interventions and policies, as well as adopting a collaborative approach 
(Ockene et al. 2007). The role of individual policy entrepreneurs, working within non-
government organisations, has been important around the world in tobacco control, and 
more especially in Australian states.  
Medical professionals as policy entrepreneurs 
Elite medical professionals, particularly academic males, have had a well-documented 
strong influence on the development of health policy in Victoria, and this is likely to be 
the case in other Australian states (Lewis & Considine 1999; Lewis 2006).  
In the USA, a succession of surgeons general has advocated strongly for tobacco-
control measures, and their reports and pronouncements have been influential not only 
in the US but internationally (Henningfield 2003). Also in the USA, leaders of health 
organisations and medical societies are able to influence politicians to take action on 
tobacco-control measures (Gottlieb et al. 2003).  
It has been suggested that in the USA, states with fewer medical practitioners 
proportional to the population are less likely to have sound cancer prevention policies, 
including programs to reduce smoking rates (Greenberg 1987).  
On the other hand it has been argued in a scathing condemnation, that the American 
Medical Association was silent or complicit on smoking and tobacco-control issues for 
many years. A former editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association 
(JAMA) was working with Phillip Morris to design marketing campaigns in the 1930s. 
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JAMA continued to print cigarette advertisements until the 1950s. Until the 1980s the 
American Medical Association Members Retirement Fund owned substantial tobacco 
shares (Nathanson 1999; Wolinsky & Brune 1994).  
The experience in the UK seems to be different from the USA. The British Medical 
Association was highly active in campaigning for indoor smoking bans including pubs 
and clubs, to the extent that it has been said that; “Tobacco took up a disproportionate 
amount of BMA time”, and individual medical practitioners applied pressure on their 
local members of Parliament (Cairney 2007, p. 63). It has also been suggested that 
dentists could play a greater role in tobacco-control advocacy internationally 
(Beaglehole, Tsakos & Watt 2005).  
Qualities of a public health policy entrepreneur 
Taking the information available about key high-achievers in the area of tobacco-
control advocacy who seem to fit the definition of a policy entrepreneur, it appears a 
policy entrepreneur:  
 Is driven by a ‘crusading’ desire to achieve positive outcomes for public health;  
 Is a person with leadership qualities, or charisma, or strong networking skills;  
 Has credibility at all levels of the policy-making community;  
 Has sound understanding of the science and the research;  
 Is able to interpret science in a simple easy-to-understand way to policy-makers, 
the community, colleagues and/or the media – acting as a knowledge broker;  
 Understands political processes in some depth, including party politics, 
parliamentary systems, cabinet processes, ministerial minders, budget processes, 
influences on political actors and policy-makers;  
 Is sensitive to mood, pressures and nuances of politicians and their parties; 
 Provides extra backgrounding for key policy-makers who have a personal 
interest, affected family member, or personal experience of the public health 
problem, and provide them with scientific arguments and research to advocate 
for the cause;  
 Has flexibility and the ability to go ‘venue shopping’ when foiled by a barricade 
or other impediment;  
 Seizes the moment when a ‘window of opportunity’ (see Kingdon 1995) opens;  
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 Is able to galvanize action by supportive relevant health organisations or 
academics at key moments in the policy cycle;  
 Understands mechanisms for countering the arguments of public health 
‘enemies’ (such as the tobacco industry and their ‘front’ organisations);  
 Has persuasive ability and can ‘sell’ ideas;  
 Is patient, persistent and not easily dissuaded from continuing to pursue goals;  
 Can see long-term benefits over years, even decades, and is not overly 
discouraged by short-term set-backs; and  
 Never gives up! 
Non-government organisations (NGOs) and advocacy 
NGOs have been influential in Australia and elsewhere in promoting tobacco-control 
measures, and have been monitored and shadowed by the tobacco industry, which is 
aware of the immense influence these organisations can have (Knight & Chapman 
2004a; Malinowska-Sempruch, Bonnell & Hoover 2006). 
Paul Sabatier developed the notion of the “advocacy coalition framework” (ACF). This 
framework assumes that the policy change will take a decade or more; that the best way 
to analyse this is to hone in on policy subsystems, that is the people with an interest in 
the policy area; and that public policies can be thought of like beliefs or values, or goals, 
with assumptions about the best way to go about achieving those ends (Sabatier1988). 
The key people involved in the ACF are people from NGOs interested in the issue at 
stake, as well as “policy brokers”, who are those who try to reduce conflict between 
people or groups. Sabatier described the concept of the advocacy coalition framework 
as a critical vehicle for understanding public policy processes (Sabatier1988). This is a 
particularly useful analytical frame of reference as it includes not just the interest 
groups, public servants and politicians involved in policy-making, but also journalists, 
analysts and researchers. However, it does not appear to be particularly helpful in 
analysing policy failure, which is the case under consideration in this thesis. 
Tobacco control is an interesting area when viewed through the ACF lens, because the 
level of conflict and disagreement between the tobacco industry and NGO health groups 
is so high, that there is no possibility of compromise. In addition, the distribution of 
economic power and resources at their respective disposal is asymmetrical, with the 
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tobacco industry commanding billions of dollars and health groups struggling for the 
charity dollar.  
The ACF is a mechanism for departure from previous models of looking at policy-
making such as the “iron triangle”. The concept of the iron triangle is the three way split 
between the executive government, the bureaucracy and interest groups. However, 
public policy researchers in the US, such as Michael Givel and Stan Glantz, remain 
convinced that the power wielded by the tobacco industry, and its influence on 
governments, remains more appropriately analysed as an iron triangle (Givel & Glantz 
2001).   
In Australia, the key NGOs advocating for tobacco control in the last decade have been 
the Australian Council On Smoking And Health (ACOSH), based in Perth West 
Australia; Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) based in Sydney; QUIT; The Cancer 
Council of Australia, with branches in all states; National Heart Foundation, all states; 
Asthma Foundation(s); Australian Medical Association (AMA); Public Health 
Association (PHA); Thoracic Society of Australia and New Zealand and the Australian 
Lung Foundation.  
The three leading tobacco manufacturers in Australia are British American Tobacco 
Australia (BATA), Philip Morris and Imperial Tobacco. These manufacturers also set 
up “front” organisations from time to time. These include the Butt Littering Trust 
(funded by BATA); The Tobacco Institute of Australia, (now defunct but formerly 
headed by federal former Liberal MP and former Tasmanian Richard Mulcahy, head of 
the Australian Hotels Association in the 1990s); retailer organisation Australasian 
Association of Convenience Stores Incorporated (AACS)(funded by BATA), and 
Healthy Buildings International (HBI) (funded by Philip Morris) (Carter 2003a; 
Chapman & Penman 2003; Dearlove, Bialous & Glantz, 2002; Harper 2006). There are 
other smaller operators and importers, but they rarely lobby state governments. 
Community involvement in grass-roots advocacy 
In the USA, grass-roots social movements have been identified as important in reducing 
smoking rates, that it has been important in articulating smoking as a strong credible 
threat to public health to have the ability to “mobilise a diverse organisational 
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constituency”, and that there is an association with the “convergence of political 
opportunities with target vulnerabilities” (Nathanson 1999, p.421). This convergence 
has been more important since the association with passive smoking and ill-health was 
established. Non-smokers were galvanized to seek government and legislative 
protection from tobacco smoke in public places and work places (Nathanson1999). This 
sort of grass-roots movement is rare elsewhere, including in Australia. 
Two of the most important and prolific Australian writers on tobacco control, both 
internationally recognised, are Simon Chapman and Melanie Wakefield. In 2001 in their 
reflections on tobacco-control advocacy they said: 
“Advocacy in Australia has been driven by a relatively small group of 
people working from an even smaller group of nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) and grassroots community groups” (Chapman & 
Wakefield 2001, p. 279).  
When asked their views, the general public in Australia would like to play a greater 
role, and be consulted more about health priorities, and particularly about funding 
allocations (Wiseman et al. 2003). There is a recognition that tobacco-control advocacy 
in Australia has rarely if ever arisen spontaneously from the “community”. This 
advocacy has been led by health non-government organisations and policy-oriented 
researchers (Chapman & Wakefield 2001).  
Bureaucrats as invisible policy entrepreneurs  
Chapman and Wakefield are amongst the few writers to recognize the important 
advocacy role that public servants can play within the bureaucracy. They are also aware 
that these public servants often do not think of themselves as advocates (Chapman & 
Wakefield 2001). As an example, Gibson identifies the role of “faceless bureaucrats” 
working within the Australian public sector state systems who relentlessly advocated for 
Needle and Syringe Programs in Australian in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
threat (Gibson 2003).  
The role of bureaucrats as policy entrepreneurs has not been studied extensively in 
Australia, probably because their role is usually hidden from public view. The role of a 
public health official has been described as that of a determined idealist, a cunning 
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political strategist and agent of redistribution from the wealthy to the poor, with the 
latter role in grave danger of extinction (in the US at least) (Mullan 2000).  
Studlar also identified tobacco-control policy entrepreneurs from the public sector in the 
USA and Canada, although he considers they should more appropriately be designated 
as advocates. Government employees Donald Shopland in the US worked for 40 years 
on tobacco control; Murray Kaiserman in Canada, John Garcia in both countries, Neil 
Collishaw in Canada and in WHO, and all these men could all be described as policy 
entrepreneurs (Studlar 2002). Public health professionals who can work at both political 
and research levels are more effective at finding windows of opportunity, understanding 
the limitations of government, and designing effective policies and implementing 
programs (Oliver 2006).  
Satterlund et al. point out that it is easier in more affluent communities to “… find 
‘champions’ with a history of proactive tobacco control work who were willing to join 
well-mounted campaigns than it was in rural counties where tobacco use was more 
prevalent and still relatively acceptable” (Satterlund et al 2011, p621). In contrast, even 
in the more affluent communities policy proposals can be subverted by a small group of 
organized smokers (Satterlund et al. 2011).  
Advice to advocates 
Tobacco-control policy advocates do not have to look far for advice about how to 
proceed with their lobbying efforts. It is important to emphasise the science, the health 
issues, counter tobacco industry criticisms, “mobilise new voices”, and to coordinate 
their efforts (Bero et al. 2001; Bryan-Jones 2004; Bryan-Jones & Chapman 2006).  
Tobacco-control advocates have also been urged to monitor government tobacco control 
education programs at a detailed level, and continue to press for effective programs 
(Bialous & Glantz 1999). Advocates are told to engage in the process, be clear and 
precise with their language about the research and to lobby on behalf of the regulators 
and policy-makers. 
“Policy makers suggested that tobacco-control advocates should: present 
science in a format that is well organised and easily absorbed; engage 
scientific experts to participate in the regulatory process; and lobby to 
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support the tobacco control efforts of the regulatory agency” (Montini & 
Bero 2001, p. 218).  
The effective use of health statistics in “marketing” by advocates is critical to the 
process of convincing policy-makers of the importance of their case (Walker, Bryce & 
Black 2007). 
All this advice is no doubt helpful for advocates; however, it does not solve the problem 
if there are few of them, if they are under-resourced and if they do not have ready access 
to the data themselves. This applies to both bureaucratic entrepreneurs as well as those 
who are more visible, such as the non-government spokespeople. 
There is little information about how policy entrepreneurs and/or advocates in tobacco 
control think and behave in Australia. There are inhibitions on some organisations 
engaging in advocacy, especially if they are funded by governments, which many NGOs 
are. More conservative governments make charity status a criterion for eligibility for tax 
deductibility of donations, which means such organisations cannot theoretically engage 
in any advocacy role. Politicians do not like being criticized and may punish groups by 
reducing funding. This poses a huge dilemma for public health NGOs, and this means 
that independent academic organisations must bear a greater load of the advocacy task, 
because their NGO colleagues may be constrained from public comment (Chapman 
2004).  
Industry duplicity 
Highlighting the deviousness and duplicity of the tobacco industry is often mentioned as 
a key issue that tobacco-control advocates should target, because this is effective in 
reducing smoking rates (Carter 2003b; Carter & Chapman 2003; Hammond et al. 2006). 
Exposing the links between the tobacco industry and politicians is also important (Givel 
& Glantz 2001). The tobacco industry will attack and undermine organisations 
dedicated to tobacco control (Ibrahim, Tsoukalas & Glantz 2004; Hiilamo 2003; Mandel 
& Glantz 2004; McDaniel, Smith & Malone 2006). Attacking the tobacco industry as an 
effective form of advocacy was not really publicly acceptable until the 1980s 
(Nathanson 1999).  
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The provincial government of British Columbia in Canada has explicitly adopted 
exposing and denormalising industry conduct, as part of its measures to implement 
tobacco control in that state. Canada has taken a lead role in attacking the tobacco 
industry and refusing to be cowed by industry litigiousness. In this case the 
governments themselves are taking an advocacy role (Thomson & Wilson 2005a). In 
Hong Kong there has been increasing political support to resist the lobbying of the 
tobacco industry (Knight & Chapman 2004b). The tobacco industry will make every 
effort to undermine even very local-level interventions that it sees as a threat 
(MacKenzie et al. 2004; White & Bero 2004). The industry has challenged the way 
carcinogens are identified; and in the process in the USA “it produced a particular legal 
precedent for judicial review that is favorable to all regulated industries” (Cook & Bero 
2006, p. 747). The tobacco industry has not demonstrated any moral conscience, 
remorse or acknowledged responsibility for the harm caused by its products. The 
industry has been described as the “intelligent vector” of cardiovascular disease by 
promoting its products and opposing tobacco-control measures (Barnoya, Bialous & 
Glantz 2005).  
Furthermore, in the United States tobacco industry lawyers have also been identified as 
“disease vectors” through their questionable behaviour, and similar tactics have been 
employed in Australia to discourage litigation and hide the truth.  
“Tobacco-related diseases have proliferated partly because of tobacco 
company lawyers. Their tactics have impeded the flow of information 
about the dangers of smoking to the public and the medical community. 
Additionally, their extravagantly aggressive litigation tactics have pushed 
many plaintiffs into dropping their cases before trial, thus reducing the 
opportunities for changes to be made to company policy in favour of 
public health” (Guardino & Daynard 2007, p. 224).  
The tobacco industry has been linked to political donations, and has spent millions of 
dollars in lobbying politicians in the USA (Goldman & Glantz 1998). Tobacco industry 
donations have also influenced legislative outcomes, in favour of the industry (Luke & 
Krauss 2004; Monardi & Glantz 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). In Australia, 
similar behaviour has seen tobacco industry political donations favouring the Liberal 
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Party, and a former NSW Liberal Premier Nick Greiner went on to Chair British 
American Tobacco Australasia (Ballard 2004).  
The European Parliament has been severely criticized in The Lancet for its association 
with British American Tobacco, and particularly giving credibility to BAT’s pretentions 
to ‘corporate social responsibility’ (Hyde 2007).  
Union officials as advocates 
The role of union officials in tobacco control has been highlighted by several writers, 
and it would be useful to see how important their role has been in Tasmania. The 
effectiveness of the cabin stewards’ unions, combined with tobacco control NGOs was 
important in eliminating smoking from airlines (Barbeau et al. 2005; Barbeau et al. 
2007; Holm & Davis 2004; Smith 2008).  
Framing 
In Canada it has been found that support for tobacco-control measures varied by 
political party and the beliefs of politicians about the role of government in health 
promotion. Ideology is influential in the way tobacco control is seen by politicians. 
Therefore the way tobacco-control policies are ‘framed’ has been shown to have 
resonance with politicians and tobacco-control advocates need to be cognisant of this, 
so as to increase the knowledge amongst legislators of the health effects of tobacco and 
ways to reduce consumption (Cohen 1999; Cohen et al. 2002; de Guia, Cohen, Ashley 
& Ferrence et al. 2003; de Guia, Cohen, Ashley & Pederson et al. 2003).  
Role of the media 
The media can play a useful role in the process of translating research and can have a 
powerful influence on public servants, policy-makers, clinicians, industry and the public 
(Lavis, Ross et al. 2003a; WHO 2004; Lin, Smith & Fawkes 2007.) The public, which 
includes politicians and public sector policy-makers, gets more information about public 
health from electronic media sources than from general practitioners or other health 
workers (Greenberg 1992).  
In a quantitative analysis of the most important influences on public-place restrictions 
on smoking in Canada, Asbridge identified the media and health advocacy as playing 
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the strongest roles in the development of policy, more important even than scientific 
research and parliamentary debate. The role of the US Surgeon General as an advocate 
was particularly important, as his pronouncements and publications have international 
cachet, credibility and influence. However, the scientific evidence provided a basis for 
the Surgeon-General and secondarily the media to present arguments in favour of 
secondhand smoke regulation, and therefore added legitimacy to these approaches 
(Asbridge 2004). Asbridge concluded that models of  
“… law making and policy formation must consider the interplay of 
multiple policy inputs” (Asbridge 2004, p.13).  
Advocates are also urged to be aware of the issues and “angles” that are important to the 
media, and to use media outlets to good effect in their tobacco-control advocacy efforts 
(Durrant et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2005; Lin, Smith & Fawkes 2007).  
Letters to the editor of newspapers in Australia are one way that advocates can get 
across messages about tobacco and smoking issues (Smith, McLeod & Wakefield 
2005). The importance of evaluating media advocacy efforts and targeting them 
effectively is also important for advocates (Stead, Hastings & Eadie 2002). The 
effective use of health statistics in public “marketing” by advocates is critical to the 
process of convincing policy-makers of the importance of their case (Walker, Bryce & 
Black 2007).  
Politicians are influenced by public opinion and the media is often seen as a reflection 
of public views. In order to take action on an issue, politicians need to be convinced of 
both the scientific evidence, and also that there is public support for any action. 
Sometimes Health Ministers, such as John Reid in the UK in the early 2000s, can be 
“blockers” of tobacco-control reforms, and advocates find themselves with a need to do 
some venue shopping, i.e. seeking out different institutions or individuals, to bypass 
“blocking” ministers (Albaek, Green-Pedersen & Nielsen 2007; Arnott et al. 2007).  
One of the problems faced by tobacco-control advocates as identified by Pollack and 
Jacobson is that it is easier to be caught up in advocating for new policies and new 
legislation, because that creates media interest and public discussion, than it is to closely 
monitor existing policies and regulations. The media hype surrounding new and 
interesting forms of regulation tend to overshadow the importance of affirming extant 
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programs (Pollack & Jacobson 2003). The role of “blockers” of current tobacco-control 
measures within the bureaucracy should also be looked at if they can be identified, and 
there seems to be no literature on this. This is examined in some depth in Chapter 7. 
Survivor advocacy 
A successful advocacy program for survivors of tobacco-related diseases was developed 
in North Carolina, the largest tobacco-growing state in the USA. Being involved in 
advocacy can be empowering for the individuals, who may otherwise feel demoralised 
by living with a tobacco-related disease (Mathew, Goldstein & Hampton 2008). Social 
marketing theory suggests that: 
“… messages delivered by survivors and victims of tobacco use are 
highly effective as they are intensely personal, convey the serious health 
consequences of tobacco use and evoke negative emotional responses” 
(Mathew, Goldstein & Hampton 2008, p.6).   
Unfortunately, so much stigma, guilt and shame is attached to lung cancer that patients 
often conceal their illness as long as they can, so it can be difficult for them to act as 
advocates (Chapple, Ziebland & McPherson 2004; LoConte et al. 2008) .  
The moral dimension of tobacco control 
It has also been suggested that there is a moral dimension in campaigns by advocates 
against tobacco smoking, as there was in the temperance movement against alcohol 
(Pennock 2002). Studlar also discusses an idea that “protestant moral populism” has 
facilitated the anti-tobacco advocates’ ability to influence governments in the English 
speaking countries of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. However, he concludes that 
the key element is not so much Protestantism as “rugged individualism”, which 
characterises tobacco control laggard states or provinces such as Alberta and the 
Northern Territory (Studlar 2007).  
The framing of tobacco smoking by anti-tobacco campaigners as a “social hygiene” 
issue was one way of overcoming the attitude of personal responsibility pervasive in the 
US, in other words smokers saying “it is my body, and I will smoke if I choose to”. 
Firstly, the framing argument was directed at the rights of children and other non-
smokers to protection from smoke, and secondly the addictive nature of nicotine meant 
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that there was no informed choice for smokers (Bailey 2004). The moral issues 
associated with tobacco consumption have been prevalent for many years, even from 
early in the 20th Century (Studlar 2006). Furthermore messages about families, such as 
preventing younger siblings from smoking, are apparently effective in making smoke-
free homes acceptable and normal (Mathew, Goldstein & Hampton 2008).  
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Public policy-making; structures and culture 
Politics, for better or worse, plays a critical role in health affairs  
(Oliver 2006 p.195). 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, tobacco control has never been adequately 
categorized, according to one of the foremost writers on the subject, Donley Studlar 
(Studlar, 2002, p.199). Whilst there is a great deal of literature on tobacco control, much 
of it is descriptive, and little is about public policy-making. Recently Fafard said 
political science can offer a rich body of theory to explain “the varying relationship 
between evidence and policy in public health” (Fafard 2015, p.1) 
Structures are important  
Internationally it has been recognised that decentralized pluralist government systems 
such as Australia have more comprehensive tobacco control than their unitary 
counterparts (Cairney, Studlar & Mamudu 2012). Hooker and Chapman (2006) found in 
NSW that political structures, including party structures and parliamentary committees, 
are important in framing tobacco-control policies. In several cases the least powerful 
players – minor parties, backbenchers, independent Upper House members, women and 
party activists – were able to influence policy. The tobacco lobby tended to be able to 
gain access to ministers, the Premier and Treasurer, but were less successful in 
influencing these more independent-minded groups and individuals (Hooker & 
Chapman 2006).  
Protecting children – an advocacy-framing device 
In a quantitative analysis of politicians and political parties in Canada, all supported, 
irrespective of their ideological position generally, the proposition that governments had 
a role to discourage youth from smoking. The parties differed along ideological lines on 
other health-promotion and smoking-related issues (Ashley et al. 2001). This is 
consistent with US studies that show public support for initiatives aimed at reducing 
smoking or preventing uptake in children, but ambivalence about other measures where 
initiatives may impinge on what is seen as personal choice by adults (Batra et al. 2002).  
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Some policy-makers are attracted to the concept of preventing smoking in children, 
however leading tobacco-control research economists, Jha et al., warn that; 
“… a strategy aimed solely at deterring children is not practical and 
would bring no significant benefits to public health for several decades. 
Most of the tobacco-related deaths that are projected to occur in the next 
50 years are among today’s existing smokers. Governments concerned 
with health gains should therefore consider adopting broader measures 
that help adults quit” (Jha et al. 1999, p10). 
Further, Jamrozik claims that driving down adult smoking rates is the most effective 
way of reducing smoking amongst children (Jamrozik 2004). Jamrozik comments 
“Already evidence shows that young people in communities with active and prominent 
general programmes of tobacco control are beginning to realise that saying ‘no thanks, 
I’ve given up’ is more ‘adult’ than accepting the offer of a cigarette”(Jamrozik 2004, 
p.1008). The tobacco industry frames arguments around “individual adult choice”, 
whereas the tobacco-control movement tends to frame arguments around collective 
responsibility and public health, including protecting children and costs to the health 
system. Individual choice values resonate strongly in the USA, but is less a hegemonic 
value in other English-speaking countries such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia. 
This may be a partial explanation for more successful tobacco-control legislative 
reforms in the latter three countries, and a greater reliance on litigation in the USA to 
achieve similar outcomes. 
Policy failure 
In an excellent study of failure of the tobacco-control policy process in Texas, Shillis et 
al. (2003) identified the processes undertaken by the Tobacco Prevention Task Force, 
tasked by government with developing an appropriate tobacco-control strategy, with 
funds from the Master Settlement Agreement, an agreement reached with the tobacco 
industry following litigation, to provided funds to selected states. The group worked 
well and produced a comprehensive plan, but, 
 “The unity built by science crumbled once the game changed to politics” 
(Shillis et al. 2003, p. 783).  
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The allocation of funds to effective tobacco-control measures, even when there is a 
large pool of designated funds available, is frequently dissipated by the political process 
(Shillis et al. 2003).  
Shillis et al. make the comparison between evidence-based medicine and public health 
process with this analogy: 
“A plan from medicine using watered down drugs, because not enough 
money was available for a dosage that would work, would be publicly 
contested. Yet, public health professionals have functioned on limited 
budgets that force watered-down practices that go against the grain of 
experience and knowledge” (Shillis et al. 2003, p.784).  
Shillis et al. underscore the critical need for leadership, and for advocates to be skilled 
in the use of politics as well as an understanding of the relevant science. Navigation of 
the political processes is a key to success in advocating for tobacco control (Shillis et al. 
2003).  
It has also been argued by some that scientists should not take a publicly political or 
public advocacy role, as this could undermine their objectivity. However, the political 
arena cannot be avoided in the field of health promotion. Indeed, it is essential that the 
players in that arena understand the rules and the processes and have skills to handle the 
structures, the people and the processes of politics. However, public health officials talk 
about prevention, but often baulk at moving into the political amphitheatre (Shillis et al. 
2003).  
There is some complexity in defining policy failure, firstly because as McConnell points 
out, “….there is a relative paucity of writings on policy failure” (McConnell, 2015, p. 
223).  For the “..rationalist, scientific tradition, policy outcomes can typically be 
measured and assessed against original goals….” (McConnnell, 2015 p. 223) within 
which framework this thesis is located. The fact that Tasmanian male smoking rates did 
not fall for a decade, in comparison to mainland states, and overall smoking rates were 
not declining at the same rate, was a trigger for examination of the causes of this failure. 
See Charts 4, 9, 10 and 11. McConnell recognises the “messiness and contestability of 
failure” (McConnell, 2015 p.230) and puts forward the following definition, “A policy 
fails, even if it is successful in some minimal brespects, if it does not fundamentally 
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achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great and/or 
support is virtually non-existent” (McConnell, 2015 p.230)  
This definition of policy failure is useful, because it encompasses the Tasmanian 
situation where some evidence-based policies were introduced, but the package was 
incomplete, and therefore substantial reductions in smoking rates were not achieved. 
Had Dr John Snow in 19th century London avoided entering the political sphere and 
gone away to publish a paper, rather than seeking the immediate removal of the pump 
handle, then 19th Century cholera epidemics may have continued (Brody et al. 2000).  
Hypothecated taxation as a mechanism for allocating resources to tobacco 
control  
Lin et al. (2007) made the important observation, highly relevant to this thesis, that 
hypothecated taxation was significant in developing health promotion, including that 
dealing with tobacco control, in Victoria and West Australia. Hypothecated taxation or 
‘earmarking’ as it is sometimes termed, means allocating funding from a taxation 
measure, directly to off-setting the ill effects of the policy. This allocation has persisted 
long after the original source of the funding dried up following the 1997 High Court (Ha 
1997) decision preventing states from raising revenue from tobacco and other excises. 
WA and Victoria still (in 2003-2004) had the highest funding allocations for health 
promotion activities, although as a proportion of all health funding, health promotion 
funding is tiny (Lin et al. 2007).  
According to figures provided to the NSW Cabinet Office in 2007, the proportion of 
funding devoted to tobacco control was much smaller in Tasmania, Victoria, WA and 
NSW compared to other states and territories. NSW subsequently increased its 
expenditure on mass-media campaigns and successfully reduced its smoking rates as a 
result. At various points states have reduced their funding, found that smoking rates 
increased and increased funding again. 
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Chart 2 State and Territory Expenditure on tobacco control 
 
Graph based on figures submitted to NSW Cabinet Office, and the 2004 National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey, State and Territory supplement, AIHW, June 2005, p. 12 (figures as at June 
2004) Note: Unfortunately more recent data is not available as governments are reluctant to 
release statistics about expenditure on tobacco control, record them in different ways, and 
include different inputs, which may explain the low figure reported for Victoria, which 
traditionally has had a large allocation.  
Voluntary agreements with the tobacco industry – a useless endeavour?  
One method of policy orientation is using voluntary agreements with industry. The 
legislative corporatism approach, which inevitably involves governments consulting 
with the tobacco industry leads to ineffective voluntary agreements. It was a feature of 
the Howard government in its approach to tobacco industry “regulation”, as well as in 
other countries such as Denmark (Albaek, Green-Pedersen & Nielsen 2007).   
The Howard government, as a conservative Liberal government, had a much more 
individualistic approach to governance of tobacco issues than federal Labor 
governments, which have been much more proactive about regulating the industry. This 
legislative corporatism approach was a feature of Tasmania in the late 1980s, when 
voluntary agreements about advertising were in favour with the then state Liberal 
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government, however, such agreements do not appear to have been relevant to tobacco 
policy within the last decade. 
Research not the complete story 
Research does not give a complete story to decision-makers and policy-makers (Weiss 
1982). Weiss says: 
“Rather, research provides a background of data, empirical 
generalizations, and ideas that affect the way that policy-makers think 
about problems … 
“As the ideas from research filter through, officials test them against the 
standards of their own knowledge and judgment … they have many 
sources of information other than social science, ranging from their own 
firsthand experience to systematic and unsystematic reports from the 
field. … the extent to which they accept a research idea, or give it at least 
a provisional hearing, depends on the degree to which it resonates with 
their prior knowledge. If it ‘makes sense’, if it and make sense of their 
earlier knowledge and impressions, they tend to incorporate it into their 
stock of knowledge” (Weiss 1982, p.622).  
This observation resonates with the experience in Tasmania. Judgments about what will 
work in Tasmania, an entity that is sometimes seen as “different”, will probably only be 
incorporated into practice if they are meaningful in relation to other beliefs and values. 
The impact of research over time is often mediated through sources other than the 
individual researchers themselves, and their contact with decision-makers. The media is 
influential in highlighting issues (Levin 2004).  
Policy-makers’ decision-making processes 
It has been found that decision-makers’ information searching processes are not always 
rational, logical or effective, with such processes likely to have an adverse outcome in 
policy-making (Rich & Oh 2000).  
“Overall, the results show that the decision-makers’ information search 
processes are biased and skewed” (Rich & Oh 2000, p.184).  
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So, how do policy-makers make decisions? It is possible that even the decision-makers 
themselves do not understand, or articulate, all the processes associated with the way 
they reach a decision. 
As Weiss said in the 1980s:  
“An investigator going out to study the uses of policy research quickly 
finds out that respondents have great difficult disentangling the lessons 
that they have learned from research from their whole configuration of 
knowledge. They do not catalog research separately; they do not 
remember sources and citations. With the best will in the world, all they 
can usually say is that in the course of their work they hear about a great 
deal of research and they’re sure it affects what they think and do. They 
can’t give specific illustrations of their use of a specific study, because 
that is not how they work” (Weiss 1982, p. 623).  
Policy-makers are also likely to be looking more to short-term solutions. Political 
timeframes are often not beyond the next election, whereas public policy commitments 
need to be made in a longer-term basis (Stephen 2003).  
Rich and Oh (2000) found in their study of decision-making in the mental health field, 
that decision-makers behaviour does not conform to a “rational actor model”. Whilst 
there seems to be a desirable relationship between research or scientific knowledge and 
its applicability to policy, this is not always the case. Rich and Oh found that; 
“….decisionmakers more often search for information from their own 
agencies rather than seeking information from a variety of sources … 
bureaucratic secrecy and monopolistic control of information may make 
decisionmakers less likely to share information with other 
decisionmakers outside their agencies. This is, to a large extent, because 
they do not want to share sources of potential power with others. 
Furthermore, at the stage of information utilisation, even valid and 
reliable information is little used by decisionmakers” (Rich and Oh, 
p199) [emphasis added]. 
Rich and Oh’s finding that “internal sources” are the most preferred form of 
information, and consulted more than anything else, including academic sources (Rich 
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& Oh, 2000), might contribute to “groupthink” and repetition of errors within 
government agencies. The rationality perspective is not the tool that best explains 
individual decision-making (Rich & Oh 2000, p. 203). Furthermore, “Concerned over 
bureaucratic secrecy and fear of how others might use information, if it were to be 
shared with them, bureaucrats tend to seek monopolies over control of information” (Oh 
& Rich, 1996, p. 7). 
Decision-makers will trust information from internal sources because they believe it 
will support their existing policy position or that of their agency. If the information is 
not in keeping with the agency’s goals or existing policies, then decision-makers will 
not use it. Knowledge utilisation, therefore, is not the result of individual rational action, 
but a much more complex internal and cultural political activity. The organisational 
interest perspective appeared to have more explanatory power in this study than the 
rational actor or communication (two communities) perspective. This model is located 
within the Weberian tradition that bureaucracies, once established, seek to reinforce 
their own power and autonomy (Rich and Oh 2000), and indeed beliefs and 
thinking/accepted wisdom.  
Non-decisions 
The idea of non-decisions is also useful in the context of this thesis as it is unclear 
whether there has been any deliberate decision at any stage not to provide additional 
funding for tobacco control. This is of particular relevance. Stone suggests that the 
power relationships and the resources available to particular groups contributes to the 
protection of imbalances, rather than challenging them, and that this can be described as 
elements of a “nondecision” process (Stone 1982, p. 275).  
Hancock (1983) asserts:  
“To date, most analysts have focused on what governments do; the 
absence of government policy in a given area has typically been cited as 
a nondecision and a corresponding indicator of either lagging national 
development or differences in the scope of government. Yet the absence 
of overt government activity does not necessarily mean the absence of 
policy activities. So-called non-decisions may well mask a significant 
array of private social and economic policies by corporations, charitable 
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organisations, unions, and other non-government actors. Such activities 
are eminently worthy of systematic comparative investigation” 
(Hancock, 1983).  
Non-decisions could easily be as much of a barrier to evidence-based tobacco control, 
as the positive or action-oriented decision-making process. 
Can the burden of disease explain differences in funding for tobacco control? 
In the US, studies on state variation in tobacco-control funding showed that tobacco-
induced burden of disease did not explain differences. A study by Austin-Lane (2003) 
reported that the factors that were linked to higher funding allocations for tobacco 
control were: the existence of a Democratic governor with a high degree of control over 
funding; and citizen liberalism, that is, public opinion oriented towards tobacco control. 
States that had a high degree of tobacco industry activity and lobbying and where 
tobacco growing was significant were less likely to allocate funds for tobacco control 
(Austin-Lane 2003).  
“These results imply that a strong scientific case for tobacco control is 
not sufficient to secure prevention funding at the state government level. 
Attention to political and economic aspects of the state budget process 
could lead to increased tobacco-control funding” (Austin-Lane 2003, p. 
3).  
What is the role of public servants or bureaucrats in tobacco control? 
Earlier in this chapter the potential role of public servants as internal advocates seeking 
tobacco-control policy actions was examined. However, the question needs to be 
considered whether or not these bureaucratic resources even exist. Studlar 
acknowledges that the existence of bureaucratic resources: 
“… may also be important for tobacco control, but they are difficult to 
measure” (Studlar 2007, p. 167).  
Institutional structures and contexts do matter when it comes to tobacco-control 
measures, and policy-bargaining processes can include many actors, including even 
citizens groups with little organisational structure (Licari 1997).  
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Small states 
Small states have trouble implementing some broad-based strategies on their own, and 
leadership needs to be taken by national governments (Greenberg 1992). It is a strong 
possibility that some of the impediments to action on tobacco control and other 
population health initiatives in small jurisdictions are those that relate to small size and 
lack of infrastructure support within the bureaucracy.  
Bell refers to “public sector research units” in her paper on influencing holistic health 
policy (Bell 2007). There is an assumption in some of the literature, as in this Bell 
article, that there are people employed within the public sector to synthesize research 
and to channel that information to the policy-makers. What if there are no researchers or 
policy analysts doing this work in relation to tobacco control? The absence of such staff 
could influence how policy-makers perceive or receive information or research data. Lin 
touches on this issue when she says that there must be sufficient expert staff to interpret 
all the information, and render it explicable to decision-makers (Lin 2003).  
Role of Cabinet 
In Australia the hierarchical political system in the states is such that Cabinet ministers 
have the most influence on the policy agenda. But even here there is a pecking order. A 
study into second-hand smoke restrictions in NSW confirmed the superior role of 
economic ministers in over-riding health ministers on matters where revenue or 
expenditure was involved.  
“Due to business and economic concerns, many participants indicated that the Minister 
for Health is not as powerful when compared to the Premier, Treasurer, and other 
business-oriented Ministers. A Minister for Health … who (ignored) a more business-
oriented Minister would be doing so at his own peril” (Bryan-Jones 2004, p. 65).  
Similar restraints exist in the United Kingdom where health ministers used voluntary 
agreements with the tobacco industry to create an illusion of progress in dealing with 
smoking, with the Treasury watching over events to make sure they went no further 
(Cairney 2007). Smith described the way tobacco-control advocates developed 
increasingly sophisticated economic arguments around tobacco-control measures, much 
to the chagrin of the tobacco industry (Smith 2013).  
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In a later published article Bryan-Jones said: 
“SHS restrictions have been delayed by several broad factors: the 
influence of industry groups successfully opposing regulation; issue 
wear-out; and political perceptions that there is not a salient constituency 
demanding that smoking be banned in bars and clubs” (Bryan-Jones & 
Chapman 2006, p. 192).  
In New South Wales in an examination of the period 1955 to 1995, Hooker and 
Chapman identified factors that delayed tobacco-control policies as: 
 the conservative stance of premiers; 
 commitments to unanimous federal action; and 
 rivalry between the political parties (Hooker & Chapman 2006).  
Particular premiers in NSW, of both major political parties, opposed legislative 
measures for tobacco control. The role of premiers in determining public policy on 
tobacco control, particularly if they are also the Treasurer, seems to be crucial in 
determining outcomes.  
In the US, governors have a strong influence on expenditure on tobacco control and in 
some cases the non-government anti-tobacco organisations considered that governors 
were more interested in crime, education and roads and highways than in public health 
issues, including tobacco control (Harris 2006).  
Political or ministerial advisers - minders 
Political advisers in ministers’ offices act as gatekeepers and information filters (Bryan-
Jones 2004). Many respondents to the Bryan-Jones study commented that tobacco 
control public servants within the health agency needed stronger 
“… leadership from within the government and the Health Department 
for their recommendations to be supported and rely on their relationship 
with tobacco-control advocates to perform the advocacy they cannot 
openly perform” (Bryan-Jones 2004, p 68).  
There was a view amongst some political advisers that tobacco-control bureaucrats were 
“zealots” because of their dedication and passion, but that the forms of communication 
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they used were too technical and obscure to be easily understood (Bryan-Jones 2004; 
Bryan-Jones & Chapman 2006).  
Clearly there is evidence in Bryan-Jones’ work of a frequent tension between the roles 
played by bureaucrats and their political masters on the issue of tobacco control. 
Bureaucrats walk a fine line between advocating for tobacco control, and meeting the 
political needs of their ministers, not offending them and not speaking out publicly. 
They are required to be troglodytes, operating in a subterranean community, working as 
a go-between for ministers and using advocacy groups to publicly campaign for 
particular tobacco control goals. 
Former Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, was at one time a ministerial adviser 
and his view about the role is expressed in this way: 
“By contrast, ministerial advisers must also be mindful of a different set 
of interests. Advisers must analyse the prospective political impact of any 
given policy proposition in terms of the likely response of the rest of the 
ministry, the governing party (both in its parliamentary and 
organisational capacities), the parliamentary Opposition, significant 
interest groups such as the business community and the trade union 
movement, community opinion in general, as well as the media” (Rudd 
1992, p. 91).  
Rudd articulated the pressures on a ministerial adviser (and indeed minister him/herself) 
and the issues that have to be taken into account. Notably, the question of scientific 
evidence does not even rate a mention in this list of interests that must be considered. 
Rudd goes on to say; 
“Good policy is invariably the product of multiple inputs presenting the 
range of interests which advisers and officials are responsible for 
reflecting. These are the ingredients of a healthy policy process” (Rudd 
1992; p. 98).  
Senior public health officials in the USA have reported being muzzled by successive 
administrations, and prevented from advocating and speaking out on particular issues. 
Surgeons General Carmona, C Everett Koop and David Satcher all reported political 
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interference in speaking out on such issues as HIV/AIDS, needle-exchange programs, 
sexual behaviour and tobacco control. 
“The responsibility for achieving neutrality falls partly in the 
Administration's lap; it is essential that politicians allow public-health 
officials to release the best evidence-based information available without 
political interference. But responsibility also rests with the surgeon 
general, to speak out about such interference while he is still in a position 
of power, and to stand up and resist the pressure to censor scientific 
information … 
“… Affected agencies include the Food and Drug Administration, the 
Fish and Wildlife services, and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), predominantly with respect to politically sensitive 
issues such as childhood lead poisoning, toxic Mercury emissions, 
climate change, nuclear weapons, and reproductive health” (The Lancet 
Editorial 2007, p. 193).  
Corruption and crony capitalism 
In Tasmania there is a history of corruption in government, and allegations of politicians 
being offered financial incentives. One such event related to Kevin Lyons MHA who 
was allegedly given money by British Tobacco in 1972, and who was accused of 
bringing down the Bethune Liberal Government as a consequence. However, the 
charges were never proven by a police enquiry (Hay 1976; Petrow 2006; Quarmby 
2006). Crony capitalism and corruption have been identified as a characteristic of 
Tasmanian governments continuing to the present day by Beresford (2010, 2015) and 
Flanagan (2004, 2007). Chapter 5 of this thesis describes in more detail how these 
events unfolded, and why the concept of “crony capitalism” is essential to an 
understanding of Tasmanian policies and governance. How close more recent 
governments are to the tobacco industry is difficult to ascertain, but such relationships 
would be a barrier to tobacco-control reforms and have been specifically singled out by 
the WHO in Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) as 
relationships to be avoided (WHO 2014).   
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Economics 
A state’s economy and its revenue base can have a significant effect on funding for 
smoking prevention and tobacco control (Harris 2006). Indeed, this raises the very basic 
question of how and why funding decisions are made in relation to tobacco control? In 
Australia, health ministers control their budget allocations for tobacco control; however, 
they are constrained by the actions, priorities and interests of Cabinet and department of 
Treasury and Finance in making decisions through the budget process (Lin, Smith & 
Fawkes 2007). Treasury is always interested in minimising new expenditures, and can 
act as a constraining “dead hand” on any new initiatives. This view tends to be very 
short-term. 
Goel and Nelson (2006) attempted an economic analysis of the effectiveness of anti-
smoking legislation and other non-price controls (health warnings and bans on 
workplace smoking and advertising), as well as price measures (higher taxes) across 
many countries. This has not proven to be very helpful. It was too difficult for the 
researchers to separate the variables to give a very clear picture (Goel & Nelson 2006), 
or it is perhaps not surprising that Treasurers tend to stand off this area.  
Women and independent politicians 
Hooker and Chapman found however, that women politicians from all political parties 
were a source of bipartisanship in advocating for tobacco control, and they also found 
that independent MPs were important in promoting reform (Hooker & Chapman 2006, 
p. 10).  
Conclusion 
Tobacco control is a wicked problem in Australia and elsewhere. Smoking causes high 
long-term economic and social costs to the health system and to societies as a whole. 
There is ample evidence to support various initiatives that have been found to be 
effective to reduce smoking rates, and which work well in most countries. 
Despite this, little attention has been given to tobacco control in the policy literature. 
This thesis adopts the Kingdon (1995) theoretical model of “agenda setting” as a way of 
considering how tobacco control has been considered, or left off, policy-making 
agendas.  
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The central theme of this thesis is that either evidence or knowledge transfer has not 
occurred, or it has been ignored, in relation to tobacco control in Tasmania. The value 
orientation of the thesis is that it is better for governments to adopt evidence-based 
policies in relation to public health issues such as smoking and tobacco control, and to 
have a long-term view of this. 
Policy-makers adopt a different set of parameters to evaluate ‘evidence’ than that which 
is adopted by scientists, and will consider such things as colloquial advice, the media 
and ideas from political constituents.  
There are several models of evidence transfer, detailed in this Chapter, none of which 
offers a complete answer, but which are all useful for thinking about the way knowledge 
is transferred and utilized, and the barriers to knowledge utilisation. 
The role of “policy entrepreneurs” has been important in tobacco control, and the term 
is used in a wider sense than the term “advocate”. Leaders and influential members of 
non-government organisations, senior bureaucrats, union officials, the medical 
profession and the tobacco industry itself have all sought to influence tobacco-control 
policy. Many would argue that the tobacco industry has been the most effective agency 
in this regard, as it has effectively delayed or prevented many reforms over many years 
and across the world. 
In the case of policy failure, it may be that the absence of adequate resources, including 
people and access to information, within the bureaucracy or NGOs could be a factor in 
not progressing evidence-based reforms. Governments in Australia are under constant 
pressure to reduce the number of bureaucrats, and to increase the number of workers 
directly delivering services, thus diminishing institutional and corporate memory and 
wisdom in decision-making. 
The structures of government in Australia as a federal system can act as a brake on 
reform in many areas including tobacco control. Policy-makers’ decision-making 
processes are constrained by the structures in which they find themselves. The roles of 
political minders, of Cabinet processes and political pressures on public servants and 
ministers all influence the way policy is made, and can overwhelm the influence of 
scientific “evidence”. 
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All the factors outlined in this review of the literature will be considered in the thesis, as 
part of the analysis of data gathered on political and bureaucratic influences on tobacco-
control policy. 
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Chapter 3 Methods 
Introduction 
Consideration of the method for conducting research for this thesis was based on 
discussions with all supervisors and a great deal of background reading. In particular, 
several books on conducting qualitative research were consulted and were useful in 
providing a guide (Patton 2002; Grbich 1999; Hansen 2006; Wolcot 2009; Bell 2010).  
As the hypothesis is that there have been barriers to evidence-based tobacco-control 
policy in Tasmania, the method is designed to elucidate the barriers using a number of 
different sources of data. It rests on an assumption that there are barriers to using 
evidence to determine policy, because of evidence for the lack of implementation or 
adequacy of key interventions. 
The theoretical framework adopted is that of Kingdon’s approach to agenda setting in 
the public sector, through a study of the political and bureaucratic decision-making 
processes associated with funding for tobacco control in the public sector (Kingdon 
1995).  
The key themes are, firstly, “windows of opportunity”, agenda setting, and how policy 
entrepreneurs and advocates might attract the notice of policy makers, leading to the 
allocation or non-allocation of resources.  
Secondly, the process of transferring evidence or knowledge from the scientific or 
research sector relating to tobacco control, into the sphere of government decision-
making.  
The third theme is that of examining the structural and bureaucratic infrastructure and 
resourcing available within the Department of Health and Human Services, for 
developing policy frameworks relating to tobacco-control measures. 
The methodological approaches used in this thesis are based on a modified, or 
expanded, grounded theory approach (Patton 2002, p. 125, Hansen 2006, p. 63) using a 
collection of published and unpublished documentation, including newspaper, electronic 
media reports, Hansard transcripts, archival records and documents found in the 
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Tasmanian State library, the Parliamentary Library and government files. An iterative 
thematic analysis was adopted; using a ‘realist’ approach which involve moving 
iteratively back and forth as data found was used to “adapt and re-focus research 
questions” (Hansen 2006, p. 139).  
As Hansen says, “The process of ‘coding’ is a key feature of grounded theory (Hansen 
2006, p64)”, in the tradition of Strauss and Corbin, (Strauss and Corbin, 1994) and not 
all documents obtained were amenable to coding. The grounded theory approach was 
modified in that not all documents were coded. Those that were not coded were scanned 
to see if they bore any relationship to the data obtained through those documents that 
were scanned. This provided an iterative approach to the coding process and allowed 
addition of documents where they shed light on the theories and findings that had 
emerged. The type of research adopted in this thesis tries to “get to the truth of the 
matter” and to try to “identify processes, experiences” or “reasons” why people 
“behave” in a certain way (Hansen 2006, p. 140). It does not use discourse or narrative 
analysis, which is used to produce an account that is satisfying to the participants and 
the researcher. Central to this approach is coding of data as it is collected and analysed 
and as explained later. 
There is no formal recorded field work. No interviews were conducted for several 
reasons, as explained in previously in the introductory chapter. Essentially, as the 
accessing of documents proceeded and the politicians and bureaucrats became aware of 
the study, the likelihood of extracting meaningful unbiased information from the actors 
in Tasmania became more and more remote. The author and all supervisors have been at 
various points involved in the processes of policy-making as observers, advisors, 
clinicians, critics or advocates. Therefore, the probability of significant “participant 
observer bias” was deemed to be probable. 
Tasmania is so small that all the researchers, physicians, politicians, public servants and 
health organisation officials are well known to one another, their views, ideologies and 
biases understood, and therefore any interviews would almost certainly have been 
tainted by participants saying what they thought the interviewer wanted to hear, or 
would find acceptable. Retrospective self-justification of past actions (or inaction) was 
inevitable in this environment. A study in NSW by Hooker and Chapman encountered a 
similar difficulty, but were able to conduct interviews because the first author and 
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interviewer was a non-activist impartial historian, even though the second author was a 
well-known public health professional academic and activist (Hooker & Chapman 
2006). By contrast, Viehbeck chose to study within her own Canadian tobacco research 
community, however, the lens and familiarity brought advantages in that the application 
of a “constructivist” perspective was perceived to have improved the meaning of the 
project (Viehbeck 2011).  
Document analysis 
In this thesis, a document analysis, although considered one of the most demanding 
forms of qualitative research (Bell 2010), was adopted as the most effective and 
balanced way to proceed. Bell (2010) says the document analysis approach demands, 
 “….sophisticated understanding of, for example, the ways in which sub-
texts operate, and how the same words can mean different things or vice 
versa over the history of evolution of a policy argument.”(Bell, p. 91)  
By 2010 the amount of material, data and documentation amassed was so enormous that 
it was considered unnecessary, and almost certainly counter-productive to proceed with 
interviews, even if the potential problems of bias could have been overcome. The thesis 
therefore relies on what actually happened, what was recorded and what was said 
publicly and on the record. Many of these records were not publicly available, and were 
provided by government agencies. The rich data obtained included for example, copies 
of internal emails, which showed that people within the agency were confused and 
unclear about the status of a particular document, where it was, who was responsible, 
and where it should go next. These emails highlighted issues of accountability that 
would never otherwise have been available to researchers. There seems to be little 
evidence in the literature of such a comprehensive documentation study in this context.  
Using many sources, including government files, newspapers, archive documents, and 
Hansards enables triangulation of data to check on validity of the observations and 
collections. A thesis by Mark Lawrence at Deakin University on folate fortification 
provided a useful model for a case study of public health policy-making in Australia. 
Some ideas from the structure of his methodological approach was adapted in this 
thesis. Lawrence used Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as a theoretical 
framework (Lawrence 2002; Sabatier 1988).  
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The thesis uses the Kingdon theoretical framework, because it aims to delve into policy 
failure, rather than mapping a successful policy approach using an ACF Sabatier type 
analysis. Kingdon recognises the importance of policy entrepreneurs and their role as 
part of a policy community. He discusses how ideas float around in the “policy primeval 
soup”, some are taken up and others drift away. Smith too recognises the importance of 
“ideas” in tobacco control, throwing out a challenge to the extent that; 
“Sometimes research evidence must lag behind policy interventions and 
that is one reason why a narrow obsession with “evidence-based policy 
can be restrictive” (Smith 2013, p. xi). 
The role of ideas, and the impact of policy entrepreneurs is difficult to incorporate into a 
methodological approach, when such ideas may go beyond existing evidence. The key 
research questions are therefore important in grounding the research in time and place, 
and in actual events, activity and outcomes.  
The research questions and themes 
The three major research questions or themes considered, concern evidence/knowledge 
transfer, policy entrepreneurs and structural issues. There are many questions within 
these three major themes and are linked to the Kingdon model. 
Evidence/knowledge transfer 
The first question is what has prevented Tasmania implementing mass media 
campaigns, community education and funding of tobacco control efforts on a scale that 
is considered by the literature to be necessary in order to achieve a reduction in smoking 
rates? 
The second question is has the evidence about the importance of funding and mass-
media campaigns in reducing smoking prevalence, been transmitted to higher 
bureaucratic and political levels in Tasmania prior to 2008? 
Thirdly, if the evidence has been conveyed – has action been “blocked”? (e.g. by Senior 
health bureaucrats Treasury/Premiers/ministers) 
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Policy entrepreneurs 
Fourthly are there policy entrepreneurs in tobacco control in Tasmania? If so, what 
influence have these policy entrepreneurs had? Is their role crucial or influential in 
moving the agenda forward in tobacco control?  
Structural issues 
Finally, the question of structural issues is addressed. What influence has the Tasmanian 
political and bureaucratic structural system had in relation to tobacco smoking 
prevention initiatives? How does it compare with other state structural systems for 
dealing with tobacco control at a policy level? The role of Ministerial Council on Drug 
Strategy (MCDS), the Inter-governmental Council on Drugs (IGCD) and the Tasmanian 
Tobacco Coalition will all be considered under this theme. 
Record examination 
Records in the public domain were examined, using specific search terms, to see if there 
were any records of funding decisions about tobacco control, how and to whom the 
scientific evidence has been accessed and transferred; who has prepared policy advice, 
their position and what happened to any such advice within the system. (See also coding 
on Page 120 below) 
The records searched and analysed were, 
 Hansards, the transcript of Parliamentary proceedings as well as Estimates 
committees, which is available online, was searched for data about legislation 
reform, funding decisions, views expressed by politicians about effective 
methods of reducing smoking prevalence and tobacco-control measures 
generally. 
 Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Treasury and 
Finance records of processes relating to tobacco control initiatives, measures, 
and records of any representations made by the tobacco industry or their 
associated organisations were sought. The Department of Health and Human 
Services; Department of Premier and Cabinet and Department of Primary 
Industries, Parks, Water and Environment (which includes Lands) provided 
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many helpful and relevant documentary records. The Department of Health and 
Human Services provided documents in pdf format and allowed access to the 
relevant files. The Department of Treasury and Finance refused access to 
records. 
 Tasmanian daily newspapers since 1996 through search engines such as ANZ 
Reference Centre to online Australian newspapers. In addition, newspapers on 
microfiche at the State Library of Tasmania from earlier periods in the 1970s 
were examined for relevance to the policy-making process. 
 Archival records at the Tasmaniana Library and the State Library of Tasmania 
relating to the British Tobacco bribery allegations of the 1970s. 
 Archival file records from the national archives from the 1970s concerning inter-
government machinations, political decisions, and a tobacco tax. 
 Records of Tasmanian Television News ABC, WIN and Southern Cross were 
sought but were not available.  
The following Table 5 provides more detail about the number and types of documents 
obtained. The table does not include all documents that were read or searched during the 
course of the study. Only those documents that were retained, because of their 
relevance, either in hard copy or digit al format are recorded here.  Many are 
specifically referred to in the thesis, and annotated or referenced accordingly.  
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 Table 5 Documents searched, analysed and retained in either hard copy or digital 
format. 
Type of document *1 Source  No of 
documents2  
Letters, reports, memos, 
handwritten notes, legal 
advice, meeting notes. 
Primarily from the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s. 
Tasmanian State Archives, 
LINC. 
65 
Mercury reprints 1974, 
repealed legislation. 
Parliamentary library 
(Tasmania) 
11 
Extracts from Australian 
Political Chronicle -1972 - 
1974 
Parliamentary library 
(Tasmania) 
4 
Notes, letters, reports – 
tobacco industry documents. 
Various years 1975 onwards 
Truth tobacco industry 
(Legacy) documents - 
UCSF Library and Center 
for Knowledge 
Management USA. 
80 
Statistics and graphs ABS, AIHW, DHHS, 
Parliamentary Library. 
165 
Maps Department of Primary 
Industries and Water 
(DPIPWE) 
10 
Minutes of meetings, reports, 
surveys, state of public health 
reports, ministerial briefings, 
internal emails, letters, 
agendas, reviews, evaluations, 
tobacco action plans, 
strategies, discussion papers. 
Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) 
433 
                                                 
1 Documents used in this study, and retained. Many other documents were examined. Documents were not 
saved, if not used. For example, many government budget papers and annual reports were searched and 
discarded, not recorded or returned, if nothing relevant or useful relating to tobacco control was found. 
2 Number of pages of these documents vary from one page (mostly individual news clippings and maps) to 
multiple pages well over 100 (in the case of reports and internal confidential government reviews). 
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Newspaper clippings. 
Transcripts of media 
reports.3 
State Library (Tasmania), 
LINC & Newsbank 
213 
Political Parties annual 
returns 
Australian Electoral 
Commission 
54 
Miscellaneous NGO 
publications, statistics, 
graphs, documents – 
including “Dirty Ashtray” 
summaries and calculations. 
Public Health Association, 
Cancer Council, Heart 
Foundation. QUIT, AMA, 
ACOSH, Pharmacy 
Association. 
43 
Commonwealth reports  ANPHA, DOHA, NPHP,   21 
Other state government 
Departments documents and 
reports. Emails, letters. Some 
sections redacted with 
notation “Internal working 
deliberative information 
removed” or “personal 
information removed”. 
DPIPWE, Auditor-General, 
DOTAF, Premier and 
Cabinet (DPAC).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
167 
Hansards – extracts copied. 
Most coded in NVivo. Around 
123 pages each. Approx. 
35,000 pages. 
Parliament of Tasmania, 
Hansard  
289 
Letter, list.  National Library  2 
Research reports and 
appendices 
Australian Parliament  2 
 
Data Collection and analysis  
A qualitative data analysis of the role of the bureaucracy was conducted, using 
documentation obtained from various sources from 1997 to 2010, with particular 
emphasis on agenda-setting, knowledge-transfer and organisational structures. 
                                                 
3 Newspaper clippings- the digitized version of these are grouped in sets of months [eg 2005 (Oct 27-Dec 12)], 
so “1 newspaper clipping” may represent 10 or more articles/stories/letters to the editor or “clippings”. 
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Documents relating to tobacco control were sought from: Health and Human Services 
(DHHS), Primary Industry Parks and Water (DPIPWE), Treasury and Finance 
(DOTAF), and Premier and Cabinet (DPAC). Some documents were provided by non-
government organisations (NGOs). Some documents were difficult to obtain and/or 
took a long time to be provided. For example, a file requested from the national archives 
took a year to be provided, because it involved controversial internal political 
correspondence during the 1970s between the Commonwealth and Tasmanian 
governments, including Treasurers, Premiers and the Prime Minister, and had to be 
approved for release as a public document. A few documents contained redacted 
sections.  
Parliamentary Hansards were searched, then the relevant pages copied as documents 
into Microsoft word and later entered into NVivo, and coded. The same process was 
used with newspapers or on-line articles. 
Digital documents were analysed and coded using NVivo. Other documents were sorted 
and analysed manually. Grey literature searches included published government reports, 
newspaper reports, government websites and tobacco industry document websites, 
mainly the Legacy Library, Truth Tobacco industry documents held and managed 
online by the University of California San Francisco Library.  
The data collected is from several sources, which enabled “triangulation” to occur to 
determine whether there were discrepancies or agreement between what people are 
saying, and a relationship or otherwise to the outcomes or the written decisions (Patton 
2002; Hansen 2006).  
Other documents such as the pages from the files copied from the Archives do not lend 
themselves well to incorporating into NVivo, so these were examined and sorted and 
analysed separately. The paper used in the 1960s and 1970s in the files examined for the 
Chapter 5 were different shapes and sizes, some in a fragile state, and many of them 
foolscap, a paper size used commonly before A4. Older newspaper clippings were on 
microfiche, and had to be found, and then printed from the microfiche equipment at the 
State Library, and were not always clear or readable by digital readers, and had to be 
collected and analysed and sorted manually. This was a very laborious and time-
consuming process, as each set of newspaper files for each few weeks’ period had to be 
loaded into the reader and scrolled through to find the relevant item. The library index 
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systems were initially on cards at the beginning of the data collection period in 2007. 
Later by 2014 the index system had been digitized and it was easier to find documents. 
However, the initial data collection for the first few years of this thesis was painstaking 
and slow. Over 200 source documents, many over thirty pages, were incorporated into 
NVivo. These were coded into 94 cases, 38 free nodes, and 14 tree nodes.  
The bulk of the document data that could be managed in digital format comprised 
lengthy Hansard extracts. This was invaluable in drawing together the threads of various 
arguments, opinions, and statements made by the key individuals, particularly 
politicians and senior public servants involved in the decision-making processes. The 
collection of data from separate types of sources enabled triangulation and verification 
of events, decision-making processes, ideas presented, and actions of policy 
entrepreneurs and advocates both within the public sector and outside it. 
Coding 
The coding process began with the first documents until “saturation” was reached, to the 
extent that nothing new was materializing, and no new themes were emerging. The 
primary key term used for searches in both newspaper and Hansard transcripts was 
“tobacco”. Early attempts to use the key search terms ‘smoke” or “smoking” generated 
multiple thousands of “hits”, because in Tasmania the use of forest burn-offs means that 
these terms appear many times. The relatively unsophisticated search engines available 
in the Parliamentary and state libraries at the time this study began in 2006 to about 
2009, meant that forestry burns could not be eliminated from the searches. Therefore, 
the key term “tobacco” was used throughout, which still successfully generated large 
amounts of data. Entering the term “tobacco” on the Parliamentary website as at mid-
2015 generates 13,841 “hits” in 1,625 documents. It is unlikely that any important 
debates were missed.  
The coding process was inductively derived following the approach suggested by Patton 
(Patton, 2002 p.462-466). Later, deductive analysis was implemented once the 
framework, patterns, themes and categories were established (Patton, 2002 p. 453-455) 
Firstly, key phrases and themes in the Hansards and were identified, and later by 
identifying and coding references in the other digital written records. Secondly, 
individuals’ and organisations’ statements were coded to cases, so that they could later 
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be identified and discussed in context of particular epochs, ideas, reforms or themes. All 
politicians who spoke in any detail on tobacco-related issues were listed, and extracts of 
their speeches coded. All organisations identified, that made media statements, 
including NGOs, and tobacco industry and their associates, were recorded and coded. 
Some of this was repetitive and duplicates were not included, for example if a statement 
appeared in two newspapers. There were 200 “source” documents, however each 
individually may have included a number of documents, for example ten or more 
extracts from newspaper clippings may have appeared on one NVivo “source” 
document, and many pages of transcript from Parliamentary records may only be 
recorded as one “source” document. As an example, the Wednesday 10 December 1997 
House of Assembly debate on the Public Health Bill 1997 (No. 106) ran to 49 pages and 
19,472 words. For the purposes of NVivo this was recorded as only one source 
document, but it generated a significant amount of coding, for individual politicians and 
themes.  
There were 94 “cases” that were mainly names of individual politicians, tobacco 
companies and their front organisations, senior public servants, NGOs and academics or 
activists. Thirty-eight “free nodes” and 14 “tree nodes” were generated and coded. The 
free nodes included themes such as ‘addiction” (8 references), “passive smoking” (188 
references), “smoking rates” (23 references),” litigation” (51 references). The tree nodes 
were such themes as “children smoking” (62 sources and 89 references) and “tobacco 
companies’ behaviour” (46 sources and 76 references). 
The trustworthiness of the research approach was improved not only by the breadth and depth 
of data obtained, but by engaging in self-reflexivity throughout the process, and triangulation 
of reflexive enquiry more generally (Patton 2002, p 495). Advisors and supervisors were 
from differing politico/social perspectives, academic disciplines and research specialties, 
which worked to ensure that interpretations were reasonable.  
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Table 6 Tree Nodes coded in NVivo 
Tree Nodes Sources References 
Cabinet 
 
16 24 
Children smoking 
 
62 89 
Civil Liberties arguments 
 
8 10 
Costs of tobacco smoking 
 
8 9 
Funding 
 
26 33 
Legislation 
 
66 116 
Political party funding by 
tobacco industry 
 
18 26 
Sport 
 
20 27 
Taxation 
 
39 78 
Teachers pay 
 
7 20 
Tobacco companies’ behaviour 
 
46 76 
Treasury 
 
4 8 
Figures for the Cases and Free nodes contents are not included here because of their large size. 
Data Interpretation 
The data were interpreted through the lens of Kingdon’s theoretical approach. This 
included the role of policy entrepreneurs; the content of the “policy primeval soup” in 
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the context of Tasmanian public sector policy-making in tobacco control; the policy 
community; consideration of “windows of opportunity” – which ones opened and 
closed and why; budget constraints and what has happened over time (a decade or so); 
and the “coupling” of problems to solutions and how that happens. 
This thesis is looking for something that was missing – adequate tobacco-control 
funding – and lack of other evidence-based policy implementation, as well as looking at 
the events surrounding the making of tobacco-control policy. The data sought were: 
what was written, what was said, what was actually done, and the barriers and 
impediments that slowed or prevented reforms or the allocation of resources. Therefore 
Kingdon’s concept of the ‘windows of opportunity” was the key to interpreting data in 
this thesis.  
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Chapter 4 Tasmania – a brief history of tobacco 
control 
Introduction 
This Chapter provides material about the various smoking rates reported by different 
statistical measures over time, as well as a record of the major initiatives designed to 
reduce smoking rates. Both AIHW data and ABS data are shown, and although they 
were collected in different ways and at different times, the trends give a picture of what 
has happened, even though the exact numbers may differ. 
Australia has been a world leader in tobacco control (Beaglehole, 2015, p. 459, 
Chapman et al, 2003). Comprehensive tobacco control strategies have been in existence 
nationally and at most state and territory levels for many decades, and smoking rates 
have fallen considerably. However, the nature of the Australian federation is such that 
states control certain aspects of tobacco control and federal government control other 
measures. For example, until 1996, states could realize some control over the price of 
cigarettes, but after that date it became the responsibility of the Commonwealth, see 
Table 9. 
Tasmania has always had higher smoking rates than other Australian states, just as it has 
higher unemployment and lower average socio-economic status (SES). Only the 
Northern Territory has a more disadvantaged profile, and that is mostly as a result of 
indigenous disadvantage in that jurisdiction. Smoking rates are associated with socio-
economic status, and therefore the higher smoking rates in Tasmania are unsurprising. 
However, it is also true that smoking rates can be reduced in all SES groups (Durkin, 
2009) provided that effective measures are implemented. Furthermore, in Australia 
mass media campaigns are effective overall. Durkin et al conclude  
“Mass media campaigns to promote quitting are important investments as 
part of comprehensive tobacco control programmes to educate about the 
harms of smoking, set the agenda for discussion, change smoking 
attitudes and beliefs, increase quitting intentions and quit attempts, and 
reduce adult smoking prevalence. Jurisdictions should aim for high reach 
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and consistent exposure over time with preference towards negative 
health effects messages.” (Durkin et al, 2012) 
Sometimes in Tasmania it appears efforts to reduce smoking rates are dismissed for the 
very reasons that should spur greater incentives to do so. A kind of collective despairing 
hand-wringing has occurred, characterised by comments such as from one health 
minister who declared she was at her “wit’s end” as to how to reduce smoking rates as if 
this was some extraordinary “act of God” she could not affect (Giddings, in Hansard 
2009). The reasons for this nihilism and barriers to effective action are explored in 
detail in the other chapters. 
Tasmania was late onto the Australian scene in implementing tobacco-control measures. 
There was little significant local effort by governments to reduce smoking rates until the 
late 1990s. While states such as Victoria had led the way in the 1970s and 1980s with 
significant reforms (Ballard 2004), there was little discernible influence in Tasmania 
from health NGOs nor a visible or energetic culture of public health advocacy on 
smoking until the mid-1990s. Despite slow beginnings, Tasmania has had a long history 
of innovative individuals bringing forward legislation in tobacco control, not always 
successfully, recorded as early as 1894 in a Sydney newspaper.  
In 1907 there was even an attempt to ban sales of cigarettes to women (Editor, 1907). 
And even earlier 1894 attempts to eliminate juvenile smoking. 
“Tasmania’s Counterblast. Juvenile Cigarette Smoking…… Tasmania, 
long looked upon by her more pretentious neighbours as a quiet little 
place, and only too often dubbed ' Sleepy Hollow,' has at last set her 
bigger sisters an example of prompt action that is worthy of notice. The 
move that the quiet little island is now agitating itself with is the 
suppression of the juvenile cigarette smoker. A bill has been presented to 
the Assembly by Dr E. L. Crowther, providing that any child under the 
age of 16 found smoking in the streets shall be required by any constable 
witnessing the indulgence to supply his or her name and address, 
presumably with a view to communication with parents or guardians” 
(Evening News 1894, p. 5).  
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Smoking rates 
ABS data has shown for many years that Tasmanian smoking are higher than other 
states, although the 2010 AIHW data showed that the smoking rate is actually lower in 
Tasmania than in Queensland (Chart 3). (See also Chart 9 at the end of the chapter). 
Smoking rates have declined in Tasmania since 2009, with the most significant decline 
in female smoking rates. Male smoking rates have fallen very little since 1995 and are 
slightly higher than in 2001 (See Chart 4). (See also Charts 8 and 9 at the end of the 
chapter). 
The other notable feature of the trend in smoking rates in Tasmania is a plateau in the 
declining smoking rates between about 2001 and 2009. This thesis was precipitated by 
the alarming lack of a decline in smoking rates in Tasmania. 
Population Health Surveys conducted in 2009 by Menzies Research Institute, (Menzies, 
2009) and 2013 by the DHHS (DHHS, 2014) show that smoking rates for both men and 
women apparently fell across all age groups, but the only significant declines were for 
males aged 45-54 and for females 35-44. The fall in female smoking rates was quite 
dramatic in both these groups, and in the ABS data, which suggest that this was a real 
decline. The age cohort is also important in that it is in the child-bearing years that 
women’s smoking rates are declining. Male smoking rates in these age groups are not 
falling as fast.  
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Chart 3 Overall population smoking rates and poverty rates by State and Australia 
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2011, p. 30; Kryger 2009.  
Chart 4 Proportion of current smokers by sex, 18 years and over, Tasmania 1989 - 
2012 
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Mortality  
Tobacco smoking kills more Tasmanians than alcohol, suicide, all other injuries, road 
vehicles, illicit drugs assault and fires combined. The following estimates were provided by 
the Epidemiology Unit of the Department of Health and Human Services prior to the study by 
Banks et al, which showed that two-thirds of smokers die from tobacco related illnesses. 
Therefore, it is likely that smoking deaths the following graph would be adjusted upwards by 
another third, in future. 
Chart 5 Deaths caused by smoking, alcohol and other selected causes Tasmania 
2008-2012 
 
Source: DHHS Epidemiology Unit, Public Health, 2015, unpublished data. 
 
Poverty and socio economic issues 
Tasmania has higher poverty rates than other states (Chart 3), which is important as 
lower socio-economic status is considered to be a major contribution to higher smoking 
rates (Taylor 2013; Mackenbach et al. 2008).  
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The State of Public Health Report for Tasmania (2013) noted that, 
“• In December 2012, Tasmania had the highest rate of unemployment 
(7.3%) of all jurisdictions.  
• Additionally, the estimated long-term unemployment rate for Tasmania 
(1.5%) was the highest in the country, as was the estimated under-
employment rate (9.3%).  
• Tasmania has the highest proportion of people living below the poverty 
line, as a result of very low median incomes and a high reliance on 
government income support payments” 
And  
“• In 2011, Tasmania had the second highest proportion (after the 
Northern Territory) of single parent families (17%) among the 
jurisdictions, with the national average rate being 15.9%. The higher 
proportion of sole parents also contributes to Tasmania’s higher poverty 
rates.  
• Education levels have increased in Tasmania, from 31.3% of 
Tasmanians aged 15 years and over completing Year 12 in 2006 to 
36.5% in 2011. However, Tasmania is still behind other jurisdictions … 
in Year 12 school retention rates” (Taylor 2013, p. 24). 
Whilst it has been known for some years that smoking rates can be reduced in low SES 
groups (Durkin, Biener & Wakefield 2009; Niederdeppe et al. 2008), this did not occur 
in Tasmania until late in 2013. Although many legislative reforms were introduced in 
Tasmania during the 1990s and 2000s, it was not until 2013 that sufficient funds were 
allocated to social marketing campaigns, in accordance with the national and 
international evidence, and the reasons for this are explored in other chapters (Tobacco 
Coalition 2013).  
The Director of Public Health recognised in his 2013 report that, 
 “…more must be done. In particular, there is a need to further increase 
resources for and diversification of social marketing measures against 
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smoking in Tasmania as it appears the states with the greatest declines in 
smoking rates in recent years have been those that invested the most in 
sustained social marketing campaigns” (Taylor 2013, p. 43).  
The Tasmanian Tobacco Action Plan year 3 Review, completed in 2013 stated: 
“The most significant achievement for tobacco control in many years is 
the recent increase in funding for social marketing campaigns supported 
by both Tasmanian and Australian governments. For the first time ever 
in Tasmania, this will enable campaigns to be implemented at the level 
the evidence says will have an impact” (Tobacco Coalition 2013, p. 6) 
[emphasis added]. 
It is difficult to obtain accurate information about poverty rates in Australia, however in 
2011 a researcher at the Parliamentary Library in Canberra published a paper that 
provided some useful estimates of poverty in 2006 by Australian electorates. Smoking 
rates for Tasmania have been used in Chart 3 to give a picture of the smoking rates 
compared to poverty rates in each state. Tasmania has had both the highest poverty rate 
and the highest smoking rate. Whilst the actual smoking rates for the year 2010 as 
recorded by AIHW may have some anomalies, nevertheless it provides a way of looking 
at the situation, and may have some explanatory power. 
Tobacco control efforts and interventions 
Taxation 
Tasmania was at the forefront of attempts to introduce tobacco taxation in Australia, and 
the Bethune Liberal Government had legislation drafted to this effect in 1972. The 
Reece Labor government introduced a franchise fee in 1973, but soon abandoned it. 
James states:  
“The first (Australian state) attempt at introducing a business franchise 
fee occurred in Tasmania in February 1973 in respect of tobacco. The 
legislation imposing the fee was challenged in the High Court, where it 
was found to be valid, although certain technical flaws with the 
legislation, especially in regard to a consumption tax element of the 
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scheme, were identified. The State redrafted its legislation to overcome 
these but before it could be retested in the High Court the fee was 
suspended following the negotiation of revised financial arrangements 
with the Commonwealth. The collection of licence fees was suspended 
from 1 July 1974” (James1997).  
A more detailed explanation of this story is contained in the Chapter 6. 
While none of these taxation measures was aimed at reducing smoking rates, the 
intention was purely revenue raising, nevertheless they would have had the effect of 
reducing smoking rates. In the early 1990s the state Liberal government increased the 
tobacco tax, which reduced the amount spent on tobacco.  
Chart 6 shows how much Tasmanian smokers spent on cigarettes and other tobacco 
products during the period 1985 to 2011. It also depicts which government was in 
power at a state and federal level, and what tobacco control interventions took place at 
each point in time. This particular figure does not necessarily equate to smoking rates, 
because some smokers switched to cheaper brands when taxes went up, but it is useful 
for looking at trends. (See also Chart 7, which shows a comparison of expenditure on 
tobacco between states). 
Expenditure on tobacco in Tasmania has been declining at the same rate as Australia in 
general since the 1980s, with a couple of exceptions. During the period from around the 
early 1990s then from 1999 to 2005 expenditure in Tasmania increased against the 
national trend. After 2009 this improved and expenditure on tobacco declined in 
Tasmania at a similar rate to the rest of Australia. 
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Chart 6 $ Millions expended on tobacco per quarter by Tasmanian smokers 1985 – 2011  
Source: 
Derived from ABS 5206 Household final consumption expenditure (HFCE)Table 8.   
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 134 
 
Chart 7 Expenditure on tobacco, comparison between Australia and Tasmania 1985 to 2013 
 
Source ABS. 5206 and 5206 Table 8. 
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History of tobacco control interventions and laws in Tasmania 
Interventions in Tasmania in tobacco control differed from mainland states in two 
important ways. Tasmania was an early adopter of legislative reforms, but a late adopter 
of adequate funding for both cessation services and for social media campaigns. This 
dichotomy is significant and at the core of this study. The barriers to allocation of funds, 
and delays to legislative reform, are explored in detail in subsequent chapters. 
The chronological history of tobacco control interventions, laws and funding 
arrangements is listed chronologically in Tables 5 and 6 at the end of the Chapter.  
As described in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 the tobacco industry was a significant barrier to 
taxation and legislative reforms at all stages, to the extent that it was prepared to engage 
in corrupt behaviour and dispose of an elected government. However, there is no 
evidence that the tobacco industry was a barrier to allocation of funding, except to the 
extent that it was trying to control the media, politicians and community perceptions of 
tobacco, and to downplay the health effects.  
The association between particular tobacco control interventions and smoking 
prevalence is not always clear as there are always many variables and unclear trends in 
operation, both nationally and at a state level. Even international reports from for 
example the Surgeon General may have an impact on community awareness of the 
health effects of tobacco.  
Wakefield et al. have provided some useful analysis of the effects of tobacco control 
interventions in Australia over the years 2001 to 2011. They found that increased 
tobacco taxation, more comprehensive smoke-free laws and increased investment in 
mass-media campaigns played substantial roles in reducing smoking prevalence in adult 
Australians (Wakefield et al. 2014). The Wakefield study did not include Tasmania, and 
was confined to capital cities elsewhere. As the writers noted, time series analysis tends 
to detect “the more immediate and direct effect of interventions and is less able to detect 
longer-term priming effects or indirect effects of policies or mass-media campaigns” 
Wakefield et al. 2014, p. 419). As legislative reforms are tabled in Parliament and 
discussions about the health effects of tobacco appeared in the media, debates between 
health organisations and hotel, tobacco or retailer organisations were made public, 
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caused controversy and discussion and may well have had an effect on the social 
acceptability of smoking, but such a subtle change would be difficult to measure. 
Stories about tobacco in the Hobart Mercury peaked in 2004, which was the year 
premier Jim Bacon died of smoking related lung cancer. 
Chart 8 Tobacco-related newspaper articles in Tasmania- Mercury/Sunday 
Tasmanian 2001 to 2008 
 
Source: Cancer Council Victoria, courtesy of Prof. Melanie Wakefield. 
Smoking restrictions in public places were first mooted by Minister Peter McKay in 
1996 (Rogers 1996), and he issued a strong warning to the tobacco industry that 
legislation would follow if the pubs and clubs, which had been agitating to continue 
self-regulation, did not take action to protect staff and customers from tobacco smoke 
pollution.  
The first truly significant efforts to introduce tobacco control in Tasmania began in 
1996 with the establishment of Quit Tasmania and the development and enactment of 
the Public Health Act 1997. The Director of Public Health, Dr Mark Jacobs, his staff 
and the Liberal Minister for Health Peter McKay began that process. Dr Jacobs’ 
contribution was widely recognised by members of parliament (Hansard, 1997). Peter 
McKay’s contribution was recognised in 1998 by the AMA and ACOSH, when 
Tasmania was awarded the “Clean Ashtray” award for the best performing state on 
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tobacco control that year (Diwell 1998). These first reforms were significant as they not 
only prohibited the sale of tobacco products to children under 18 years of age, but also 
restricted vending machines and tobacco displays in shops. Manufacturers were also 
prohibited from providing false information to any person about tobacco-control 
legislation or the health effects of tobacco products, the first jurisdiction in the world to 
do so. The tobacco industry challenged some of the guidelines issued under the 
legislation, which prompted the government to initiate further reforms and greater 
restrictions on tobacco display provisions.  
The Department of Health and Human Services acknowledged the lack of resources 
allocated to mass-media campaigns and cessation support, and that legislation has been 
used to compensate for this (Taylor & Frendin 2010, p. 72):  
“Tasmania has always had strong tobacco-control legislation but 
this is largely to compensate for a lack of resources available for 
health education and clinical interventions, particularly at the 
level provided by other Australian jurisdictions. Legislation on its 
own however is not sufficient to reduce smoking rates and this is 
the main reason why Tasmania has the second highest smoking 
rate in Australia, which has not decreased since 2001” [emphasis 
added]. 
This is a very important statement from the Department because it shows that at least 
some senior officers in the agency were well aware that insufficient resources had been 
allocated to tobacco control, and that this was a likely cause of higher smoking rates. It 
seems likely smoking rates in Tasmania could have been reduced, had sufficient effort 
been made by the government. 
Over the subsequent years from 1997 to 2013 smoking prohibition in public places both 
indoors and in many outdoor areas was established in Tasmania through continuing 
incremental legislation amendments to the Public Health Act 1997. These changes were 
always opposed by the tobacco industry and the Australian Hotels Association (AHA). 
The health NGOs, the relevant unions whose members were affected and the DHHS 
supported the reforms. This process is described in detail in other chapters.  
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Smoking in cars with children 
Other reforms such as banning smoking in cars with children in 2008 proceeded with 
almost no public opposition, although there were concerns expressed by the Police 
about enforcing these provisions (Hine 2010). The tobacco industry for reasons known 
only to itself did not oppose his legislation, but presumably because they had no way of 
countering evidence that smoking in small spaces such as a car is dangerous to children. 
There is also the possibility that any opposition would have created a backlash against 
the industry, and finally they may not have been concerned because they thought it 
would not affect overall sales of tobacco products. However, this is speculation, though 
it is possible that the sharp decline in smoking in young women of child-bearing age 
after this legislation was passed in 2008 may be attributable to this particular ban (See 
Chart 4) Interestingly, there was no decline in male smoking rates in this age group. 
This contrast has not been investigated to our knowledge and would be worthy of study. 
Summary 
The following graphs, charts and tables give a collated visual description of what 
happened in Tasmania in terms of smoking rates, interventions by year, comparisons 
with other states, mortality, interventions by year and by elected government and 
revenue collected over time. The roles and responsibilities of federal and state 
governments in relation to tobacco control are set out in Table 9. 
Each chapter provides a more detailed description and analysis of what occurred in 
Tasmania in the context of tobacco control.
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Tables and Charts 
 Table 7- Catalogue of tobacco control interventions by year 
Year  Action 
1894 A Bill presented to the Assembly Tasmania to prevent juvenile smoking. 
1900 - 1907 
Juvenile Smoking Suppression Act, 1900. This Act appears not to have been enforced, or perhaps never received 
Royal Assent. Another attempt was made in 1907 to introduce legislation to prevent sales to minors. 
1934 
Ban on the sale of cigarettes to children under 16 years of age under the Police Offences Act 1934. There were no 
recorded prosecutions under this legislation for around sixty years. 
1972 
Bethune Government launches criminal charges against the head of British Tobacco. Bethune Liberal Government 
drafts tobacco tax legislation but is ousted from office before it can be introduced. See Chapter 5 on Crony Capitalism. 
1973-1974 
Tobacco Tax established by Reece Labor government in 1973 but traded off and not collected, in exchange for 
additional funding of $15 million from the federal government and withdrawal from Grants Commission processes.  
1985 
Tobacco Business Franchises collected in Tasmania from 1985, not as a health measure but as revenue raising and 
under the control of the Treasury, not the Health Department. 
1996 Quit Tasmania established and funded by the Health Department. 
1996-1998   
Liberal government’s Public Health Act 1997 commenced including bans on tobacco advertising, the sale of cigarettes 
to children under 18 years of age self-service vending machines and display restrictions in retail shops. Manufacturers 
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Year  Action 
and suppliers were also banned from providing false information to any person about tobacco-control legislation or 
the health effects of tobacco products.  
1998  
Guidelines for tobacco products incorporating the tobacco product vending machine code 
Guidelines for display of tobacco products 
Guidelines for packaging and labelling of tobacco products 
 
1999 
Further sale and display restrictions in retail shops introduced following, and in response to, the tobacco industry legal 
challenge to guidelines.  
1999 Guidelines for non-tobacco cigarettes 
2000 
Regulatory Impact Statement published  – Smoke-free public places and work places for Tasmania: a review of the 
potential impact on business, and the costs and benefits of environmental tobacco smoke restrictions (PEHS 2000). 
2000 Regulatory Impact Statement published: Tobacco sellers’ licencing system (PEHS 2000)  
2000  
Tobacco licensing system introduced to ensure retailer compliance with the Public Health Act 1997 and funding for 
enforcement activity. Licensing now under the control of the health agency. 
2001 
Guidelines released for smoke-free areas (snacks) 
Guidelines for proof of age (tobacco products) 2001 
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Year  Action 
September 
2001  
Workplaces and enclosed public places become smoke-free. This includes areas such as shopping centres, restaurants, 
factories, hospitals, corridors and toilets. 
Further smoke-free areas are introduced: 
 within 3 metres outside entrances and exits  
 within 10 metres from ventilation equipment  
 work vehicles where another person is present  
 in reserved seating at cultural and sporting venues. 
November 
2003  
Graphic health warning notices become mandatory in shops that display tobacco products.  
April 2004 Tobacco Coalition holds its first meeting. 
January 
2005  
Gaming areas, nightclubs and 50 per cent of outdoor dining areas become smoke-free.  
January 
2006  
Liquor venues, such as pubs and hotels, become smoke-free inside. 
2006 Tasmanian Tobacco Action Plan 2006-2010 released. 
May 2006 DHHS releases Discussion Paper: Strengthening Measures to Protect Children from Tobacco. (DHHS 2006) 
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Year  Action 
2007  
Establishment of cessation services at three locations around Tasmania by the Alcohol and Drug Service. 
The sale of split packet cigarettes is banned.   
January 
2008 
Smoking is banned in cars where children (under the age of 18) are present.  
 2008  Sale of fruit and confectionery tobacco products is banned.  
June 2008 Tobacco displays in retail shops are reduced to one square metre.  
2009 
Trebling of funding for social media campaigns. [NB an important move, but not sufficient to meet evidence.] 
Guidelines for price tickets and other matters (tobacco products) 2009 released. (DHHS 2009) 
February 
2011  
Tobacco displays are banned in general retail shops.  
2011 Tobacco Action Plan 2011-2015 (DHHS 2011) 
March 
2012   
Extensions to smoke-free areas: 
 playgrounds  
 patrolled beaches  
 pedestrian and bus malls  
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Year  Action 
 bus shelters  
 100 per cent of outdoor dining areas  
 competition and seating areas at sporting events  
 other large public events. 
Tobacco displays are banned in specialist tobacconists. 
November 
2012 
Carols by Candlelight events required to be smoke-free. 
January 
2013 
Selected markets, food and wine, and music festivals are required to be smoke-free or have designated areas for 
smoking. 
May 2013 
Agricultural shows organised by the Affiliated Societies of the Agricultural Show Council of Tasmania are required to 
be smoke-free or have designated smoking areas. 
September 
2013 
Sufficient funding allocated to social media campaigns to meet evidence-based standards.  
Table adapted from DHHS website: http://www.dhhs.tas.gov.au/peh/tobacco_control/smoke-free/history 
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Table 8  Federal interventions since 1973 
The Commonwealth Department of Health lists interventions in Australia since 1973 as 
follows: 
 1973 – Health warnings first mandated on all cigarette packs in Australia; 
 1976 – Bans on all cigarette advertising on radio and television in Australia; 
 1986 to 2006 – phased-in bans on smoking in workplaces and public places; 
 1990 – Bans on advertising of tobacco products in newspapers and magazines 
published in Australia; 
 1992 – Increase in the tobacco excise; 
 1993 – Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 prohibited broadcasting and 
publication of tobacco advertisements;  
 From 1994 to 2003 – bans on smoking in restaurants; 
 1995 – Nationally consistent text-only health warnings required; 
 1998 to 2006 – bans on point-of-sale tobacco advertising across Australia; 
 2006 – Graphic health warnings required on packaging of most tobacco products; 
 2010 – 25% increase in the tobacco excise; 
 2011 – First complete State or Territory ban on point-of-sale tobacco product 
displays; 
 2012 – Introduction of tobacco plain packaging, and updated and expanded graphic 
health warnings; 
 2013 – Changes to the bi-annual indexation of tobacco excise and a further 12.5% 
excise increase on 1 December; and 
 2014, 2015 and 2016 – further 12.5% excise increases on 1 September each year 
(Tobacco in Australia, 2015b)  
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Chart 9 Smoking rates by state by year 
 
Source: ABS (2013). 
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 Table 9 - Respective responsibilities and roles of state and federal governments 
in Australia in relation to tobacco control 
 
Sphere of influence and responsibility  
Australian government  State governments 
Taxes and excises (collects revenue) 
Bans on advertising in mass media 
Labeling 
Graphic pack warnings/plain packs 
Control of ingredients or regulating products –
e.g. ban on “lights”; fruit cigarettes 
Disclosure of ingredients – on national website 
Counter advertising – e.g. National tobacco 
campaign 
Control of internet; movies; trade; tax-free 
products at airports 
Customs services/Border Force 
Controls on smuggling 
Funding of doctors under Medicare 
Foreign policy – e.g.  FCTC  
Control of RIP(RFR) cigarettes  
Control of national drug approvals and 
subsidies under PBS 
 
Bans on advertising at point of sale 
Control of product displays at point of sale 
Licensing of tobacco retailers 
Controls of sales to minors 
Controls on smoking in public places, 
workplaces and cars and outdoor areas. 
QUIT campaigns 
Cessation support services in hospitals and 
health clinics and for special groups. 
Control of illicit and pharmaceutical drugs 
including nicotine 
No revenue from tobacco  
 
 
Local government can also ban smoking on 
beaches, streets, playgrounds, sporting 
venues, parks, and in outdoor shopping malls. 
Overlaps: 
Both national and state governments can conduct advertising campaigns; fund Quit groups; 
fund cessation programs for indigenous, low-income, youth, or disadvantaged groups; fund or 
conduct research  
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Chart 10 Tasmania- smoking rates 2011-2012 by gender by age 
 
Source: ABS (2013). 
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Chart 11 Changes in daily smoking status of Australians aged 18 years and older 
by each Australian state and territory, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010 
 
Source: AIHW (1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010). Extract from National Tobacco Strategy 2012-
2018. 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare figures from the national drug strategy showed a 
rise in smoking rates in Tasmania from 2001 to 2007, against the national trend, then a 
dramatic fall recorded in smoking rates in 2010. This is consistent with other data that show 
Tasmanian smoking rates rising in the early 2000s and then starting to fall in 2009. 
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Chart 12 Deaths caused by smoking, alcohol consumption, illicit drugs and 
other selected causes, Tasmania, 2001-2006 
 
Source: DHHS Epidemiology Unit, Population Health, unpublished data.  
 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 150 
 
Chart 13 $ millions spent on tobacco in Tasmania compared to the cost of a 
packet of Peter Jacksons 30s cigarettes 
 
 
 
From 1981 until 1997 the Tasmanian Government levied an excise on tobacco, increasing it 
dramatically in 1993. As a result of the Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465 High 
court case, states lost the right to levy these taxes. The above graph shows the effect on 
tobacco consumption as prices rose in Tasmania in the 1990s. Peter Jacksons were a 
particularly popular brand with around 36.4% of the mainstream brand share in 2010 (Scollo 
& Winstanley, 2015 ) Notes: Dr Michelle Scollo (personal communication) supplied the 
price data relating to Peter Jackson 30s. The dollar consumption figures are from ABS Cat 
series. 5206.0 – Tasmania. There are some gaps in the data, and this graph should be viewed 
with caution, but it is useful for looking at trends. 
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Chart 14 $Millions revenue collected from tobacco business franchise fees 
Tasmania 1981 to 1997   
 
Source: Derived from Scollo (2008).  
Chart 15  Expenditure and revenue from tobacco $ millions 1985 to 1997 
Tasmania 
 
Sources: Derived from Scollo (2008) and ABS Sept 2013 5206.0
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Chart 16 Smoking prevalence rates and key tobacco-control measures implemented in Australia since 1990 
 
 
 
Source: Commonwealth Department of Health (2014).
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Chapter 5 Crony capitalism and corruption: British 
Tobacco’s obliteration of an ethical Tasmanian Government 
in the 1970s 
Note: Most of this chapter has been published in Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 
Papers and Proceedings (Barnsley 2011).  
Introduction and Synopsis 
At an early stage in the research for this thesis, and in the process of searching local 
publications about public policy and politics in Tasmania, a brief mention of events in the 
1970s involving British Tobacco was found in a thesis by Hay (1976).  Hay described events 
surrounding alleged corruption involving British Tobacco, and the Minister for Lands to 
transfer “… a large section of land in northeastern Tasmania in contravention of the Crown 
Lands Act.” Hay stated that the “alleged transaction can best be described as “bureaucratic 
patronage” (Hay 1976, p.200).  Today this might be titled “crony capitalism”.   
This inspired curiosity and a process of further research, which involved going to the State 
Archives to find the Lands Department files relating to these events. These documents were 
not made available to the public for many years, until the 1990s. It is likely that few people 
knew of their existence or availability, and they were certainly not available to Hay in the 
1970s at the time his thesis on corruption in Tasmania was written. Discovery of this 
extensive file uncovered the full story of the British Tobacco crony capitalism and corruption 
saga set out in this Chapter. 
 In the 1960s and early 1970s Tasmanian politicians became embroiled in events relating to 
land deals with British Tobacco, allegations of bribery, and the demise of a Liberal minority 
Government. The story is important because it reinforces the close relationships (some) 
governments in Tasmania have had with the tobacco industry over many decades, with the 
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strands of such corruption and crony capitalism running through the politics of tobacco 
control in Tasmania. 
There are a number of different names of tobacco companies involved as British Tobacco 
was engaged in mergers with other companies around this time. Therefore, the names Amatil, 
British Tobacco and WD and HO Wills Pty Ltd appear at different times in documentation 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. All were associated with or were part of the same 
company, and in this Chapter the term British Tobacco is used. However, some of the direct 
quotes and references use the other names. 
The story unfolded from 1969 when, after 35 years of Labor Government, a minority Liberal 
Government was elected in Tasmania. In order to govern, the Liberals formed a coalition 
with the Centre party, the sole elected member of which was Kevin Lyons MHA. 
The incoming Government investigated actions of the previous government. In the 1960s, as 
a result of arrangements with the Labor Government, British Tobacco had amassed extensive 
leased landholdings in North-East Tasmania. The new Liberal government investigated these 
land transactions and found that there were breaches of the law. The law had been designed 
to assist small landowners, not large companies, and the incoming Liberal Government 
proceeded to prosecute the perpetrators of this law breaking.  The scandals associated with 
these proceedings were front page news in Tasmanian daily newspapers. Criminal charges 
were laid against eminent Australian citizens, including: the Chairman of British Tobacco, 
TJN (Noel) Foley, BT legal executive William McComas; a former Labor Minister for 
Lands, Douglas Cashion; a prominent local grazier Ernest Mills and the former Secretary for 
Lands, Frank Miles (Mercury 1971a). 
These charges were dropped in 1972 when the Liberal government found that British 
Tobacco had marshalled international resources and would be likely to escape conviction. 
The Attorney-General, Max Bingham, dropped the charges after receiving legal advice from 
a Melbourne law firm that: 
“… In my opinion. it is in the public interest that the charges against all 
defendants, should be withdrawn at this stage. The factors which have 
weighed most heavily in leading me to that conclusion are the absence of 
financial corruption, the good character of the defendants, and the fact 
that it does not appear that any of the defendants regarded himself as 
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acting morally dishonestly. I do not think that it is possible to 
differentiate between the defendants in this respect. Another factor is that 
it would not be in the interests either of the defendants, the Crown, or the 
public in the circumstances of this case to conduct long criminal 
proceedings where convictions are not likely to result” (McGarvie 1972 
in Hay 1976, p. 201). 
In January 1972, a British Tobacco executive warned the Liberal Premier that Kevin Lyons 
was willing to bring down the government, for a price. In the same year Kevin Lyons was 
paid $25,000 (equivalent to $250,000 in today’s currency) by British Tobacco for his 
memoirs. This fact was not disputed. The memoirs were never published and probably not 
written. 
In March 1972 Kevin Lyons, who held the balance of power, resigned, thereby bringing 
down the government and causing an election to be held, which the Liberals lost to the Labor 
Party.  
Prior to losing office the Liberals had prepared legislation to impose a tobacco tax. The 
tobacco industry had always strongly opposed tobacco taxes, as it adversely affects their 
revenue. This opposition continues to the present day. 
A somewhat disingenuous police enquiry cleared Kevin Lyons of bribery and corruption. Mr 
Dawson QC, who conducted the inquiry, said that British Tobacco was willing to pay for the 
memoirs, because it was likely that the memoirs would refer to senior officers of the 
company (Hay 1976, p. 296). Dawson established the existence of conflict of interest, but no 
further action was taken.  A special Act of Parliament was initiated by the Reece Labor 
government, and enacted in November 1972, to retrospectively validate the actions of British 
Tobacco and the government and to indemnify all the participants against prosecution in 
relation to the land deals. Agitation for a Royal Commission was not successful and no public 
enquiry was ever held. 
Method  
This Chapter is based on a search of Tasmanian newspapers, The Mercury and The Examiner; 
original documents held in the State Library of Tasmania archives; the Tasmanian 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 159 
 
Parliamentary Library; the Tasmaniana Library, and maps held by the Department of Primary 
Industries, Parks, Water and Environment.  
Very few of these documents are online, and few are digitized. Hansards are available online 
from 1992. In the period in question (the 1960s and early 1970s) there were no Hansard 
records, but the Mercury newspaper recorded the events in Parliament and these records were 
collected and retained in the Parliamentary Library. These newspaper records are mainly on 
microfiche in the State Library of Tasmania. Some other newspaper records of Parliamentary 
proceedings and debates relating to the period prior to Hansard being established are 
available in paper form in the Parliamentary Library. 
Original correspondence from British Tobacco is in a 1960s to 1970s Lands Department file 
released for public scrutiny, and available on request for perusal in situ at the Archives Office 
of Tasmania. This file also contains records of meetings between ministers and company 
entities, memoranda and reports relating to the land deals and subsequent events. 
An online search was also undertaken of the online Legacy Truth Tobacco Industry 
Documents Library held at the University of California San Francisco; however, none of the 
correspondence found on file in Tasmania is in the UCSF records. It may have been 
destroyed as part of the document destruction process undertaken by British American 
Tobacco (Australia) (Liberman 2002). Some relevant records are referred to in the Legacy 
Library, but none of the actual correspondence. 
Background 
The structure of the Tasmanian economy makes it vulnerable to crony capitalism and, some 
have argued, to institutional corruption (Petrow 2006). Tasmania is a small state, with a few 
dominant industries, which inevitably develop close associations to politicians and the 
political process.  It is hard to prove corruption (Petrow 2006, p 1).  
This inability to “prove” things was a feature of events described here. 
Petrow (2006) and Beresford (2010) both identify the potential for institutional corruption in 
Tasmania (Beresford 2010). Beresford says: 
“Crony capitalism is prone to corruption because it is based around an 
imbalance of power and lack of transparency in the government-business 
relationship” (Beresford 2010, p. 213) 
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In 1969 the Liberal and Labor Parties each won seventeen seats in the 35- member House of 
Assembly. Kevin Lyons of the Centre Party won one seat and therefore held the balance of 
power. Kevin Lyons had considerable political experience and was a son of former Premier 
of Tasmania and Prime Minister of Australia, Joseph Lyons and Federal Minister Dame Enid 
Lyons.  Kevin Lyons agreed to support the Liberal party. A Liberal government was therefore 
in power after 35 years of Labor government (Bingham 2003).  
At the time of the events recorded here, there were few administrative checks and balances, 
nor transparency of government operations in Tasmania. There was no Ombudsman, no 
freedom of information legislation, no Hansards, no public records of political donations and 
no Integrity Commission. The Director of Public Prosecutions was not independent, and 
prosecutions were within the control of the Attorney General, a politician and Cabinet 
member. Events in Parliament were recorded in the Mercury newspaper, but not in full, and 
were sometimes recorded in other newspapers. A chronology of events can be found at Table 
10. 
Criminal charges against British Tobacco executives and others 
Soon after gaining office in 1970, key members of the Liberal Government became 
concerned about the way substantial British Tobacco land holdings in North East Tasmania 
had been allocated and acquired, and suspicions arose in the public service that correct legal 
processes had not been observed. As the former Attorney General said, “It looked like a case 
of public property being used for the private gain of a privileged few” (Bingham 2003, p. 
152). The Crown Lands Act 1935 precluded large companies from leasing or purchasing the 
land in question as it was intended for small farmers. A “dummying” process was employed 
that meant that employees of British Tobacco, including some Directors, were applicants for 
the land. The relevant provisions of the Act had been designed to encourage small 
landholders to take up and develop land, and therefore allowing a large company to do so was 
against both the letter and spirit of the law. An internal inquiry was held that led to criminal 
charges of conspiracy being laid against two British Tobacco executives, TJ N (Noel) Foley 
and William McComas; a former Labor Minister for Lands Douglas Cashion; a prominent 
local grazier Ernest Mills and the former Secretary for Lands, Frank Miles (Caldwell 1971; 
Caldwell, Thorp & Coatman 1971; Foley 1971, 1972; Mercury 1971a, 1971b).  
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The Premier, Hon WA Bethune, met with British Tobacco executives on 25 January 1971 
and cautioned them regarding a pending legal investigation. The Chairman of British 
Tobacco T J N Foley responded in writing the next day:  
“In complete good faith we have put to the State government a plan of 
land development in an area which was previously classified as almost 
useless and which had been held on lease for many years by other 
persons without any significant improvements being carried out. The 
Government of the day approved the plan and you and your Government 
have since on several occasions endorsed it as being for the good of the 
State. Now, because of a suggested breach of a section of the Crown 
Lands Act by the method of leasing and freeholding approved and 
operated by your predecessors in Government and administered by the 
Lands Department, we are to be presented publicly as alleged breakers of 
the law – in the words of your Attorney-General – and subjected to 
investigation. For a company such as ours with a high reputation for 
probity and so much in the public eye, this would be most embarrassing 
and damaging, even though at the end of the inquiry it were declared free 
from wrong-doing” (Foley 1971, p.3).  
In September 1971, charges of conspiracy to “obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the 
administration of the law” or to “cheat or defraud the public” or “to obtain for WD & H O 
Wills Aust Ltd … lands of the Crown” and various other criminal charges were lodged 
against Foley, McComas, Cashion, Mills and Miles. These charges were front page news in 
local newspapers (Mercury1971a, 1971b).  
However, British Tobacco said that they had received a “very strong welcome” from the 
previous Labor Premier Eric Reece, Lands Minister Cashion and later the Liberal Premier Mr 
Bethune regarding the controversial 130,000 acres for land development in Tasmania in 1963 
(Mercury1971a). Subsequently Labor Premier Eric Reece dismissed all these allegations of 
corruption. Reece said that “…there was not one word in the allegations which would provide 
sufficient proof for a royal commission”. Mr Bingham responded that, “if these allegations 
are true, then the conduct of the people concerned came to the verge of sedition”, and “Mr 
Reece had attempted to stifle debate” and “[the ALP] were trying to sweep it under the 
carpet.” (Crawford 1973b, p. 2).  
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In February 1972, the Liberal Attorney-General Max Bingham decided to drop the charges 
because as he expressed it with considerable hindsight some thirty years later,  
“The Company naturally rallied its world-wide resources, and produced 
from Britain some documentation I had not previously seen. I forget the 
details, but it seemed likely to raise doubts about the guilt of the 
Company officials, as if they had been led astray by the wicked 
Tasmanians” (Bingham 2003, p152).  
The British Tobacco Company and its executives seemed likely to escape any legal liability. 
It was considered by the legal advisers to the government that the only people who would 
eventually be convicted were relatively minor players in the land scheme (Bingham 2003). 
No further legal action either civil or criminal can be taken against any of those involved in 
this scheme.  
In November 1972 British Tobacco provided advice on how to validate the land scheme and 
ensure that the land deals were retrospectively legal. Validating legislation was subsequently 
passed by Parliament under the auspices of the newly elected Labor government. The 
validating legislation, the North East Land Development Act 1972, provided indemnity 
against criminal or civil legal proceedings for all the people. Section 8 states “… no action or 
any other legal proceeding whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted by or against any 
person in respect of any declaration or statement made, or any act matter, or thing done [in 
relation to the land transfers]”.  Therefore, these 1960s land transfers are now considered to 
have been lawful. The legislation was passed through Parliament before it became public 
knowledge that Kevin Lyons had received money from British Tobacco. Whilst the 
indemnity would not have covered corruption, the fact that the donation to Lyons was not 
known at the time meant that the legislation went through relatively easily without close 
scrutiny. The Parliament was unaware of these events, so did not question the legislation 
closely (Bingham 2003).  
What were the land deals? 
In the early 1960s British Tobacco, under the auspices of WD &HO Wills, and with the 
strong support of the Labor government, developed extensive land and pastoral interests in 
North-East Tasmania. This land was not used for growing tobacco but was used for pastoral 
purposes. The government was keen to see bulldozers move in and clear the land. At one time 
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up to 130,000 acres (52,610 hectares) of land was involved in the land deals between British 
Tobacco and the government. This is a substantial landholding in Tasmania (Caldwell 1971; 
Quarmby 2006).  In 1972 some of this land was removed from British Tobacco by the 
Bethune government and placed as a reserve within Mt William National Park (Quarmby 
2006).  
The Crown Lands Act 1935 did not contemplate the prospect of large companies acquiring 
land in this way and so in order to provide legal certainty to British Tobacco an amendment 
to the Act was considered, but rejected by the government. The Labor Premier Sir Eric Reece 
and Minister Cashion “… were against any such step because they could not see parliament 
agreeing to Wills or BT having a privileged position”. Premier Reece specifically asked 
Minister Cashion if the scheme could be carried on under the Act as it stood, and was advised 
that it could. The rationale for this opinion is difficult to understand. The Premier was 
therefore poorly advised, and presumably remained unaware of the illegality of the scheme 
for some time (Foley 1970; Caldwell, Thorp & Coatman 1971).   
In the 1960s British Tobacco was associated with various other companies including Naroo, 
WD & H O Wills and Amatil. British Tobacco became associated with large properties in 
North East Tasmania known as Rushy Lagoon, Icena Estate and Miegunyah (Foley 1968; 
Amatil 2009). The company used for the purpose of the development of the land was WD & 
H O Wills (Australia) Limited, “… which at the commencement of the venture and for many 
years previously had carried on an extensive tobacco business in Tasmania” (Foley 1968, p 
4).  
The public servants involved in approving the land transactions were directly involved in the 
conspiracy. One senior public servant explained in 1971 that after a meeting of officials with 
tobacco executives it was recognised that it was “highly undesirable” for any persons other 
than those associated with the tobacco company, to be able to access land grants in the 
designated area.  Therefore, the Company ensured that: 
“… applications made by persons acting on behalf of the company 
should be marked so that they would be recognised by myself and the 
Surveyor-General. It is my belief that the sole purpose of marking the 
applications was to ensure that no person, not connected with the 
Company would receive a grant of land in the subject area. I am of the 
belief that the sole purpose of marking of the application was to enable 
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administrative effect to be given to the scheme as a whole” (Thompson 
1971, p.2).  
The initials of William McComas, “WRM”, solicitor for the company, were placed in the top 
left hand corner of every Wills application (Caldwell, p.11). 
This is an extraordinary document as in it the public servant involved in facilitating this 
scheme has placed on record the mechanism for achieving the purpose of the company 
acquiring the land, and ensuring that ordinary members of the public were excluded from this 
opportunity, directly against the spirit and letter of the relevant law. This illustrates the two 
factors identified by Beresford that can lead to corruption, a powerful business lobby with 
close ties to government, and a lack of transparency in government processes (Hay 1976; 
Beresford 2010).  
British Tobacco knew at an early stage that their leases were potentially unlawful, but were 
apparently given verbal assurances by senior government officials and the minister that there 
would be no difficulties. The Company wanted written assurance from the Government that 
these legal problems would be overcome. In April 1968, TJN Foley, the Chairman of British 
Tobacco, wrote to the Surveyor-General and Secretary for Lands. In this letter he said inter 
alia, “These then are the matters which are concerning us and on which we need your help, 
we appreciate that there are technicalities in the law governing this matter but as you 
indicated in Hobart it should be possible to overcome these without great difficulty” (Foley 
1968, p. 7). Foley assured the government that development of the land was proceeding at a 
fast pace, and British Tobacco was anxious to acquire more land. Foley said “At this date we 
have reached the stage where our bulldozer crews will complete clearing on all lands now 
surveyed within the next few days” (Foley, 1970 p. 2), and he added “our estimates indicate 
that by the end of October 1971 we will have over 5,000 head of cattle and about 35,000 
sheep on Rushy Lagoon”. 
The scheme became public knowledge, and was widely reported in newspapers, when the 
incoming Liberal Bethune government came into office. They began investigating the matter, 
and the Attorney-General launched a prosecution action against these major public figures. 
As already mentioned, the Government was subsequently forced to withdraw the action on 
legal advice. 
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As a consequence of this very public scandal and mutual criticisms, the Bethune government 
was not enamoured of the British Tobacco Company and some of the British Tobacco land 
was resumed by the Bethune government for a national park. Quarmby says this may have 
been done because: 
“… ill-feeling over the issue of corruption under the earlier Labor 
Government possibly influenced the Bethune Government to support the 
Parks Service’s interest in resuming 6,880 hectares from the British 
Tobacco Company’s allocation” (Quarmby 2006, p.184).  
This action would no doubt have further annoyed the British Tobacco Company 
management. 
Bethune Liberal Government is brought down 
Kevin Lyons MHA had been a member of the Liberal Party but left when prevented from 
achieving his ambitions to be Leader or a federal politician like his parents. He then 
established the Centre Party. The relationship between Lyons and Bethune had been fraught 
with difficulty for many years. Lyons had reportedly continued to try to undermine Bethune’s 
leadership, and have him replaced by another MP (Crawford 2000).  
In March 1972, Kevin Lyons MHA resigned his positions as Deputy Premier, Chief Secretary 
and Minister for Tourism and Immigration and advised the Governor, Premier and Parliament 
that he would no longer support the government. The government was thus forced to resign, 
Parliament was dissolved and an election called. A Labor government was elected.  
In 1972 British Tobacco paid Lyons $25,000 (the equivalent to $AUD 250,000 in 2015) to 
write his memoirs (Mercury 1973a). In 1973 British Tobacco (Amatil) denied that it had 
anything to hide in connection with the purchase of the memoirs of Kevin Lyons MHA, but 
did not dispute that it had paid him the money (Mercury1973b). No memoir was ever 
published. 
According to a report in the Mercury newspaper in 1973 regarding Mr Bethune’s meeting 
with an unnamed British Tobacco director:  
“Mr Lyons at that time deputy to Mr Bethune, had told British Tobacco 
he would resign from parliament and bring down the Tasmanian 
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Government if it was made worth his while, according to the director” 
(Mercury1973c, p. 1). 
This story was backed up by a member of the Premier’s staff, who was told the same story by 
the British Tobacco director (Crawford 1973a). The former Attorney-General in the Bethune 
government says: 
 “… It looks as though the charges precipitated the deal which saw Kevin 
bring the government down” (Bingham 2003, p. 153).  
British Tobacco had therefore reportedly warned the government in advance that Kevin 
Lyons was open to destroying the government, and that he was allegedly open to bribery. The 
unnamed British Tobacco director had made a special trip to see Premier Bethune on January 
6 1972 to talk about these issues, but he had died by the time the matter became public 
knowledge (Examiner 1973b). British Tobacco Chairman T J N Foley denied these 
allegations and, after the prosecution was dropped, counter-accused the Liberal Party of 
seeking donations from British Tobacco. Mr Bethune said these accusations were 
“scurrilous” and accused the Chairman of making misleading and inaccurate statements 
(Examiner 1973a, 1973b; Mercury1973c, 1973e). British Tobacco shut down the debate 
when its manager of corporate relations and public affairs refused to comment any further on 
former Premier Bethune’s statements in Parliament (Mercury1973e).  
The Bethune government had also had a bill drafted to impose a tobacco tax. Tobacco taxes 
are an anathema to tobacco companies, as they cut into their profits and reduce smoking 
rates. Indeed, tobacco companies in Australia have always vigorously opposed any increase 
in tobacco taxes (Mercury 1972; Bible 1993; Smith, Savell & Gilmore 2013).  
There was public pressure for a Royal Commission to be held to enquire into the allegations 
of graft and corruption relating to British Tobacco payments to Kevin Lyons and others, but 
the Melbourne QC Mr D Dawson, who was asked to investigate these events, said that he did 
not believe there was anything questionable in the deal over the memoirs. Mr Bethune said 
that Mr Dawson was “naïve” (Crawford 1973; Mercury 1973d).  
The police report cleared Kevin Lyons of bribery charges. Peter Hay commented:  
“… reaction to the police report was mixed”… “In all the ensuing furore 
over the report, no attention was paid to the problems of conflict of 
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interest which it revealed” (Hay 1976, p. 294). “Mr Dawson said there 
was evidence that British Tobacco was willing to pay for the memoirs to 
have some control over them because it was likely the memoirs would 
refer to senior officers of the company” (Examiner 5 December 1973, 
cited in Hay 1976, p. 297). 
Hay argues that Tasmanians are less aware of, and less concerned about, conflict of interest 
as it occurs in practice, than perhaps those in other states (Hay 1976).  
Hay points out that,  
“As Mr Lyons held the balance of power in a Government whose 
Attorney-General had embarked on prosecutions potentially injurious to 
British Tobacco, it is very easy to conceive of an interest which British 
Tobacco might have had in the resignation of Mr Lyons” (Hay 1976, p. 
297). 
Mercury Photograph 1 Kevin Lyons 
Photo 1 Kevin Lyons 
 
Photo of Kevin Lyons printed with permission of the Mercury. 
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Kevin Lyons died in May 2000. He always denied the charges of bribery and 
corruption (Crawford 2000). The unnamed British Tobacco executive who paid 
Kevin Lyons is believed to have died in February 1972. No memoir was ever 
published.  
 
Sir TJN (Noel) Foley was an eminent Sydney company director and influential in national 
politics. He was knighted in 1978, and died in 2005. His obituary, written by Gerard 
Henderson of the Sydney Institute, listed Foley’s many accomplishments, including as 
Chairman of the Boards of CSR, Westpac, British Tobacco and other organisations 
(Henderson 2005a, 2005b). He was a public supporter of Liberal John Howard, and a lifelong 
conservative but never a member of the Liberal Party. He was proud of his tobacco company 
and regarded it as having a “high reputation for probity” (Foley 1971, p. 3). It is unlikely that 
he would have taken kindly to being embarrassed and humiliated, or impressed over possible 
damage to his company reputation in the Tasmanian and national media, having company 
land resumed for a national park, nor having a tobacco tax levied on his profits. The 
suppression of legal proceedings would have suited him well, and of course he was very well 
connected to be able to put influence into very high places. 
Sir Angus Bethune died in 2004 in Hobart, and was recognised for his achievements, his 
brilliant mind, his strong ethics, sound financial management, humanity and his highly 
reformist government (Hansard 2004). 
British Tobacco and WD & HO Wills no longer exist as companies as they did in the 1970s, 
and their succeeding companies are no longer associated with Amatil. 
Conclusion 
There is a potential for crony capitalism to lead to corruption. The proceedings of the 1960s 
and 1970s demonstrate the difficulties faced by a small government in dealing with a 
powerful multi-national company, and this is a characteristic of crony capitalism. It is also 
very difficult to obtain evidence to “prove” anything. 
Events in the 1960s involving tobacco-company land deals in Tasmania led to a criminal 
prosecution being launched by the Liberal Attorney-General against British Tobacco 
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executives, public servants, a former Labor Minister and other eminent citizens in the 1970s, 
with resultant public humiliation for both the company and its leading directors. The charges 
were eventually withdrawn, but there was consequent antipathy between the Tasmanian 
Liberal politicians and the British Tobacco company executives. 
 
 
Photo 2  Sir Angus Bethune 
 
Photo printed with permission of the Mercury newspaper. 
A key politician, Kevin Lyons MHA, who held the balance of power in the Tasmanian 
government, was known to have been paid a substantial sum by British Tobacco for his 
memoirs that were never published. This politician brought down the Liberal government, 
which had attempted to prosecute British Tobacco executives, resumed land for a national 
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park which had been previously allocated to the company, and was about to impose a tobacco 
tax. Clearly the company had good reason to hope for the demise of the Bethune Liberal 
government. This raises the question of whether or not British Tobacco was implicated in the 
downfall of a government in Tasmania. The definitive answer to this may never be known. A 
police enquiry at the time “cleared” Kevin Lyons of wrongdoing, but circumstantially the 
episode was highly bizarre and incriminating. 
Most of the key senior tobacco executives and politicians involved in these events are now 
deceased, no Royal Commission was held, and therefore any hope of discovering more than 
that which is already on the public record, is unlikely.  
However, as Petrow commented: 
“Close relations between government and big business or other sectional 
interests will always provide opportunities for corruption in the insular world 
of Tasmanian politics and, incompetence apart, will always be difficult to 
prove” (Petrow 2006, p. 1).  
Table 10  Chronology of political events relating to British Tobacco 
Political events relating to British Tobacco activity in Tasmania 1969 to 2005 
Date/Year Events 
1934-1969 Labor government in power – 35 years. 
1960s to 
1970s 
British Tobacco develops land in North East Tasmania 
through leasing arrangements with the government. 
1969 May Bethune minority Liberal government elected. Holds office 
because it has the support of Centre Party member Kevin 
Lyons, who is made Deputy Premier and Tourism and 
Immigration Minister. 
1970 October Serious breaches of the lands legislation involving British 
Tobacco are reported to the government. An investigation 
commenced. 
1971 January The results of the investigation, which revealed serious 
breaches, were reported to the Attorney-General. This was 
referred to the police. 
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Political events relating to British Tobacco activity in Tasmania 1969 to 2005 
Date/Year Events 
1971 August The police report was received by the government. 
1971 
September 15 
Charges of conspiracy laid under the Criminal Code Act 
1924  against British Tobacco executives TJN and William 
McComas; as well as Douglas Cashion, a former Labor 
Minister; Frank Miles, former Secretary of Lands; and 
Ernest Mills, a grazier. 
1972 January An unnamed British Tobacco executive warned Angus 
Bethune that Kevin Lyons was willing to bring down the 
government, if it were made worth his while. The BT 
executive reportedly died five weeks later. BT Annual 
Report in1972 refers to the death of one of its directors Mr 
WS Bengtsson on 14 February, so it is possible that he is the 
executive referred to. 
1972 
February 
Criminal charges against British Tobacco executives and 
others are dropped. 
1972 March Kevin Lyons MP withdraws support for the Bethune 
government. The government falls on 15 March and 
Parliament was dissolved and an election called. 
1972 April British Tobacco alleged they first heard that Kevin Lyons 
would write his memoirs. 
1972 April 22 Election date. Reece Labor government (re)-elected. 
1972 May  British Tobacco allege they offered to pay Kevin Lyons for 
his memoirs. 
1972 June British Tobacco alleged the contract was signed with Kevin 
Lyons for $25,000 for his memoirs. This was not known to 
the public. 
1972 
November 
The North East Land Development Act 1972 was enacted to 
validate the actions of BT and the government and to 
indemnify all from prosecution. 
1973 
December 
It was publicly revealed that Kevin Lyons had been paid by 
British Tobacco. 
1973 
December  
Calls for a Royal Commission not heeded. 
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Political events relating to British Tobacco activity in Tasmania 1969 to 2005 
Date/Year Events 
2000  Kevin Orchard Lyons died. 
2004 Sir Angus Bethune died. 
2005 Sir TJN (Noel) Foley died. 
Sources: Mercury; Examiner; Sydney Morning Herald newspapers, Parliament of Tasmania 
website http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/; Tasmanian Electoral Commission website 
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Chapter 6 Political barriers to evidence-based tobacco 
control in Tasmania 
Most of this Chapter is incorporated in an article that has been accepted by the Journal 
Evidence and Policy. Publication in May 2016. 
Introduction  
This chapter follows on sequentially from the history of crony capitalism and corruption that 
occurred in Tasmania in the 1970s, but is primarily focussed on the period from the early 
1990s to around 2013. Other periods and initiatives are briefly mentioned, for example in 
relation to taxation, but the primary areas of tobacco reform in Tasmania occurred from 1996 
onwards.  
Tasmania has a population of fewer than 500,000 people, yet it led Australia and the world in 
some areas of tobacco-control policy and legislative reform in the period 1997 to 2010. The 
renaissance of reform in the late 1990s followed decades of inaction, and in a few instances 
thwarted action, possibly as a legacy of the torrid times in the 1970s. 
In the 1990s and 2000s there were three important evidence-informed areas of tobacco 
control reform in Tasmania on the political, NGO and community agenda; namely 
elimination of tobacco displays, fostering smoke-free public areas and funding of mass-media 
campaigns. All of these were subjected to identifiable political and bureaucratic impediments 
and delays (Barnsley, Walters & Wood-Baker 2015). The tobacco industry and its front 
organisations were lead instigators in these delaying tactics. Further impediments were 
political cronyism; the conservative ideology of some politicians, based on libertarianism, 
individualism and beliefs in “choice”; a bias towards retailers and profit rather than public 
health; the classic cognitive dissonance of smoking politicians, including a rejection of 
preventative measures; and finally an emphasis on acute hospital funding as a priority.  
Additionally, there was a lack of understanding or sense of urgency regarding the scientific 
research evidence, or the damage to individuals, families and society that was occurring from 
the effects of smoking. 
The initiatives that evidence supported as being effective and thus should have been put in 
place in the health agenda at this time, were to reduce or eliminate tobacco advertising, in 
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particular displays at point-of-sale, eliminate smoking in public places and work, and finally 
as a priority allocate adequate funding for tobacco-control mass-media campaigns and 
individual cessation-support services (“quitting”), such as Quit Tasmania. Effective tobacco 
control requires a multi-pronged approach, with adequate expenditure on all.  To achieve this 
needed political will, which was lacking in Tasmania at the time. While politicians in 
Australia have always taken much of their advice from the government bureaucracy, as Head 
observes, there has been increased contestability in the provision of information from an 
array of sources (Head 2013). In policy areas such as crime and corrections, Head (2013) 
writes that “Policy-making in the real world is linked to public opinion” (Head 2013 p399).  
Yet in the area of tobacco control, public opinion has, with the exception of smokers 
themselves, been ahead of reforms, such as of smoke-free areas in public places. These 
differences between policy domains require analysis of power politics and the influence of 
industry on politicians, and this chapter examines the political circumstances that existed at 
various times, and limited evidence-based progress on tobacco control.  
Method  
To clarify the barriers to evidence-based tobacco policy in Tasmania, a forensic document 
analysis was undertaken. There is considerable evidence on record about words and actions 
of political actors and their advisers. As discussed in the Method Chapter 3 interviews were 
not conducted. Bryan-Jones used interviews in her examination of delays in implementation 
of smoke-free area restrictions in NSW (Bryan-Jones 2004). She found that, 
“SHS restrictions have been delayed by several broad factors: the 
influence of industry groups successfully opposing regulation; issue 
wear-out; and political perceptions that there is not a salient constituency 
demanding that smoking be banned in bars and clubs” (Bryan-Jones & 
Chapman, 2006 p. 192). 
Bryan-Jones was able to use interviews for her research regarding second-hand smoke 
restrictions in NSW because she was not well known to the participants or interviewees 
(Bryan-Jones and Chapman 2006). However, this was not possible for this study because of 
the size and social connectedness in Tasmania. 
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As outlined in Chapter 3, a qualitative data analysis was conducted, using documentation 
obtained from various sources for 1997 to 2010. Documents relating to tobacco control were 
sought from Health and Human Services, Primary Industry Parks and Water, Treasury and 
Finance, and Premier and Cabinet. Some documents were provided by NGOs. Digital 
documents and Hansards, which are transcripts of parliamentary proceedings, for the period 
1997 to 2010 were examined, sorted, recorded and analysed using QSR International NVivo. 
Other documents were sorted and analysed manually. Grey literature searches included 
published government reports, newspaper reports, government websites and tobacco industry 
document websites, including the important online Truth Legacy Library, an archive of 14 
million documents created by tobacco companies about their advertising, manufacturing, 
marketing, scientific research and political activities, hosted by the University of California 
San Francisco  (UCSF) Library and Center for Knowledge Management. 
The theoretical framework used for this research is that of Kingdon (1995) with particular 
emphasis on agenda-setting and knowledge-transfer. In public health the agenda-setting 
processes outlined by Kingdon rely on three policy windows of opportunity to be open 
simultaneously as a precursor to progress (Mannheimer, Lehto &Ostin 2007) : 
• recognition that a problem exists;  
• agreement on the way forward; and  
• a lack of boundaries between the politicians, civil servants and advocates. 
All three appear to be precursors to progress (Mannheimer, Nehto & Ostin 2007). 
The role of policy entrepreneurs, another key factor outlined by Kingdon was considered, but 
little evidence was found of significant policy entrepreneurs of the stature of those identified 
by Ballard (2004) in Victoria and NSW, in this regard. 
Results 
The tobacco industry, cronyism and political donations 
Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s the tobacco industry denied evidence for the 
detrimental health effects of tobacco, engaged researchers to back up their arguments, and 
lobbied against any reforms (Francey & Chapman 2000). Misuse of health research by 
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politicians, and denial of the adverse health effects of passive smoking occurred (Thomson, 
Wilson & Howden-Chapman 2007).  In Tasmania the tobacco industry lobbied hard against 
all the proposed major legislative reforms, collaborating with like-minded organisations such 
as the Australian Hotels Association (AHA) and tobacco retailers to do this, and making 
substantial strategic political donations (See Chart 17). The industry and their associates 
publicly and privately attacked individual public servants, as well as taking legal action 
against the government to disallow parts of the legislation (Legacy Library 1999a; Hansard 
1999c; Rogers 1997b, Pos 1997). Crony capitalism in Tasmania is characterised by structural 
weaknesses in the economy which make the political system vulnerable to powerful business 
groups. Beresford described crony capitalism in the Tasmanian context as “… prone to 
corruption because it is based around an imbalance of power and lack of transparency in the 
government–business relationship” (Beresford 2010, p. 213).  
Political donations by the tobacco industry to the main political parties continued through the 
1990s and 2000s, as it had for many decades, to both the Liberals and ALP, but this did not 
apply to the Greens. Larger donations were made in election years to both major parties. The 
last donation was for the Liberals for the 2013 State election (Australian Electoral 
Commission 2013-14). The affiliated gaming and alcohol industries, concerned about bans on 
smoking in their premises, falsely argued that their businesses would be decimated, which 
also influenced government, and delayed implementation of tobacco-control measures 
(Stevenson 2000; Rose 2003; Dearlove, Bialous & Glantz 2002). The Labor government 
eventually acted, despite these concerns, and finally ceased accepting tobacco industry 
donations in 2004 (Rose 2003), but the Liberals only in 2013. In 2012 the Labor government 
moved to legislate to prevent donations by the tobacco industry to political parties, however 
this move was defeated in the Legislative Council whose members were concerned that 
tobacco was being “singled out”, and that alcohol and gaming were just as bad (Bolger & 
Arndt 2012). The Greens have never received donations from the tobacco industry, and have 
always criticised the major parties for so doing.  The extent of these donations is additional 
evidence of the cronyism that has existed in Tasmania. 
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Chart 17 Donations to Tasmanian political parties by tobacco companies by year 
 
 
Cronyism and the Australian Hotels Association (AHA) 
The first hints of a determination to regulate smoke-free areas in public and workplaces, 
came from a Liberal Health Minister, Hon Peter McKay, a member of the Legislative Council 
in the 1990s.  McKay issued a Discussion Paper associated with the development of the 
Public Health Bill 1996, and warned the hospitality industry in media stories that the 
government would legislate if self-regulation did not result in fewer smoking areas, 
particularly targeting hotels and restaurants (Dally 1998). McKay was strongly anti-smoking, 
and as an ex-smoker, he referred to the tobacco industry and retailers as “sellers of death” 
(Hansard 1997c). As a member of the Upper House Legislative Council, McKay was not 
subject to the same electoral pressures as members of the Lower House of Assembly, as he 
had a six-year term of office. This meant he was able to be more courageous in his reforms 
and more outspoken than many health ministers, and maintain his distance from the tobacco 
and hotel industries.  
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However, continuing in the tradition of cronyism in Tasmania (Barnsley 2011), Labor leader 
Paul Lennon was not so circumspect. The responsibility for delays in implementation of 
smoke-free areas legislation in Tasmania can be attributed to the tobacco industry, in 
association with the AHA, and in particular their influence over Paul Lennon, as the key 
Labor politician. Indeed, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Lennon on behalf 
of the Labor Party and the AHA prior to the 1998 election, which promised that the 
government would not legislate to ban smoking in hotels. Paul Lennon told the media in 
1998: 
“… the Labor-AHA memorandum of understanding would be honoured 
in full. It also includes: No sale of alcohol in supermarkets. Smoking in 
hotels will not be banned, but self-regulation will continue” (Dally 1998).  
When Lennon became Premier in 2004, he employed former AHA chief Daniel Leesong as 
his Chief of Staff, continuing the tradition of cronyism.  Despite this, subsequent Health 
Ministers Judith Jackson and David Llewellyn, with considerable advocacy and public 
pressure from health groups and in face of opposition from successive Premiers, managed in 
2006 to bring in smoke-free areas in pubs, the first state in Australia to do so. Advocacy 
coalitions, such as the framework outlined by Sabatier, were extremely important in keeping 
governments on track with legislative reform, but they appeared to have no influence on 
allocation of funds, nor on placing anti-smoking resources on the agenda as a priority 
(Sabatier 1988), as the power to do so lies with a layer of politicians and bureaucracy above 
the level of health minister and his/her advisers. 
Indifference of governments to tobacco as a priority 
The issue of placing tobacco control on the public agenda is a problem in many countries. As 
Mannheimer et al. say,  
“The problem seems to be that public health is not prioritized high 
enough on the political agenda (Mannheimer, Lehto & Ostin 2007, p. 
308). 
Whether this almost universal lack of priority is ideological, or whether there are other 
factors at play is an important question. Liberal governments in Australia have traditionally 
had close ties, classifiable as cronyism, with the tobacco industry, although in Tasmania this 
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has varied over time.  Indeed, as discussed at length in Chapter 5, the Liberal Bethune 
Government of the 1970s was destroyed in part because of its actions in opposing British 
Tobacco interests (Barnsley 2011). As previously mentioned, in contrast, the Liberal Gray 
Government of the 1980s was supportive of big tobacco, and apart from big tax increases on 
the product, attempted no inroads on tobacco control. Premier Robin Gray was reported in 
Philip Morris correspondence to have a “good relationship” with tobacco industry executives, 
and was censured by a Tasmanian Royal Commission on corruption (Legacy Library 1993a; 
Carter 1991). During this 1980s period Liberal Health Minister Roger Groom signed weak 
self-regulation agreements with the tobacco companies (Legacy Library 1989), and former 
federal Liberal member for Bass, Warwick Smith, assisted the tobacco industry in 
representations to the WA State Premier, Court, to torpedo efforts to upgrade national health 
warnings on tobacco products (Legacy Library 1993b). 
However, some individual Liberal MPs have shown distinct antipathy to the tobacco industry, 
including Brett  Whiteley, Dr Frank Madill and Rene Hidding. Rene Hidding MHA [1996 –
present] strongly supported bans on smoking in prisons in 2005, and precipitated a split with 
the AHA in 2004 when the Liberals, under his leadership, supported a ban on smoking in 
pubs and clubs; at that point the AHA told the Liberals that all contact was over. In August 
2004 reporter Ellen Whinnett wrote in the Mercury,  
“There's been a lovers' tiff between those cosy bedfellows the state 
Liberals and the Australian Hotels Association. 
“Seems AHA head honcho Daniel Hanna was peeved when the Liberals 
made a surprise backflip and called for a total ban on smoking. 
“Hanna responded with a volley on radio, which prompted Liberal leader 
Rene Hidding to also take to the airwaves and lob a hand-grenade back, 
saying the AHA shouldn't be advocating unsafe workplaces. 
“Apparently Hanna was quickly on the phone to the Libs, telling them all 
contact was over” (Whinnett 2004, p. 29).  
Donations to the Liberals from tobacco and hospitality industries were, not 
surprisingly, decreased substantially in 2004 compared to preceding years (Rose 
2005; Whinnett 2004). 
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The Labor Party (ALP), when in office, also failed to expend sufficient funds on tobacco 
control, particularly for cessation-support services and media campaigns. Health groups 
regularly criticised the government for not providing such sufficient funding (Mercury 1998; 
Rogers, 1997). The annual “Dirty Ashtray”, awarded by the AMA and ACOSH to the worst 
performing state minister on tobacco control, regularly recorded Tasmania’s failure to 
provide adequate funding (AMA & ACOSH 2000–2010). In 1999 Dr Madill, a Liberal, 
questioned the ALP Minister Jackson on whether the government was going to honour an 
election promise to provide additional funding for Quit, and she replied, “… the Government 
is not in a position at this stage to honour all of its election promises. This has had to be 
deferred” (Hansard 1999b). Reasons were never given by successive ministers, beyond the 
pressures of their budgets, for failing to provide adequate funding for tobacco-control 
measures, nor for failing to prioritise tobacco control.  
Similarly, in 2009 Greens MHA Cassie O’Connor questioned the Health Minister, Lara 
Giddings, at length about funding for tobacco control programs, and the Minister was clearly 
unable to answer the question adequately. She claimed to have put funding in place, although 
seemed unaware that it was inadequate to meet the need to achieve change in smoking rates, 
and yet claimed to be at her “wit’s end” at the failure of Government to decrease these rates 
(Hansard 2009).  Finally in 2013 Health Minister Michelle O’Byrne and the Commonwealth 
allocated adequate funding (Tobacco Coalition 2013). 
Cognitive dissonance – smoking politicians 
Smokers generally reinforce their behaviour, rationalise it, and believe that the risks are lower 
than understood by those who do not smoke or who have quit smoking. In a large study 
conducted across several countries, Fotuhi et al. (2013) found that smokers’ perceptions can 
change depending whether or not they have recently quit, or have had a failed attempt. It is 
therefore not surprising that smoking politicians have irrational beliefs about the risks of 
smoking, and act and speak accordingly in their party rooms, cabinet or in Parliamentary 
debates. Smoking has long “been the poster child for cognitive dissonance” since it was 
discussed in Festinger’s book on the theory (Festinger 1962).  
In a 2001 scathing editorial the Mercury asked “Would the legislation have been stronger if 
the smokers in Cabinet had all managed to quit cigarettes before deciding the issue?” 
(Mercury 2001, p.16). The editorial summed up the problems contained in that legislation. 
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“The State Government has run out of puff on the question of protecting 
the public from the health dangers of tobacco smoke. 
“The new anti-smoking legislation, rather than a breath of fresh air, is a 
real stinker.  
“The Government has chosen the path of expediency rather than 
responsibility by exempting bars and gaming venues from a total 
smoking ban.  
“Health Minister Judy Jackson's statement, that Tasmania is not ready to 
accept a total ban, is unconvincing. It is more a case of some ministers 
not being prepared to put altruism ahead of their own and others' tobacco 
addictions which result in people inhaling clouds of second-hand smoke. 
The new legislation will be an administrative can of worms. … 
“The Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union is 
understandably unhappy with the legislation. Bar and gaming room 
workers will still have second-hand smoke blown in their faces. … 
Cabinet deserves credit for at least banning smoking in enclosed public 
and work places, and in reserved seating areas of outdoor sporting or 
cultural events. … In the interim, hotel staff will have to cope with 
disgruntled smokers who are unclear about where and when they are able 
to light up. This uncertainty will not please smokers and non-smokers 
alike. 
“The Government has obviously concluded that in this important area of 
community health, half a smoking ban is better than none. It has judged 
that long-suffering non-smokers will be grateful for even this degree of 
relief from those who generate second-hand smoke.  
“But it is a pity that Cabinet has shown such a lack of willpower when 
the public was gasping for a stronger ban” (Mercury 2001, p. 16).  
Robin Gray represented both the more individualistic neo-liberal ideological position 
associated with conservative politics and the cognitive dissonance of a smoker. He said in 
Parliament when speaking against a motion to ban smoking in Parliament House,  
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“I think we are losing sight of the right of individuals. There are just as 
many people who die through other lifestyle-related illnesses, or spend 
time in hospitals as a result of the bad diet that they have had, or the 
alcohol that they have consumed, as there are people who are in there or 
suffering as a result of having smoked”(Hansard 1994).   
Similarly, his federal Coalition counterparts were “… inactive on tobacco control from 1976 
to 1983, and provided no funding for education programs” (Ballard 2004 p. 95), as was Gray. 
As Ballard says about this period of politics, 
“In line with Coalition ideology, the prevailing federal government view 
depicted smoking as a problem of individual behaviour rather than a 
public policy issue – a position warmly supported by the tobacco 
industry” (Ballard 2004, p. 95).  
Whilst smoking politicians in Tasmania had a poor record on tobacco reforms compared to 
non-smoking ministers, Labor’s Judith Jackson was an exception, and she took the proposal 
for smoking bans to Cabinet six times before it was approved (Jackson 2015 – personal 
communication). Indeed the strongest opponents of reform were smoking Premiers, Gray 
(Liberal), Bacon (Labor) and Lennon (Labor), and smoker backbenchers mainly in the 
Liberal Party. These backbenchers engaged in name-calling and insults, such as the “Neo-
fascist anti-smoking juggernaut” (Hodgman, in Hansard 1994). These epithets are common 
amongst pro-smoking advocates around the world. Leading contemporary anti-tobacco expert 
Robert Proctor points out: 
“…… charges that nico-nazis and tobacco fascists want to jackboot us 
into a world where no one has any fun. Tobacco prevention is made to 
look like the priggish obsession of nanny-state naysayers, a backwater of 
the meddling, have-no-fun puritanical crowd” (Proctor 2011, p.2).  
The following Table (8) records what happened in tobacco control over time, from the 
1950s when nothing much happened, to the 1990s when there was a flurry of legislative 
reforms, and the 2000s in Tasmania. It records who were ministers and which parties 
were in power at the relevant dates. Premiers are particularly powerful and can make or 
break legislation reforms and the allocation of funds, and indeed many of them held the 
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office of Treasurer as well at the same time. Notations are included as to whether or not 
particular people were smokers during this period. 
Premier Jim Bacon publicly blamed himself for his lung cancer, just prior to his death, rather 
than placing any responsibility on the tobacco industry. His declaration “I am an idiot” was 
front-page news in Tasmanian newspapers (Whinnett & Sayer 2004). 
Exposure of atrocious behaviour by the industry has been effective over time in galvanising 
public opinion, as well as influencing the views of politicians to regard the tobacco industry 
as “immoral”. Writing on climate change, and why so many politicians and members of the 
public ignore it, Marshall suggests that immorality is one of the factors likely to trigger public 
attention (Marshall 2014). MLC Cathy Edwards said she was disturbed by the fact that the 
tobacco industry had paid the AHA to produce a very expensive information package and CD 
for parliamentarians, “….and some research by UMR Research was underwritten by Philip 
Morris” (Hansard 2001). Labor MHA Peter Patmore reported that he had been threatened by 
the tobacco industry: “Now, Mr Speaker, if I ever had any doubts about not supporting this 
bill, those doubts went straight out the door when these people who lie for a living and sell 
drugs to children, threatened me” (Hansard 1997b). 
Acute awareness of at least a few politicians of the immoral behaviour of the industry is 
evident in Hansard, Parliament of Tasmania transcripts, from this and many other references.  
Conservative “white male” effect of limited risk perception? 
Most of the opposition in the Tasmanian Parliament to strengthening laws restricting smoking 
has come from conservative men, while many of the reforms have been initiated by female 
ministers. Tasmania has a very culturally homogenous population, and this is reflected in 
State Parliament. In Tasmania, all state politicians are white and most are male, around 80 per 
cent, varying only slightly over the period studied.  Conservative white males, who are in 
positions of power, perceive less risk even in identified public health problems, including 
climate change and smoking. McCright identifies the significance of the dominant elite of 
conservative white males in endorsing climate changed denialist views (McCright & Dunlap 
2011). Palmer also studied US populations and reported that: 
 “… white males tend to perceive health and technology hazards as 
having low risk because their worldview is one of trust in institutions and 
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authorities. These findings suggested that the ‘white male’ effect—that 
is, a preponderance of white males judging risks to be low—is explained, 
at least in part, by sociopolitical factors” (Palmer 2003, p. 71).  
Adequate funding for tobacco control was finally achieved in Tasmania only in 2013, at a 
unique conjunction in time, when there was a female federal Prime Minister, female Premier, 
and female health ministers at both federal and state levels. The idea of conservatism in 
Tasmanian politics was examined but not found to be particularly influential, as both major 
parties have been labelled as conservative on particular issues and at particular times. 
Tasmania’s political landscape is complicated by a strong Greens presence, a homogenous 
population, a formidable and independent Legislative Council, a powerful Treasury 
bureaucracy, crony capitalism and an intractably inadequate state economic base.  This 
contrasts with libertarian traditions in Sydney, and progressive social establishment (with 
physicians prominent in advocacy and as policy entrepreneurs) in Victoria, as described by 
Ballard (2004). The restricted ability of conservative male Tasmanian politicians to perceive 
and accept the risks of tobacco smoking has been a key factor in the issue’s failure to gain 
traction on the political agenda: they have slowed reform and refused to allocate adequate 
resources. 
The following table outlines the events and reforms over time in Tasmania by political party, 
minister and premier. 
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Table 11 Tasmania - Tobacco reforms by political party, Premier and Minister for Health 1958-2015 
Years Premier Health Minister  Parties in government Tobacco control initiatives 
1958-1969 Reece, Eric Everett, Mervyn (1964-1969) Labor  No tobacco control initiatives.  
1969-1972 Bethune, Angus  Abbott, Nigel (very reformist 
on road safety) 
Liberal/Centre Party Drafted a tobacco tax. Lost office due to tobacco industry - 
probably bribery. See (Barnsley, 2011) 
1972-1975 Reece, Eric Foster, Alan (1972-1974) Labor Tobacco tax introduced, but it failed and was repealed. 
1975-1977 Neilson, Bill Farquhar, Hedley (1974-1976) Labor No substantial reforms 
1977-1981 Lowe, Doug Barnard, Michael (1977-1980) Labor No substantial reforms 
1981-1982 Holgate, Harry James, Gill (1980-1981) Labor Tobacco Excise introduced.  
 
1982-1989 *Gray, Robin  Cleary, John (1982-1986) 
Groom, Roger (1986-1989)  
Liberal Massively increased tobacco taxes to 100%, but did not allocate 
funds to smoking prevention. (Groom signed a deal on self-
regulation of advertising – with four tobacco companies) (Bacon et 
al.) Gray was regarded by the tobacco industry as a friend, and 
found to have engaged in “improper conduct” by a Royal 
Commissioner in relation to a failed bribery attempt. (Carter, 
1991) 
1989-1992 Field, Michael White, John Labor/Green No tobacco reforms 
1992-1996 Groom, Ray Roger Groom (1992-1996) Liberal Established “Quit”. 
1996-1998 Rundle, Tony McKay, Peter (1996-1998) Liberal – in minority with 
Green support 
First smoking restrictions. Public Health Act 1997. First inroads 
on tobacco displays and marketing at point-of-sale, raised smoking 
age, banned “lying” by tobacco industry. Discussion paper on 
smoke-free areas. 
1998-2004 *Bacon, Jim (died 
lung cancer 2004) 
*Jackson, Judy (1998-2002) Labor First smoke-free indoor area laws, workplaces, eating areas, and 
some limited pub bans 2001. 
  Llewellyn, David (2002-2006) Labor Nightclub and gaming smoking ban 2005, pub smoking ban 2006 
2004-2008 #Lennon, Paul 
2008-2011 Bartlett, David Giddings, Lara (2006-2010) Labor (Greens included 
from April 2010) 
Ban on smoking in cars with kids, fruit flavoured cigs banned, 
reduction in size of POS 2007, Trebling of tobacco control funding 
2007 
2011-2014 Giddings, Lara O’Byrne, Michelle (2010-
2014) 
Labor/Green Elimination of tobacco displays at point-of-sale 2011 and 
tobacconists 2012. Extension of outdoor smoking bans. First 
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Years Premier Health Minister  Parties in government Tobacco control initiatives 
allocation of sufficient resources to undertake evidence informed 
education campaigns (2013). Proposal for Tobacco Free 
Generation referred to the Children’s Commissioner. Ban on 
smoking in prisons commenced. 
2014-present Hodgman, Will Ferguson, Michael Liberal Ban on smoking in prisons completed. 
* Smoker. #Smoker – quit whilst in office.  
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Expenditure on tobacco control – impediments and delays 
The first significant tobacco taxation reform was in 1973, but in reality the motivation was 
not about reducing smoking rates. Rather it was purely a revenue-raising measure (NAA 
1975b). Tasmania was the first state to attempt to impose such a tobacco business franchise 
fee, followed later by other states. However, the initial attempt in 1973 was a debacle, as part 
of a peculiar deal between Labor Premier, Eric Reece, who lost power soon after these 
events, and the Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, to make Tasmania independent of the Grants 
Commission. The federal government, in particular Treasurer Bill Hayden, later persuaded 
Tasmania to abandon this tax, in return for an additional $15 million, because federal Labour 
was about to face an election in May 1974, in which Tasmanian marginal seats would be 
crucial and bad publicity could jeopardise re-election (NAA 1975b). Furthermore, the fee was 
challenged in the High Court, where it was found to be flawed, though valid, and redrafted 
with bizarre provisions that required individual purchasers of tobacco to fill out forms and 
send the money to Treasury. This of course was totally impractical and the initiative was 
abandoned after much satire and hilarity in the media (Mercury 1974a, p. 3 & 1974b, p. 6). 
Photo 3 Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and Tasmanian Premier Eric Reece 
pictured in Whitlam’s office 1975  
 
Source: NAA 1975a. 
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Business franchise fees were re-introduced in Tasmania in the 1980s, but finally declared 
invalid by the High Court in 1997 (James 1997; Hansard 1996). 
Attempts were made to link tobacco taxation revenue to increases in health funding, or health 
education. The Liberal Health Minister John Cleary wrote to the Treasurer in 1983 
recommending that an increase to tobacco taxation be incorporated in the budget. He said: 
“While historically Treasury’s views on the hypothecation of revenue are 
quite clear, if you consider it is appropriate to increase the revenue from 
business franchise taxation on tobacco wholesalers, I believe it would be 
important, from a political point of view, to ‘sell’ the decision by an 
increased allocation to the health area in general or to the [public] health 
education area in particular” (Cleary 1983, p2).  
In May 1985 the Premier and Treasurer Robin Gray wrote that the government recognised 
that relationship of smoking to disease and that it was, 
 “… reasonable to expect smokers to make a significant contribution 
towards meeting these costs” (Gray 1985b).  
However, a few days later in another letter he said, seeming to contradict himself, that, 
“… there are a number of factors influencing government actions in 
regard to license fees for tobacco products. The more important of these 
now include the budgetary position confronting the State and the limited 
taxation areas available” (Gray 1985a). 
The second example of tobacco taxation (business franchise fees), which the Liberal 
government freely admitted being imposed to fund measures other than health, related to the 
teachers’ pay case in 1993. Labor member Paul Lennon criticised them: 
“… the Government has forgotten that it used the tobacco tax to pay for 
the teachers' pay rise. How short its memory is. We all remember the 
teachers’ pay tax – the tobacco tax that came rushing in here the day after 
the Industrial Commission decision was handed down” (Hansard 1993a).  
In 1992-93 the Liberal government had increased the tobacco franchise fee revenue from $34 
million to over $50 million, but as Labor member Michael Field (Hansard 1993a) pointed out 
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“… the government has chosen to exploit an addiction in order to increase its revenue 
without offering anything to reduce that addiction”. Furthermore, the revenue increase 
occurred at the same time as the teachers’ pay rise. Field (Hansard 1993a) went on to say: 
 “…the Government announced this revenue measure the day after the 
teachers received their pay rise. I know many teachers are quite bitter 
about this because they think they have been scapegoated by the fact that 
this tax was brought in and the increase in tobacco (sic) is directly related 
to their pay rise”.  
There were many discussions about hypothecation of tobacco business franchise fees and 
taxes to tobacco-control measures, and moves to establish a Health Promotion Foundation, 
similar to the successful one which had been established in Victoria (Hansard 1996; Borland, 
Winstanley & Reading 2009). A Health Promotion Foundation was established for a short 
time, but never adequately funded. In Tasmania, the powerful head of the Treasury 
Department was able to intimidate the government, and prevented the revenue being 
hypothecated to tobacco control, referring to the idea as a “hypothecation disease” (Hansard 
1996; Hansard 1998). The business franchise fee in Tasmania was therefore always used for 
other purposes (Hansard 1993b).  
Governments not adequately informed by bureaucrats 
Furthermore, government ministers were not always well informed by their bureaucrats. 
Within the Tasmanian bureaucracy: 
“Confused accountability and complex processes and excessive internal 
‘consultation’, contributed to policy proposals for action being ‘jammed 
up’ and never reaching an outcome or an authoritative decision. Cultural 
barriers included a close relationship between governments and the 
tobacco industry, lack of ‘belief’ in particular evidence-informed 
programs, primacy of the [illness] ‘rescue’ culture, and passive and 
active obstruction from several key government agencies” (Barnsley et 
al. 2011, p.12). 
The health bureaucracy (Taylor 2010) has openly acknowledged that legislation has been 
used to offset lack of resources allocated to tobacco control, and that the latter has led to 
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continuing high smoking rates. The following quote has been included in Chapter 4, however, 
it is repeated here because it is both fundamental and directly relevant to an understanding of 
the awareness of the reasons for Tasmania’s high smoking rates, and the failure to address the 
key issues, 
“Tasmania has always had strong tobacco-control legislation but this is 
largely to compensate for a lack of resources available for health 
education and clinical interventions, particularly at the level provided by 
other Australian jurisdictions. Legislation on its own however is not 
sufficient to reduce smoking rates and this is the main reason why 
Tasmania has the second highest smoking rate in Australia, which 
has not decreased since 2001” (Taylor 2010) [emphasis added]. 
Point-of-sale tobacco display restrictions 
The next reform where Tasmania did lead Australia, and the world, was in the restriction of 
cigarette displays at point-of-sale, (Laugesen et al. 2000) which the tobacco industry had 
expanded to huge sizes known as “power walls” (Dewhirst 2004) to replace conventional 
advertising as it disappeared. The tobacco industry acted swiftly to deal with this proposal 
and whipped up fear in retailers. A vitriolic name-calling public slanging match ensued, 
culminating in the retailers calling for the dismissal of the Director of Public Health, Dr Mark 
Jacobs and the Health Minister Peter McKay. McKay enraged the tobacco industry and 
retailers by calling them “peddlers of death”, and the industry responded (Pos 1997) by 
calling Dr Jacobs an “overzealous bureaucrat”. The AMA and Cancer Council called Liberal 
member Bob Cheek an “apologist for the tobacco industry” (Hansard 1999c).  Taunting of 
tobacco-control reformers is not new, nor unique to Tasmania, and the terms “fascists” and 
“nazis” were epithets used to mock health campaigners in the Parliament and elsewhere 
(Hansard 1994). Cheek was later to become leader of the Liberals in 2001–2002. Cheek’s 
Chief of Staff, Andrew Gregson, was in 2014 appointed head of corporate affairs at Imperial 
Tobacco. Nevertheless, the initial display restriction measures in 1997 were enacted by a 
cadre of committed independent-minded strong politicians and bureaucrats, particularly Peter 
McKay and Mark Jacobs, and in subsequent years progressively tightened, including 
removing loopholes after they were subjected to legal challenge by the tobacco industry.  
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McKay was plagued by opposition to his reforms from his own Liberal backbench, in 
particular the staunchly pro-business Tony Benneworth, Bob Cheek and Michael Hodgman.  
The latter, known to Canberra journalists as the “mouth from the south” – a smoker, former 
federal member and a Minister (but not in cabinet) in the Fraser government (Maccallum 
2013), died of smoking-related emphysema. Despite his strong legislative reforms, McKay 
did not allocate sufficient funding to tobacco control, and in 1997 in response to the 
Australian Medical Association call for more money to be spent on anti-smoking education 
“Health Minister Peter McKay brushed the call for increased smoking education funding 
aside, saying the Government needed money to run hospitals” (Rogers 1997a, p. 6).  This was 
a classic case of prioritising treatment over prevention, which has continued to have a 
devastating effect on health services and expenditures (Tobacco Coalition 2013). 
During the debate on legislation to reduce tobacco displays, Liberal Brett  Whiteley said in 
Parliament: 
“Our problem here is that the Government has caved in to the retail 
lobby. The minister herself admitted that the profits of retailers trumped 
health outcomes in terms of the total ban on retail cigarette displays when 
she answered my question in Parliament on 30 October 2007. We intend 
to rectify that situation in our amendments” (Hansard 2007a). 
The tobacco industry was, throughout all those changes, very concerned about reductions in 
tobacco displays, and took legal action against the Department’s guidelines in 1998. This 
necessitated amendments to the Public Health Act 1997. At the same time the government 
decided to strengthen the laws, and introduce a tougher regime in relation to tobacco displays. 
In 2000 the government (Labor) leader in the Legislative Council Michael Aird said: 
“... cigarettes should be separated from confectionery on display because 
… children are obviously attracted to the confectionery. I am advised that 
one supermarket removed confectionery from their tobacco counters in 
stores in both northern and southern Tasmania and replaced it with 
Disney videos - that is, children’s videos….We must make sure that 
children are not the subjects of marketing and promotion of cigarettes” 
(Hansard 2000).  
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He went on to describe how the tobacco industry used tobacco product packaging as a way of 
encouraging young women to smoke.  
“… one document about packaging produced by the research firm, 
Colmar Brunton for Philip Morris has evidence of personality profiling 
of young Australian women who smoke Alpine. The 'typical Alpine gal' 
is described in patronising terms as being physically timid, no daredevil 
and she has a great capacity for clichés. This document provides detailed 
advice on how to package Alpine to sell more cigarettes” (Hansard 
2000). 
It took many years after this to finally eliminate the display of tobacco products at point-of-
sale. Greens Leader Peg Putt questioned Health Minister Lara Giddings in Parliament in 
October 2007: 
“Why have you squibbed the vital measure of banning display of tobacco 
products for sale in your upcoming smoking amendment legislation, 
despite the fact that your Government's discussion paper on smoking law 
changes strongly supported this ban? Are you aware of the strong 
condemnation of this failure by antismoking advocates and doctors? Is 
there any truth in claims that you were rolled in Cabinet on this important 
measure, and what was considered a higher priority than banning 
display? Was it profits from tobacco sales?” (Hansard 2007a).  
Ms Giddings responded later in this exchange with Nick McKim:  
“Ms GIDDINGS - Mr Speaker, I am very supportive of the fact that 
legislation I bring to the Parliament will be decreasing the size of 
displays from four metres to one metre. 
“Mr McKim - Why not just get rid of them entirely? 
“Ms GIDDINGS - It is a positive step forward in terms of reducing the 
amount of space. As I have said publicly on a number of occasions now, 
there have been some concerns from small businesses, and I expect 
members from all parties would have been lobbied by various elements 
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of the small business community about their concerns about this 
proposed legislation. 
“Mr McKim - Ah, so it's the money” (Hansard 2007a). 
Peg Putt highlighted the hypocrisy when she suggested the government had caved in to the 
retailers,  
“Our problem here is that the Government has caved in to the retail 
lobby. The minister herself admitted that the profits of retailers trumped 
health outcomes in terms of the total ban on retail cigarette displays when 
she answered my question in Parliament on 30 October 2007 ” (Hansard 
2007b). 
On retailers’ and their lobbyists’ hypocrisy Ms Putt made the comment earlier in 2006 that,  
“They come in and say, 'We want people to stop smoking, we do not 
want to support the habit, we believe that it is an obnoxious habit and it 
pains us to be selling these products to people'. They appear to be 
genuine when they say it. They then turn around and say, 'However, we 
do not want any restrictions on display that might reduce the amount of 
profit that we can make by people being unaware of the range of cigarette 
products that we have for them that they can buy'.  
“In response, I put to them:  if you actually believe that it is important to 
reduce smoking rates in Tasmania, then you must accept that that will 
inevitably lead to a drop in sales and a drop in profits from cigarette 
sales; there is no other logical outcome. To come to members of 
parliament and say, 'We want to maintain the profits but we claim to be 
concerned about the impact of smoking' is an extraordinary thing to do. 
That is about the point at which our meeting got somewhat explosive” 
(Hansard 2006).  
The final eradication of tobacco displays was wrought through the Legislative Council, which 
amended the government’s legislation to eliminate tobacco displays entirely. The initiative 
did not come from Cabinet, which did not heed Health Department advice.  
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Licensing of retailers 
Licensing of retailers in 1999 was a significant reform, another early initiative that has still 
not been enacted in several other states, which enables governments to keep track of retailer 
locations, to ensure that retailers are kept informed of changes to legislation, and to monitor 
compliance with sales to minors and display restrictions. An important mechanism is that the 
regime is self-funding, as fees obtained from retailers are allocated to enforcement 
administration (Hansard 1999a), which has helped to ensure the high rate of compliance of 99 
per cent (Tobacco Coalition 2013). 
Boundaries between key policy makers, and political dynasties 
One of the factors Kingdon identified as being important, that is, a lack of boundaries 
between the politicians, public servants and advocates, is very strongly evident in Tasmania, 
and may be a factor in success in legislative reforms (Kingdon 1995; Mannheimer, Lehto & 
Ostin 2007).  
In Tasmania boundaries between key people influencing policy are equally slight, because of 
the small population, a small number of “elite families”, and inevitable interactions between 
them. Newman records many political dynasties in Tasmania, and lists nine pages of details 
in his book on Tasmanian political representation (Newman 1994). There are many examples 
of fathers, sons, daughters and brothers either being elected to successive or neighbouring 
seats of Parliament. Liquor Union (LHMU) Secretary Darren Matthewson shared a house 
with an adviser to the Health Minister. His successor as LHMU Secretary was David 
O’Byrne, who became a convenor of Advocacy Group SmokeFree Tasmania. David O’Byrne 
was elected to Parliament in March 2010 as a Labor member, and appointed to Cabinet. His 
sister Michelle O’Byrne was elected as a Labor MP in 2006 and in 2011 was appointed 
Health Minister. Both Jim Bacon and Michael Hodgman have had sons elected to Parliament, 
and Michael’s father and brother were also MPs. Scott Bacon became a minister and Will 
Hodgman became Premier in 2014. So, it is not uncommon in Tasmania for MPs’ sons and 
daughters to be elected to Parliament and many family names can be seen to be repeated in 
succession in electorates (Tasmanian Parliamentary Library 2015b). These characteristics of 
a close-knit community are an ideal crucible for change and opening windows of opportunity, 
however, they are also an ideal way of closing doors if the prevailing views of a powerful 
political family are opposed to change. 
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In Parliament in 2004 Michael Hodgman voted not to support a ban on smoking in pubs. 
Michael Hodgman’s son Will Hodgman, also an MP and current Premier and leader of the 
Liberal Party, also voted against this bill (Hansard 2004b). Michael’s father William 
Hodgman senior, a leading member of the Legislative Council from 1966 to 1974, took a 
similar stance in 1975, rejecting health warnings on cigarette advertisements (Legacy Library 
1975). The Hodgman family has never supported tobacco-control reforms in Parliament. In 
contrast, Jim Bacon’s son Scott Bacon, whose father died from lung cancer, has been an MP 
from 2010 and has supported anti-smoking measures, such as the bill to ban political parties 
receiving donations from the tobacco industry. 
Smoke-free areas debates, debacles, and hypocrisy 
An interesting insight into public policy-making and who is responsible for putting forward 
policy – governments or bureaucracy – is highlighted in the debate on smoke-free areas that 
began in the late 1990s. There are suggestions that the bureaucrats in health were cowed by 
the actions of ALP leader Paul Lennon and his agreement with the AHA, a Memorandum of 
Understanding not to proceed with smoke-free areas legislation, and too frightened to put 
forward proposals for smoke-free areas. An exchange was recorded in 1999 between Greens 
leader Peg Putt and Health Minister Judy Jackson, in which the minister tried to avoid the 
question of the Labor deal with the AHA. The leader of the Greens tried to elicit a response 
from the Health Minister as to whether the Minister or Department of Health were 
constrained from putting forward proposals for smoke-free legislation, because of the attitude 
of Paul Lennon and his deal with the AHA, and whether she had asked for advice from the 
Department.  
“Ms PUTT - With respect to passive smoking, is it correct that it is the 
policy of this Government not to enact any further legislation to restrain 
passive smoking – that is, not to enact legislation to restrict smoking in 
restaurants or hotels? 
“Mrs JACKSON - I cannot look into the future. There is nothing at the 
moment for the Government to do that, but whether or not there is in the 
term of this Government - 
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“Ms PUTT- Do you receive advice from your department about things 
like the impact of passive smoking and possible legislative action or 
other action that could be taken? 
“Mrs JACKSON - I have not, no. 
“Ms PUTT - Would that normally be a function that the department 
would look for with respect to that? 
“Mrs JACKSON - Well, I am sure if I asked them they would. I admit I 
have not asked for that information - so no, I have not received any. 
“Ms PUTT - You would have to trigger it by asking? 
“Mrs JACKSON - Not always, no. I have not either asked for it or it has 
not been offered to me. 
“Ms PUTT - It has not been offered to you. There is no comparison 
between what we have here and what the other States have in terms of 
that sort of legislation. 
“Mrs JACKSON - I have some idea myself but not the department, no. 
“Ms PUTT - What I am wondering is whether you are actually 
constrained in coming forward with initiatives by a deal that has been 
done by another government minister with the hotels. 
“Mrs JACKSON - You would have to address that. I can only tell you 
what has happened in my area and what I have done. I have not asked 
and I have not received, and I do not think the department feels 
constrained by any other minister” (Hansard 1999b).  
By March 2001 the Labor Government introduced a Bill to ban smoking in workplaces and 
public places, but which provided some exemptions for hotels and bars. The Bill was passed 
and came into effect in September 2001.  
In February 2002, the Department of Health and Human Services Smoke-free Areas Review 
(DHHS 2002) recommended:  
 All bar and gaming areas plus York Park and Bellerive Oval be made smoke-free;  
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 half of the state's outdoor dining areas should become smoke-free;  
 more funding should be allocated to enforce anti-tobacco laws; and 
 smoke-free areas be reviewed again in two years (Hansard 2003).  
In November 2003 a letter to the editor of the Hobart Mercury from the Greens spokesman 
said:  
“Your editorial (October 30) is quite correct. The Government's latest go 
at making venues smoke-free is policy-making at its worst. The Greens 
suspected as much and introduced a Bill into Parliament on Tuesday to 
fully implement the recommendations of the smoke-free areas review 
which would provide for an effective and immediate ban.” The Greens 
pledged “We will continue to campaign alongside Quit Tasmania, the 
Cancer Council and the hospitality union until we create smoke-free 
venues and workplaces” (Morris 2003). 
Accusations were made by the Greens and others that the perceived need for revenue from 
poker machines was preventing the government from acting to eliminate smoking from 
gaming revenues, because revenue fell in Victoria following action:  
“A similar ban on smoking in Victoria's pokies venues cut $190 million 
from that state's gambling take”(Rose 2003). Mr Morris said: “We know 
these recommendations are currently sitting before Cabinet, and we urge 
a swift decision to implement them fully -- or an explanation for the 
continual delay. Is the Government putting its own addiction to pokies 
revenue above the welfare of hospitality workers and patrons?'' (Rose 
2003) 
By late 2003 there was still no legislation and the Greens criticised the government for not 
acting to ban smoking in gaming areas. Greens MHA Tim Morris said in September 2003 
that the reforms had been recommended in February six months previously and accused “… 
Health Minister David Llewellyn of stalling because such bans would affect the State 
Government's $70 million annual revenue from gaming” (Rose 2003, p23; Hansard 2004b). 
In June 2004 the Greens introduced their own Bill to try to get the government to move 
forward on the issue. MHA Tim Morris taunted Minister Llewellyn for failing to proceed, 
with the complexity and compromises in the government Bill, and for winning the 
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ACOSH/AHA Dirty Ashtray award, which is given to the State Minister for the worst 
performing government in Australia.  
“Your bill languishes on the Notice Paper as if you are ashamed to bring 
it on - and you should be ashamed. It is a pathetic piece of legislation that 
does next to nothing to protect Tasmanians from the poisonous effects of 
tobacco smoke. Your bill is ridiculous. Take the one-metre rule for 
example - what do you think that is going to do? What a farce - why 
bother? ….. Since the 2001 bill, you have done nothing. In your time as 
Minister for Health and Human Services you have done nothing, not a 
thing. … You have had reports done by your own department that show 
you should be bringing in total bans and what have you done? Nothing, 
except putting a half baked idea on the Notice Paper which you were too 
embarrassed to debate. Next, you recently won the Dirty Ashtray award. 
Well done!” (Hansard 2004b).  
Both the Liberals and Greens introduced Private Members’ Bills in 2004 to expand these 
areas to bars, but the government Bill was finally passed in 2004 and came into effect with a 
ban on smoking in gaming areas in January 2005 and bars in January 2006. 
As Bryan-Jones (2004) found, there may have been a perception of a salient constituency 
advocating for this reform. Smoke-free public places engage community anger, discussion, 
media and advocacy because individuals can see and feel the smoke, and are affected by it. 
Funding for public education campaigns, although effective, is more abstract, does not affect 
individual constituents and voters, and is not a front-of-mind issue at elections, and so the 
ability of health groups to engage public imagination and political action for such funding is 
limited, despite the fact that the tobacco industry does not specifically oppose it. 
Smoking in cars with children present 
There were few obstacles experienced by government in banning smoking in cars with 
children present in Tasmania. Thomson looked at policy makers’ views about such laws in 
2008-2009 and found, 
“We found very strong themes of policy maker concern for the 
vulnerability of children and the need for their protection from 
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secondhand smoke. There were mixed reactions to the idea of a 
smokefree law for cars with children in them. These themes and mixed 
reactions spanned both the ‘left’ and ‘right’ political parties” (Thomson 
et al. 2010, p. 970).  
In Tasmania local lobby groups including the AMA, SmokeFree Tasmania and the Asthma 
Foundation lobbied the government to support such a ban. The proposal was made in a 
Department of Health and Human Services Discussion paper in 2006, followed by legislation 
and implementation in 2007 (Taylor 2006; Freeman, Chapman & Storey 2008). The proposal 
was supported by the Police Department, which had carriage of enforcement, and was 
strongly supported by the public (Brown 2009). There is no recorded opposition from the 
tobacco industry in Tasmania to this particular reform. It may be that it did not directly affect 
revenue or sales, and any opposition would have been represented as the tobacco industry 
supporting damage to children’s health, so they kept quiet about it. The tobacco industry was 
very vocal about other bans on smoking in public and domestic spaces and at times argued 
that environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) was not a danger to health, but in this particular 
case they were remarkably silent (Freeman, Chapman & Storey 2008). There seems to have 
been no opposition from any politician in Tasmania to this proposal, and the key influencing 
feature appears to have been the lack of lobbying from any sector of industry. 
Mass-media campaigns, and the evidence transferred to members of Parliament, 
or not 
Members of parliament from all political parties and independents know that mass-media 
campaigns were effective in reducing smoking rates. During the debate on the Public Health 
Bill 1997 Liberal MHA Bob Cheek said:  
“I probably will not be too popular for saying these things and I know the 
budgetary restraints … but the fact is other States do have 6 per cent of 
their total tobacco taxes and we have about 0.5 and … we get $91million 
in taxes and more should be spent on anti-smoking campaigns and 
education programs …” (Hansard 1997b).  
Labor MHA Fran Bladel added, 
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“… Now in this State we are really kidding ourselves if we hope to make 
a big dent in anti-smoking campaigns unless we are prepared to steer that 
money into areas where it will be most useful” (Hansard 1997b). 
Members of the Legislative Council were aware that well-funded mass-media campaigns 
were essential for reducing smoking rates. These Legislative Council briefings were given by 
the government, so there was clearly an awareness of the evidence relating to social 
marketing and mass-media education. During the debate on the Bill regarding reduction of 
tobacco displays and other measures in 2000, the Liberal Leader in the Legislative Council, 
Tony Fletcher asked: 
“Will the Government, when it brings down the Budget in just a month 
or so's time, have the funds available to adequately address the 
campaigns that need to be followed in regard to addressing the issue, not 
only of (a) tobacco product being available and used by people under an 
age, but also by people of society generally using tobacco products to 
their detriment?  
“We were told in a briefing session recently that the best outcomes are 
achieved by high-profile State-funded, State-based publicity campaigns 
that encourage people to turn away from the use of tobacco products. We 
have seen none of that for quite a number of years now; the reason why 
we have seen none of that is because the funds have not been available to 
do it” (Hansard 2000). 
Liberal MHA Dr Frank Madill, a medical practitioner, questioned the Health Minister about 
smoking rates and funding tobacco control during Estimates Committee hearings in 1999  
“… I see that the overall amount has been decreased and there has been a 
shift of funds from it to administered payments. What I want to know is 
… what is the Government doing about this issue? Is there money in this 
budget specifically for a campaign to try to stop people from smoking?” 
(Hansard 1999b).  
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Greens consistently reformist  
The only political party with an impeccable and consistent track record on tobacco-control 
reforms and implementation is the Greens, as both the Labor and Liberal Parties varied 
widely in their approach over the decades of the 1990s and 2000s. Variations of commitment 
to tobacco control within the major parties seem to have been related to personalities, and 
interests of the particular individual Health Minister, as well as their ability to convince 
Cabinet colleagues to take up measures of reform, or to allocate funding. Many passionate 
speeches have been made in Parliament, with a great deal of detail about the evidence and 
health effects of tobacco, by the Greens MPs Peg Putt, Gerry Bates, Mike Foley, Di Hollister, 
Paul O’Halloran, Tim Morris and Cassie O’Connor. Tasmania’s Hare Clark voting system for 
the House of Assembly, with multi-member electorates, is very fair and democratic, and leads 
to minority governments regularly being elected, as smaller parties often have members 
elected (Tasmanian Parliamentary Library 2015a). At various times since the late 1980s the 
Greens supported Liberal or Labor minority governments, which has positively affected the 
pace of anti-tobacco legislation, but very importantly not resource allocation, again because 
this power lies with the very highest layer of politician/bureaucrat (See Table 11). 
Private Members’ Bills and other legislation  
There have been sporadic, and unsuccessful Private Members’ Bills introduced over many 
years. One that worried the tobacco industry was tabled as early as 1983 by Mac Le Fevre, an 
Independent Member of the Legislative Council, who introduced legislation to regulate 
tobacco advertising. Tobacco Company Philip Morris (PM) monitored this Bill carefully, and 
their representatives regularly reported to management in the USA on its progress (Legacy, 
Batten 1984; Legacy, Simper 1983; Legacy, Sporton 1984).  
A handful of Private Members’ Bills were introduced in the 1980s to 2000s by Greens, 
Liberals or Independents, but all were defeated or lapsed on the prorogation of Parliament. Dr 
Gerry Bates, Greens, introduced Bills in 1990, 1991 and 1992 to regulate the sale, supply, 
purchase and promotion and advertising of tobacco products and to establish a Health 
Promotion Foundation, similar to that which had been achieved in Victoria. Tim Morris, 
Greens, in 2004 introduced a Bill to expand the definition of smoke-free areas, and similarly 
Sue Napier MHA, Liberal, in 2004 and 2005. Labor when in government attempted in 2012 
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to ban donations from the tobacco industry to political parties, but this was defeated in the 
Legislative Council.  
Legislative Council 
Whilst the Legislative Council is generally a conservative upper house, on two occasions it 
has shown that it has been prepared to initiate more radical reforms than the government of 
the day is prepared to consider in relation to tobacco control. In 2007, the Legislative Council 
strengthened a government Bill, which was designed to reduce tobacco product displays; and 
in 2012 it passed a motion in support of the Tobacco Free Generation (TFG). The TFG is a 
proposal to phase out the sale of tobacco products to any person born after the year 2000 
(Berrick 2013; Walters 2015). There were some passionate debates over the years on 
tobacco-control legislation, for example in 1997 Councillor Peter Schulze made a very strong 
speech mourning his daughter Suzie who died of lung cancer in her thirties, and criticising 
the tobacco industry (Hansard 1997c; Hansard 2000).  
“I was phoned up by the tobacco lobby that has worked so hard and 
effectively for so many years across this nation and across the world, to 
talk to them. I quickly told them my position and that it was not likely to 
change, particularly, but if they still wanted to come and see me in my 
office, I was prepared to talk to them and have them there and listen to 
them. I would have shown them photos of my daughter who died of lung 
cancer last year and she was a smoker” (Hansard 1997c).  
In 2007 the Public Health Amendment Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council. It 
included clauses to ban smoking in cars when children are present, and to ban fruit-flavoured 
cigarettes as well as to reduce the size of tobacco displays. Legislative Councillor Jim 
Wilkinson pointed out that the Minister for Health Lara Giddings had supported a complete 
ban on tobacco displays, by seconding a motion, which was carried, at the 2006 Labor Party 
State Conference. Clearly the Minister had not been able to get this through Cabinet as it was 
not in the Bill. Jim Wilkinson and Ruth Forrest successfully moved an amendment to phase 
out all tobacco displays by 2011, with the exception of those in specialist tobacconists. The 
government supported the amendment as it would have been embarrassing to defend an 
untenable position, given that the Minister herself had publicly supported a complete ban on 
displays (Hansard 2007c).  
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In 2012, Legislative Councillor Ivan Dean successfully moved a motion to support the 
Tobacco Free Generation. This was carried unanimously by the Council, and resulted in 
considerable publicity for Tasmania (Daynard 2013; Schriever & Pedder 2012; Corderoy & 
Darby 2012; Thomas 2012). The Government referred the matter to the Children’s 
Commissioner for consideration, but the report was not released prior to the 2014 election, 
and no permanent Children’s Commissioner was re-appointed. An amendment bill for a 
Tobacco Free Generation, introduced by Ivan Dean MLC is before the Tasmanian Legislative 
Council (Walters & Barnsley 2015). This proposal is in the realm of the Weberian analysis of 
“charismatic ideas” as outlined by Smith (2013). Hooker and Chapman have also noted the 
importance of politically independent members of Parliament in moving the tobacco-control 
agenda forward in Australia (Hooker & Chapman 2006).  
Tobacco taxes had a dramatic effect in Tasmania on expenditure on tobacco products, and 
when the states lost the power to control this source of revenue tobacco sales increased (See 
Chart 6, Chapter 4). Expenditure on tobacco generally declined under Labor Governments 
and rose under Liberal governments, with the exception of the dramatic decline in the early 
1990s when tobacco business franchise fees were doubled by a Liberal government.  
Discussion  
As Studlar and others have established, “lesson-drawing” or copying across jurisdictions in 
tobacco control is common, particularly in English-speaking jurisdictions (Studlar 2002; 
Farquharson 2003; James and Lodge 2003; Duina and Kurzer 2004; Shipan & Volden 2004; 
Studlar 2007). Tasmania has led Australia, and in some cases the world, in some areas of 
tobacco-control legislation, such as the removal of tobacco displays at point-of-sale 
(Laugesen et al. 2000). There were few other international precedents for this legislative 
action, so it was a brave step for a small state to take. In the 1970s, a progressive Tasmanian 
Liberal government lost office due to political interference by the tobacco industry as 
outlined in Chapter 5 (Barnsley 2011). However, the paradox is that those steps have been 
taken in order largely to avoid the expense of public education campaigns in spite of the 
knowledge that there are effective in decreasing smoking rates. 
Tasmania was in lock-step with other Australian states in eliminating smoking in public 
places but not in public education campaigns. There were impediments to such reforms in all 
states as the tobacco and hospitality industries campaigned against such reforms, engaged in 
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subversive undermining of bureaucratic organisations and intimidated politicians. Tasmanian 
Senior Medical Officer in the Department of Health, Dr Martin Bicevskis was particularly 
singled out for criticism by the tobacco industry for his “intemperate” comments (Legacy 
Library 1999a). Dr Bicevskis wrote to Standards Australia in February 1999 commenting on 
a draft ventilation and air-conditioning standard. The tobacco industries had infiltrated this 
committee and were attempting to alter the Australian standard so that air conditioning could 
be seen as an effective way of controlling indoor tobacco smoke, as they had done in the 
USA (Legacy Library 1999b; Bialous & Glantz 2002; Harper & Martin 2002). The tobacco 
industry also issued a legal challenge against the tobacco guidelines under the Public Health 
Act 1997, forcing the government to amend the legislation. 
All the efforts of the tobacco industry and the impediments it engineered, as outlined above, 
conspired to reduce evidence transfer to the political domain. Bureaucrats are responsible for 
providing evidence-based information to ministers and the Parliament and this too effectively 
failed in Tasmania. The failure to provide evidence was due to structural and process 
problems within the public sector; a set of cultural beliefs that did not accord with the 
evidence; unclear accountability; and indifference to tobacco control from the senior 
decision-makers (Barnsley, Walters & Wood-Baker 2015). 
Despite these impediments it is clear that many individual politicians from all parties and 
independents were aware of the evidence around effective tobacco control, yet these people 
were not the major influencers able to implement policy change, nor did they have sufficient 
power or seniority in the system to convince governments to act on the evidence. Premiers 
and senior bureaucrats and to a lesser extent health ministers were the key players, though 
with some exceptions. Awareness and recognition of tobacco smoking as a problem by these 
most powerful politicians was never a top priority. Many politicians from all political parties 
and several independents were conscious of the issue, were well informed and often 
passionate about achieving reforms. However, a succession of state premiers, powerful 
cabinet officials and the key advisers in the public service such as the head of the Treasury 
Department were not convinced, and either opposed the allocation of resources, or directed it 
be spent elsewhere. Overall, they confounded the best efforts of the better informed and more 
motivated, less powerful, political figures.  
Thus, the key factors for agenda-setting outlined by Kingdon, that is, recognition of the 
problem, agreement on a way forward and a lack of boundaries between the politicians, 
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advocates and public servants, were thwarted by various barriers. The environment for 
knowledge transfer was contaminated by the tobacco industry. From as long ago as the 1960s 
and continuing into the first years of the 21st Century the tobacco industry has interfered in 
Tasmanian politics, lobbied politicians, engaged in unethical behaviour, undertaken legal 
action against the principle statute law, and made large political donations to the major 
parties at times when an election was about to be held or a tobacco control reform was in the 
pipeline. The tobacco industry has also strategically used front organisations to pursue its 
agenda, and to pressure politicians, particularly in more recent years when the community 
and most politicians had gained an awareness of the toxic nature of the tobacco industry and 
its lobbyists. The last identifiable recorded direct tobacco industry donation to the Liberals 
was in 2013, just prior to their election as the current government. 
A number of senior Tasmanian politicians have had brazen and unapologetically close ties 
with the tobacco industry and its front organisations. Importantly, many of these were 
smokers and all were white males. The close relationships between many of this cadre of 
politicians with the hotel industry, including gaming venues, as well as retailers, significantly 
delayed legislative reforms. However, this was counterbalanced by other reforming 
politicians who questioned these alliances, and were concerned about tobacco smoking. 
Eventually these reformers were, with the support of public opinion and active health 
organisations, able to introduce legislative measures to control tobacco against the tide of 
industry pressure, but they were not powerful enough to influence the funding for social 
marketing that was also needed, as this was controlled by the very top of the political 
pyramid.  
Taxation, or later titled “business franchise fees”, on tobacco sales commenced briefly in 
Tasmania in the 1970s, was abandoned, but resumed in the 1980s, and was finally 
overthrown by the High Court in the late 1990s. The revenue obtained from such excises was 
never directed to tobacco control, despite pleas from many backbench politicians. A powerful 
Treasury Department prevented every government of any political persuasion from 
undertaking such hypothecation of revenue to tobacco control.  
Thus, the continuing failure in the 2000s to allocate sufficient resources to evidence-based 
mass-media campaigns and cessation of quitting support services were the major impediment 
to reducing smoking rates in Tasmania. There was always another priority identified on 
which to spend money, such as the 1993 teachers’ pay rise, or public hospitals in 1999. 
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Tobacco smoking never rose to the top of the government’s agenda. The bureaucracy did not 
inform the key ministers sufficiently of the importance and effectiveness of mass-media 
campaigns, although there was an awareness amongst many other politicians that this was 
indeed a crucial factor, and they said so on many occasions. Amongst politicians the 
“cognitive dissonance” characteristic of smokers and the “conservative white male” effect of 
impaired risk perception, continually operated as an obstacle to reform and resource 
allocation.  
A unique conjunction of female leaders at both a state and federal political level provided a 
vital short “window of opportunity” for reform and allocation of sufficient funding in 2013. 
Some studies have also indicated that female policy-makers are “more likely to use research 
evidence” (Oliver 2014; Brownson 2011). It is worth considering that female political leaders 
are generally less likely to be engaged in “cronyism” and corruption in liberal democracies, 
therefore less likely to be captured by industry, and are also more risk averse, especially in 
public health domains (Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer 2015).  
A female political leader in Tasmania could not go out alone to dinners with captains of 
industry without exciting salacious comment, unlike male leaders such as Paul Lennon, who 
famously dined publicly with a forestry industry leader to stitch up a deal to build an 
enormous pulp mill (Beresford 2015). Former Premier Lara Giddings would have found it 
unwise to be seen unaccompanied by minders in a public place arranging such a deal, because 
she was a young female. Nor could she go unaccompanied to the pub, the horse races, 
gaming venues, play golf, go fishing or go to exclusive all-male clubs, where the fabric of 
crony capitalism is formed and flourishes. The exclusion of female leaders from the bastions 
of crony capitalism, coupled with female politicians’ greater awareness of public health 
“risk” compared to males, and their greater propensity to use research evidence would 
contribute to an explanation of why reforms suddenly occurred when a critical mass of 
female leaders were in power. 
Tasmania’s push to ban advertising and displays of tobacco products at point-of-sale, was 
met with fierce resistance from the retailers’ lobby and the tobacco industry. The reforming 
health minister and public servants in the late 1990s and early 2000s were subjected by 
opponents to abuse, name calling, insults and calls for their resignation. Licensing of tobacco 
sellers has been a key administrative tool since 1999 for managing enforcement of sales to 
minors and display restrictions, and in comparison to other reforms was able to be regulated 
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without significant tobacco industry obstruction. Similarly, banning smoking in cars with 
children also encountered no industry resistance, presumably because they saw this of little 
threat to sales, and essentially a lost cause.  
Ideological differences between the major political parties proved less important in tobacco 
control than the personalities, power structures and underlying characteristic cronyism of 
politics in Tasmania. Some Liberals were highly civil libertarian and sympathetic to 
individualistic approaches, and prepared to blame smokers for their own fate, while many 
male Labor politicians were close to industry leaders and small business, and unprepared to 
upset these powerful interest groups. Both political parties were led at various times over the 
decades by premiers with very close ties to industry. 
Conclusion 
Most factors slowing legislative reforms in tobacco control in Tasmania have stemmed from 
the influence of the tobacco industry, and the willingness of senior politicians to engage with 
big tobacco and its associated front organisations. Crony capitalism has been embedded in 
Tasmanian political culture, including alcohol, gaming and forestry as described by writers 
Beresford (2010, 2015) and Flanagan (2004, 2007) and has acted as a barrier to challenges to 
powerful industry groups. The main antidotes appear to have been rare female leaders, and 
some male leaders such as McKay who are somewhat outsiders in the cronyism culture, and 
therefore more able to initiate reform unencumbered by strong personal and social ties to 
industry. 
The major world-leading legislative reforms in Tasmania in tobacco control in a number of 
areas that were pushed through against the odds by a small number of insightful, determined 
and socially progressive decision-makers, were offset by successive governments’ failures to 
allocate resources to evidence-based public educational initiatives, causing a lag effect in 
reducing smoking rates in this state, from which it is still suffering both socially and 
economically. This reflected the ability of the hyper-elite to control the money, and those 
were par excellence the “cronyists”. 
The unwillingness of Tasmanian politicians to allocate resources to evidence-based tobacco-
control measures such as mass-media campaigns and cessation support programs was 
essentially a product of the cognitive dissonance of key leaders who were smokers, 
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compounded by: a failure of the bureaucracy to adequately inform them of what actions 
would be effective in reducing smoking rates; a refusal by Treasury to consider 
hypothecation of tobacco taxes, coupled with a failure of successive governments to 
challenge the tight financial hegemony of Treasury; and a lack of a real sense of the real 
impact and the level of risk that tobacco smoking has posed to Tasmanian society due to their 
unique socio-cultural position as conservative white males with strong ties to industry. The 
result of all this has been enormous health costs, public hospitals that cannot cope with the 
current burden of illness, smoking-related in large part, and a financially hampered 
government. 
Tasmania has outstanding research capacities at the University of Tasmania including the 
Menzies Research Institute, School of Medicine, Health Sciences and School of Social 
Sciences. There are many non-government organisations interested in tobacco control. 
Medical fraternities and colleges have a wide range of competencies and insights. An 
enhanced and more formal association between government, the academic research sector, 
medical practitioners and non-government organisations could improve knowledge 
translation and evidence-informed public policy making by focussing attention on “wicked 
problems” such as tobacco control. Canadians have made efforts to “…build bridges between 
research and public policy making processes” (Lavis, 2006 p.42) and lessons could be 
learned from adaptation in Tasmania of such ideas and processes.  
  
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 212 
 
References Chapter 6 
 
AMA (Australian Medical Association) and ACOSH (Australian Council on Smoking and 
Health), Annual Dirty Ashtray Awards 2000 to 2010.   https://ama.com.au/ 
Australian Electoral Commission, 2013-14, Donor Annual Return, Funding Disclosure and 
Political Parties. Philip Morris Limited, Liberal Party of Australia- Tasmanian Division. 
2 July 2013 $11,000. Viewed 26 February 2016 
http://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au/Donor.aspx?SubmissionId=55&ClientId=10094 
Ballard, J 2004 “The Politics of Tobacco Control in Australia: International Template?” in 
Feldman, EA & Bayer, R (eds) 2004, pp. 89–113. 
Barnsley, K 2011, “Crony Capitalism or Corruption? The Curious Case of British Tobacco 
and a Tasmanian Government”, Tasmanian Historical Research Association, Papers 
and Proceedings, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 6-15. 
Barnsley, K & Freeman B, updated by Tumini, V & Purcell, K 2011, “Smokefree 
environments”, in Scollo, MM and Winstanley MH (eds) 2012.  
Barnsley, K, Walters, H & Wood-Baker, R 2015, “Bureaucratic Barriers to Evidence-based 
Tobacco-control policy: A Tasmanian Case Study”, Universal Journal of Public 
Health, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 6-15.  
Beresford, Q 2010, “Corporations, Government and Development: The Case of Institutional 
Corruption in Tasmania”, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 
209-25. 
_______ 2015, The Rise and Fall of Gunns, NewSouth Publishing, Sydney. 
Berrick J, 2013, “The tobacco-free generation proposal”, Tobacco Control, vol. 22, pp. i22-
i26.  
Bialous, SA & Glantz, SA 2002, “ASHRAE Standard 62: Tobacco industry's influence over 
national ventilation standards”, Tobacco Control, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 315-328. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 213 
 
Bolger, R, & Arndt, D 2012, “Tobacco donation plan defeated”, Examiner, November 15. 
Viewed 2 February 2016.  http://www.examiner.com.au/story/1124208/tobacco-donation-
plan-defeated/ 
Borland, R Winstanley, M & Reading, D 2009, “Legislation to institutionalize resources for 
tobacco control: the 1987 Victorian Tobacco Act”, Addiction, vol. 104, no. 10, pp. 
1623-1629. 
Brown, D 2009 “Smokers dobbed in: Public tips off cops over kids in cars”, Mercury, 
September 28, p.3. 
Brownson, RC, Dodson, EA, Stamatakis, KA, Casey, CM, Elliott, MB & Luke, DA 2011, 
“Communicating Evidence-Based Information on Cancer Prevention to State-Level 
Policy Makers”, Journal of the National Cancer Institute, vol.103, pp. 306-316. 
Bryan-Jones, K & Chapman, S 2006, “Political dynamics promoting the incremental 
regulation of secondhand smoke: a case study of New South Wales, Australia”, BMC 
Public Health, vol. 6, p. 192.  
Bryan-Jones, KH 2004, The Political Evolution of Secondhand Smoke Legislation in New 
South Wales, Australia, Master of Philosophy thesis, University of Sydney. 
Carter, WJ 1991, Report of the Royal Commission into an Attempt to Bribe a Member of the 
House of Assembly and Other Matters, Government Printer, Hobart Viewed 3 
February 2016. 
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/21057636?selectedversion=NBD11073818> 
Cleary, J 1983, From Cleary Minister for Health “RE: 1983/84 Budget; Business Franchise – 
Tobacco”, 1 August 1983, Letter to the Treasurer Robin Gray (who was also the 
premier) to Gray, R. 
Corderoy, A & Darby, A 2012 “Bid to ban cigarettes for anyone born after 2000”, Sydney 
Morning Herald, August 22. Viewed 3 February 2016. 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/bid-to-ban-cigarettes-for-anyone-born-after-
2000-20120822-24liy.html  
Dally, S, 1998 “Hotel licence ban to boost industry”, Mercury, October 2, p.3. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 214 
 
Daynard, RA 2013, “Regulatory Approaches to Ending Cigarette-Caused Death and Disease 
in the United States”, American Journal of Law and Medicine, vol. 39, pp. 290-297. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2002, SmokeFree Areas Review. Hobart. 
Dearlove, JV, Bialous, SA & Glantz, SA 2002, “Tobacco industry manipulation of the 
hospitality industry to maintain smoking in public places” Tobacco Control, vol. 11, 
no. 2, pp. 94-104. 
Dewhirst, T 2004, “POP goes the power wall? Taking aim at tobacco promotional strategies 
utilised at retail”, Tobacco Control, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 209-210. 
Duina, F & Kurzer, P 2004, “Smoke in your eyes: the struggle over tobacco control in the 
European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 57-77. 
Esarey, J & Schwindt-Bayer, L 2015, Women’s representation, accountability, and 
corruption in democracies,  Viewed 3 February 2016.  http://jee3.web.rice.edu/gender-
corruption-accountability.pdf 
Gray, R 1985a, “RE: ‘Do smokers pay their Way’”, Letter to Woodfield, A, 3 June 1985. 
______ 1985b, “RE: Tobacco Taxes”, Letter to Smith, W, MHR, 27 May 1985. 
Farquharson, K 2003, “Influencing policy transnationally: Pro-and anti-tobacco global 
advocacy networks”, Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 
80-92. 
Feldman, EA & Bayer, R (eds) 2004, Unfiltered: Conflicts over Tobacco Policy and Public 
Health, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. 
Flanagan, R 2004, “The Selling-out of Tasmania”, Opinion, The Age, Melbourne July 22, 
2004. Viewed 3 February 2016. 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/07/21/1090089215626.html?from=storyrhs 
Flanagan, R 2007, “The Tragedy of Tasmania's Forests: Out of Control”, Essay, The Monthly  
May 2007. Viewed 3 February 2016. 
https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2007/may/1348543148/richard-flanagan/out-control 
Francey, N, Chapman, S 2000, “‘Operation Berkshire’: the international tobacco companies” 
conspiracy’, BMJ, vol. 321(7257), pp. 371-374. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 215 
 
Freeman, B, Chapman, S & Storey, P 2008, “Banning smoking in cars carrying children: an 
analytical history of a public health advocacy campaign”, Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Public Health, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 60-65. 
Festinger, L 1962, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Fotuhi, O, Fong, GT, Zanna, MP, Borland R, Yong, H-H & Cummings, KM 2013, “Patterns 
of cognitive dissonance-reducing beliefs among smokers: a longitudinal analysis from 
the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey”, Tobacco Control, vol. 
22, no. 1, pp. 52-8.  
Hansard 1993a, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, 
“Teachers’ Pay Case”, Wednesday 26 May, Part 2, pp. 42-90.  
______ 1993b, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, “Tobacco 
Business Franchise Licences Amendment Bill Second Reading”, Wednesday 26 May, 
Part 2, pp. 42-90.   
______ 1993c, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Lennon P, 
Bates G & Hodgman M, “Tobacco Franchise Bill – increase in taxation”, Wednesday 
26 May 1993, Part 2, pp. 42-90. 
______ 1994, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Gray R, 
Putt P, Patmore P, Bates G & Hodgman M, “Tobacco smoking”, Wednesday 28 
September, Part 2, pp. 36-87. 
______ 1996, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Bacon J, 
“Health Promotion Foundation”, Wednesday 20 November, Part 3, pp. 82-125. 
______ 1997a, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, “Tobacco 
Advertising Restrictions”, Tuesday 7 October, Part 2, pp. 44-96.  
______ 1997b, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Hollister 
D, Cheek, B, Beswick, J, Patmore, P, Gard, M, James, G & Bladel, F, “Public Health 
Bill 1997”, Wednesday 10 December 1997, Part 2, pp. 38-98. 
______ 1997c, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  Legislative Council, McKay P, 
Wilson S & Schulze P, “Public Health Bill 1997”, Tuesday 7 October 1997, Part 2, 
pp. 44-96.   
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 216 
 
______ 1998, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Madill F, 
Putt P, Napier S & Jackson J, Estimates Committee B, Monday 16 November, Part 2, 
pp. 55-119. 
______ 1999a, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Llewellyn 
D, “Business Franchise Fee Abolition Bill 1999 (No 105)”, Thursday 18 November, 
Part 3, pp. 107-240.  
______ 1999b, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Jackson 
J, Madill F & Putt, P, “Estimates Committee B”, Tuesday 8 June, Part 2, pp. 57-108. 
______ 1999c Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania: House of Assembly, Jackson J, 
“Public Health Amendment (Tobacco) Bill 1999 (No. 128)”, Wednesday 1 December, 
Part 2, pp. 49-158 
______ 2000, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania: Legislative Council, Aird M. 
Squibb G, Rattray, Wilkinson, Smith S & Fletcher A, “Public Health Amendment 
(Tobacco) Bill 1999 (no. 128)”, Wednesday 5 April 2000, Part 1, pp.1-38.  
______ 2001, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  Legislative Council, Thursday 
29 March, Part 1, pp. 1-28. 
______ 2003, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania, House of Assembly, Llewellyn 
D, Tuesday 24 June, Part 1, pp. 1-51. 
______ 2004b, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania,  House of Assembly, Morris T 
& Llewellyn, D, “Public Health Amendment (Extension of smoke-Free Areas) Bill 
2004 (no. 24)”, Wednesday 16 June, Part 2, pp. 27-100. 
______ 2006, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Giddings 
L, Putt P & Napier S, “Public Health Amendment Bill 2006 (no. 55) Second 
Reading”, Tuesday 28 November, Part 2, pp. 26-92. 
______ 2007a, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, 
Questions: “Health – Smoking in Pregnancy”, Tuesday 30 October, Part 1, pp. 1-36. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 217 
 
______  2007b, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Giddings 
L, Whiteley B, Putt P, Gutwein P, Morris T & Napier S, “Public Health Amendment 
Bill 2007 (No. 39)”,  Wednesday 14 November, Part 2, pp. 27-115. 
______  2007c, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  Legislative Council, 
Wilkinson J, Parkinson D, Forrest R, Aird M, “Public Health Amendment Bill 2007 
(No 39)” Wednesday 21 November, Part 2, pp. 29-83. 
______  2009, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Tasmania:  House of Assembly, Giddings 
L & O’Connor C, “Health Smoking Cessation Programs”, Thursday 19 November, 
Part 1, pp. 1-49.  
Harper, T, & Martin, J 2002, “Trojan Horses: how the tobacco industry infiltrates the 
smokefree debate in Australia”,  Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public 
Health, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 572-573. 
Head, BW 2013, “Evidence-Based Policymaking – Speaking Truth to Power?” Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, vol. 72, no. 4, pp. 397-403.  
Head, BW 2015, “Relationships between Policy Academics and Public Servants: Learning at 
a Distance?” Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 5–12. 
Hooker, C, & Chapman, S 2006, “Structural elements in achieving legislative tobacco control 
in NSW, 1955-95: political reflections and implications”, Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Public Health, vol. 30, no1.  pp. 10-15. 
James, D 1997, “Federalism Up in Smoke? The High Court Decision on State Tobacco Tax”, 
Current Issues Brief, no. 1, 1996-97, Parliament of Australia. Viewed  3 February 
2016 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary
_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/CIB9798/98cib01  
James, O, and Lodge, M 2003, “The Limitations of “Policy Transfer” and “Lesson Drawing” 
for Public Policy Research”, Political Studies Review, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 179-193. 
Kingdon, J W 1995, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, 2nd edn, Longman, New 
York. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 218 
 
Laugesen, M, Scollo, M, Sweanor, D, Shiffman, S, Gitchell, E, Barnsley, K, Jacobs, M, 
Giovino, AG, Glantz, AS, Daynard, AR, Connolly, NG & Difranza, JR 2000, 
“World's best practice in tobacco control”, Tobacco Control, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 228-
236. 
Lavis, J.N., 2006. Research, public policymaking, and knowledge‐translation processes: 
Canadian efforts to build bridges. Journal of Continuing Education in the Health 
Professions, 26(1), pp.37-45.Legacy Library, University of California San Francisco, 
also called “Truth Tobacco Industry Documents”.  
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/ 
Legacy Library, 1975, Australia, Tasmania August 21 1975, Collection of press clippings 
from Advocate, Examiner and Mercury). 
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=jkyl0127 
______ 1983, Philip Morris. Simper, E 1983, “States Seek Ad Bans on Newspapers”. Media 
Monitors, The Australian, Thursday September 29. Viewed 3 February 2016.  
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=jfmh0143  
______ 1984, Sporton, J “Weekly Highlights”, Philip Morris , June 15. Viewed 3 February 
2016.  https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=jjdg0131  
______ 1984, Batten, K 1984, PMA Weekly Highlights, Philip Morris. Viewed 3 February 3, 
2016. https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=yxdg0131 
______ 1991, SHB, S, Hardy & Bacon, April 30 1991, Report on Recent ETS and IAQ 
Developments. Viewed 2 February 2016.  
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=qznd0119 
______ 1999a, Friedman M, Australian Ventilation Standard, letter to Reg Hodgson, Philip 
Morris, 9 March. Viewed 3 February 2016. 
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=lggh0068 
______ 1993b, “Australia”, letter from Bible, G to Davies, D. Philip Morris Inter-office 
correspondence, March 3. Viewed 3 February 2016. 
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=zjjj0018 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 219 
 
______ 1993c “The Weekly Report, Australia”, Davies, D, Philip Morris Inter-office 
correspondence, April 30. Viewed 3 February 2016. 
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=xyyd0116 
______ 1999a “Australia Ventilation Standard”, Friedman to Hodgson, letter, Philip Morris 
Inter-office correspondence, 9 March. Viewed 3 February 2016. 
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=lggh0068 
______ 1999b, Bicevskis, M, Department of Health and Human Services Hobart, letter to 
Ahearne, Standards Australia, 26 February. Viewed 3 February 2016.  
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lwb63c00 
______1989, “Agreement on Tobacco Advertisement”, Groom R and tobacco industry 
representatives, no date. Viewed 3 February 2016.  
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=hpfc0199 
Maccallum, M 2013, “Mouth from the south ‘took Canberra by storm’”, Sydney Morning 
Herald, June 26. Viewed 3 February 2016. http://www.smh.com.au/national/mouth-from-
the-south-took-canberra-by-storm-20130625-2ov3v.html  
McCright, AM & Dunlap, RE 2011, “Cool dudes: The denial of climate change among 
conservative white males in the United States”, Global Environmental Change, vol. 
21, no. 4, pp. 1163-1172. 
Mannheimer, LN, Lehto, J & Ostin, P 2007, “Window of opportunity for international health 
policy in Sweden open, half-open, or half-shut?”, Health Promotion International, 
vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 307-15. 
Marshall ,G 2014, Don’t even think about it: why our brains are wired to ignore climate 
change, Bloomsbury, New York.  
Mercury 1974a, “End this tobacco confusion”, editorial, Mercury Reprints, 4 April, 
Parliamentary Library, Hobart. 
______ 1974b, “Smokes Tax Blast and Reece Critical”, editorial, Mercury Reprints, 19 April, 
Parliamentary Library, Hobart. 
______ 1998, “Anti-smoking group blasts politicians”, editorial, Mercury, Hobart, August 
24, p5. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 220 
 
______  2001, “State Government run out of puff”, editorial, Mercury, Hobart, 23 February 
2001, p.16. 
Morris T, 2003, “Labor flunks smoke-free test”, Mercury, Hobart, November 1, 2003, p. 16.  
NAA (National Archives of Australia) 1975a, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and Premier 
Eric Reece J (photograph), NAA, Canberra. Provided with permission of the NAA. 
______1975b, Tasmania – withdrawal from the grants commission, Reference: 
NAA1000078025 Contents date range 1974–1975. Series number A1209. Control 
symbol 1974/6460.  Item barcode 8333784. 
Newman, T 1994, Representation of the Tasmanian People, Tasmanian Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament House, Hobart. 
 
Oliver K, Innvar S, Lorenc T, Woodman J & Thomas J 2014, “A systematic review of 
barriers to and facilitators of the use of evidence by policy-makers”, BMC Health 
Services Research, vol. 14, no. 2. Viewed 3 February 2016. 
http://bmchealthservres.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6963-14-2 
Palmer, C 2003, “Risk perception: Another look at the ‘white male’ effect”, Health, Risk & 
Society, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 71-83. 
Pos, M 1997, “McKay fires back on tobacco”, Mercury, Hobart, October 13, p.3. 
Proctor, RN 2011, Golden Holocaust: origins of the cigarette catastrophe and the case for 
abolition, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, California. 
Rogers, M 1997a, “AMA says state not serious”, Mercury, October 18, p.6. 
______ 1997b, “Anger at Tobacco Sales slur”, Mercury, October 11, p.7.  
______ 1997c, “Tobacco fight Spend-up call”, October 18, p.6. 
Rose, D 2003, “‘Greed delaying’ cig ban”, Mercury, Hobart, September 6, p. 23. 
______ 2005, “Liberals promise jail smoking ban”, Mercury, February 16 p. 5. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 221 
 
Sabatier, PA 1988, “An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of 
policy-oriented learning therein”, Policy Sciences, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 129-168.  
Schriever, J & Peddie, C, 2012, “Tobacco ban backed for South Australia's next generation of 
potential smokers”, Adelaide Advertiser, September 10, 2012. Viewed 3 February 
2016. http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/tobacco-ban-backed-for-
next-generation/story-e6frea83-1226471374394 
Scollo, MM & Winstanley, MH (eds) 2012, Tobacco in Australia: Facts and Issues, 4th edn, 
Cancer Council of Victoria, Melbourne. http://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/chapter-15-
smokefree-environment 
Shipan, CR & Volden, C 2004, “The Diffusion of State-level Antismoking Policies in a 
Federal System”,  State Politics and Policy Conference, Akron, Ohio, pp 1-33. 
Viewed 3 February 2016. 
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/seminars/shipan_f05.pdf 
Smith, K 2013, Beyond evidence-based policy in public health: The Interplay of Ideas, 
Palgrave Macmillan, UK. 
Stevenson, S 2000, “No butts smokes ban”, Mercury, Sunday September 3, p. 5.  
Studlar, DT 2002,Tobacco control: comparative politics in the United States and Canada, 
Broadview Press, Peterborough, Ont.; Orchard Park, NY. 
______ 2007, “Ideas, Institutions and Diffusion: What Explains Tobacco-control policy in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand?”, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol. 
45, no. 2, pp. 164-184.  
Tasmanian Parliamentary Library, 2015a, House of Assembly Elections, Parliament of 
Tasmania, Viewed 3 February 2016.  
http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/backg/HAElections.htm 
______ 2015b, Members of the House of Assembly Since 1909, Parliament of Tasmania, 
Viewed 3 February 2016. 
http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/datasheets/MHAs_since_1909.htm 
Taylor, R 2006, “Strengthening Measures to Protect Children from Tobacco”, May 2006 
DHHS Hobart: Viewed 3 February 2016. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 222 
 
https://www.dhhs.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/53799/DISCUSSION_PAPE
R.PDF 
______ 2010, Working in Health Promoting Ways: A Strategic Framework for DHHS 2009-
2012, Department of Health and Human Services Tasmania. 
http://www.dhhs.tas.gov.au/healthpromotion/wihpw/wihpw_publications/WiHPW_Backgrou
ndPaper.pdf 
Tobacco Coalition 2013, Tasmanian Tobacco Action Plan 2011-2015 Year 3 Report, 
Department of Health and Human Services, Hobart. 
http://www.dhhs.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/141444/Tobacco_Action_Plan_Year_
3_Report.pdf 
Thomas, A 2012, Australia set to stub out cigarette sales, AlJazeera, Sydney. Viewed 5 May 
2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/09/201291663731567939.html 
Thomson, GN, Wilson, N & Howden-Chapman, P 2007, “The use and misuse of health 
research by parliamentary politicians during the development of a national smokefree 
law”, Australia and New Zealand Health Policy, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 24. 
Thomson, G, Hudson S, Wilson N & Edwards R, 2010, “A qualitative case study of policy 
maker views about the protection of children from smoking in cars”, Nicotine & 
Tobacco Research, vol. 12, pp. 970-977. 
Walters, EH & Barnsley, K 2015, “Tobacco-free generation legislation”, Medical Journal of 
Australia, vol. 202, pp. 509-510. 
Whinnett, E 2004, “Smoke is in their eyes”, Mercury, Hobart, August 28, p. 29. 
  
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 223 
 
Chapter 7 Bureaucratic Barriers to Evidence-based Tobacco-
control policy 
Most of this chapter is incorporated in an article published in the Universal Journal of Public Health 
(Barnsley, Walters & Wood-Baker 2015) 
Introduction 
This Chapter examines and analyses bureaucratic barriers to implementing strategies for 
tobacco control in Tasmania. Documents provided by government agencies under Right to 
Information legislation, documents provided by non-government organisations (NGOs), 
newspaper reports and websites relevant for the period 1997 to 2010, were forensically 
examined.  
Relevant Tasmanian bureaucratic organisations have had a culture of avoiding responsibility 
for high smoking rates, their processes being excessively complex, under-resourced in 
expertise and, very importantly, having poor accountability mechanisms, failing to adhere to 
international standards in dealings with the tobacco industry, failing to follow evidence-based 
public policy despite being aware of its existence and being distracted by immediate needs. 
They also experienced passive and active obstruction from other government agencies, and 
did not adequately inform the Parliament about measures that might reduce smoking rates. 
All in all, the operation and culture of the Tasmanian governmental bureaucracy has been a 
significant barrier to evidence-based tobacco control public policy. This deficiency was not 
confined to the Department of Health and Human Services, but importantly also included the 
Departments of Premier and Cabinet and Treasury. This led to major barriers to evidence-
based tobacco control existing within the bureaucratic systems in Tasmania throughout the 
period 1997 to 2010. They were excessively process-driven with complex structures, a lack 
of “evidence transfer”, antipathetic in culture, and had scant resources. Similar barriers exist 
in some other jurisdictions. All this served to undermine the effectiveness of public health 
expert-driven action. 
This chapter examines some of the bureaucratic barriers to evidence-based tobacco control, 
particularly relating to the use of mass media anti-tobacco campaigns and cessation-support 
services in Tasmania from 1997 to 2010. Tasmania initiated several international and 
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Australian “firsts” in tobacco legislation reform through personal commitment of certain 
politicians, such as the removal of tobacco advertisements at point-of sale (Ballard 2004). 
However, several evidence-based initiatives, which required funding or resources were 
shelved, or substantially delayed. There is no detailed comparison with other states in this 
study. The related roles of politicians and NGOs are examined in other Chapters.  
Results and discussion 
The search results 
There were 2192 hits for the word “tobacco” in 289 Parliamentary Hansard documents; each 
document had approximately 123 pages, and approximately 35,000 pages were examined. 
Relevant records were copied and coded into NVivo using Microsoft Word. Older newspaper 
reports were obtained from microfiche records at the State Library of Tasmania, via a card 
index system using the keywords ‘tobacco’ and ‘smoking’. More recent newspaper reports 
were obtained from online Newsbank by searching the keywords ‘tobacco’ and ‘smoking’ 
through Linc of the State Library of Tasmania. Major bureaucratic barriers to evidence-based 
tobacco-control policy were identified. The following sections discuss these themes. Table 12 
at the end of this chapter summarises the findings. 
The policy environment 
The leading international writers on tobacco-control policy and governance, Studlar, Cairney 
and Mamudu recognise the importance of the policy environment. They state that the “… 
strength of tobacco control may be linked to the power of the health department and the 
extent to which it takes the lead within government” (Cairney, Studlar & Mamudu 2012). 
Thus, the role of government agencies is key to implementation of tobacco-control policies, 
and any restrictions on the power and influence of the health agency can operate as a brake 
on reform, as it has in Tasmania.  Cairney and Mamudu also observed that in almost all 
countries some  
“… economic incentives and litigation - are less likely to be introduced 
than others” and that “implementation involves much more than 
generating evidence -based objectives and policy instruments” (Cairney 
& Mamudu 2014, pp. 508-509).  
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Thus, it is not enough to have the evidence accessible and available, it also has to be believed, 
and transferred to those who can implement policy. It is absolutely clear that even in a 
middle-income jurisdiction (such as Australia) “… the policy environment is as important as 
the policy instruments designed to eradicate tobacco use” (Cairney, Studlar & Mamudu 
2012).  
Structural Barriers and Accountability 
The first barrier identified in the analysis was the split between policy-making and service-
delivery arms in government, i.e. the Public and Environmental Health Service (PEHS) on 
the one hand and the Alcohol and Drug Service (ADS) on the other. PEHS is responsible for 
tobacco regulation (and enforcement), whereas ADS is responsible for cessation service 
delivery, but its focus has been on dealing with illicit drugs and alcohol (DHSS 2006). At the 
same time statutory responsibility for tobacco-smoking control was and continues to be 
vested in the role of Director of Public Health, under the Public Health Act 1997 but without 
practical executive policy authority in this domain. ADS controlled all drug policy, was the 
conduit to the health minister, and national ministerial and intergovernmental committees for 
any drug policy advice, including that on tobacco. However, there was a distinct lack of 
clarity regarding activities that are statutory requirements and those which are non-statutory.  
Processes were sluggish and unwieldy. The Inter Agency Working Group on Drugs 
(IAWGD) (DHSS 2004) comprised representatives of the Departments of Health and Human 
Services, Police, Education, Premier and Cabinet, Treasury, Justice, and the Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Other Drugs Council (ATODC), and provided advice to the national Ministerial 
Council on Drugs Strategy (MCDS) and the Inter-Governmental Committee on Drugs 
(IGCD). However, the MCDS and IGCD gave primary attention to illicit drugs, with little 
attention given to tobacco, and were slow and cumbersome. All Tasmanian representatives 
were from Police or ADS, not from PEHS, and had no tobacco interest (IAWGD 2008; 
DHSS 2010). The 2009-2010 IGCD Annual Report to the Ministerial Council on Drug 
Strategy concerning Tasmania contains about three times as many references to alcohol as 
tobacco (IGCD 2010).  
Nationally, structures act to downplay, filter and sideline research evidence. McDonald, a key 
drug policy reviewer, said: 
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“In recent years the IGCD/MCDS advisory structures have been 
explicitly and intentionally structured to filter the information inputs, one 
result of which is that the research evidence receives less attention, in 
policy considerations, than it should' (D McDonald, pers. comm.). 
 McDonald said of Australian Drug Policy  
“'This pattern of resource allocation does not adequately reflect an 
evidence-informed policy orientation in that it largely fails to focus on 
the drug types that are the sources of the most harm (tobacco and alcohol 
rather than illicit drugs), and the sectors for which we have the strongest 
evidence of the cost-effectiveness of the available interventions” 
(McDonald 2011, p96).  
The committee system and the perceptions each had of its role, was a significant factor in the 
bureaucratic barriers as a result of the complex web of public sector agencies given authority 
to deal with drugs issues, but with little focus on smoking. 
Priorities and Skills in the ADS 
Although responsible for clinical delivery of smoking cessation support, the ADS had little 
expertise in tobacco-control policy. In 2006, the Clinical Director of ADS resigned from the 
Department citing concerns about management structures and lack of funding, resulting in 
headlines in the Hobart Mercury newspaper, where he was quoted as saying “... there seemed 
to be layers of management for management's sake ...” (Mather 2006). The Tobacco 
Coalition was the principle Committee dealing with tobacco issues (see later) and reported in 
2006: 
 “Alcohol and Drug Services … would not be able to ‘evaluate 
effectiveness, efficiency and accessibility of cessation services in 
clinical, community and regional areas’ (Tobacco Coalition 2006b).  
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The Department of Health and Human Services commissioned a review of Tasmanian 
tobacco cessation services by a New Zealand consultancy firm, Global Public Health, which 
found in 2007 that:  
"Smoking cessation is not a priority in the Alcohol and Drug Services" 
and "The culture of smoking in mental health and alcohol and drug 
services limits smoking cessation interventions and addressing of 
smoking by staff" (Global Public Health 2007 pp. 10 & 19) 
Documents consistently revealed that the lack of priority given to smoking cessation by the 
ADS became a barrier to reform and initiation of effective programs; one departmental 
document records that concerns were raised regarding: 
 “… the decrease in cessation services provided by Alcohol and Drug 
Services particularly at the Royal Hobart Hospital” (Tobacco Coalition 
2006a). 
As a result of the review ADS obtained additional funding in the 2009 Budget and from that 
time the Department’s major emphasis was on the provision of clinical smoking cessation 
services, but notably not on anti-smoking media campaigns, which are known to be highly 
effective, and indeed specifically recommended as a priority by the Review (Wakefield & 
Chaloupka 2000; Sly, Trapido & Ray 2002; Bala, Strzeszynski & Cahill 2008; CDC 2007; 
Wakefield et al. 2008; Population Health 2010). So, the rather odd Tasmanian neglect of 
effective media campaigns continued. 
Lack of “Evidence Transfer” 
The Director of Public Health is required by law to produce a report to Parliament every five 
years on the state of public health and reports were produced in 2003 and 2008 (Taylor 2003, 
2008). Both these reports dealt with the issue of smoking rates in Tasmania, but neither report 
mentioned the strategic importance of mass-media educational campaigns. In the 2008 report 
the Director said in his recommendations that: 
 “A further major priority for new investment must be the establishment 
of a robust smoking cessation program for Tasmania, in accordance with 
the recommendations made by the Department of Health and Human 
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Services following a recent review of smoking cessation interventions in 
Tasmania” (Taylor 2008, p. 34).  
This focus on clinical services ignored the fact that the report also recommended that 
effective community mass-media campaigns be a priority. Significantly, the 2008 report 
listed the practical activities undertaken to reduce smoking rates, namely graphic health 
warnings at point of sale, increased prosecutions for sales to minors, extending smoke-free 
areas to bars, prohibiting: split packets, the sale of fruit- and confectionery-flavoured 
cigarettes, smoking in cars with children present and reduction in the size of tobacco displays. 
But again the report did not list the strategy of mass-media campaigns as a priority, despite 
this having been a major recommendation of the very review the Director was quoting. He 
rejected, 
“… educational approaches or ‘health messages’ alone” and added that 
“The challenge now is to improve investment in smoking cessation 
support” (Taylor 2008, p. 31).  
It was not until 2013 that the report promoted the need for mass-media campaigns (Taylor 
2013). The Parliament was not advised until 2013, in the major report by the key statutory 
office holder on Tasmanian Public Health that mass-media campaigns are important in 
tobacco control, in spite of overwhelming evidence of their effectiveness for decades before 
that (Taylor 2013, p. 43).  
Complex Processes 
The complex committee system in Tasmania stifled progress, as three separate committees 
dealt with tobacco control and acted as a conduit to the minister; the Tobacco Coalition (TC), 
the Alcohol Tobacco and Other Drugs Steering Committee (ATODS) and the Inter-Agency 
Working Group on Drugs (IAWGD). 
The TC was the lowest ranked and least influential tobacco control committee operating from 
2004 within the DHHS. This was a stakeholder group comprised of representatives from the 
local DHHS, Education Department, representatives of Commonwealth Health and Ageing 
(DOHA) and NGOs. The TC was intended to “… enhance coordination and communication 
between government Departments and service providers” (DHSS 2011). This strategy failed 
mainly because after brief initial involvement the State departments’ representatives hardly 
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ever attended the meetings! By 2009 the TC was buried under another layer of bureaucracy, 
with access to the minister only through the ATODS, (a DHHS group including senior 
officers from Mental Health Services, Alcohol and Drug Service, PHES and a Service 
Development representative), then through the Inter-Agency Working Group on Drugs 
(IAWGD) (DHSS 2010).  
The IAWGD was established in 2004 as a cross-agency working group to coordinate the 
service delivery of drug-related initiatives, and to act as the principal advisory group for 
drugs-related policy in Tasmania. Tobacco control initiatives from the TC were filtered 
through this group, whose membership comprised the Departments of Health, Police, Premier 
and Cabinet, Treasury, Infrastructure, Education, Justice, Local government, Alcohol 
Tobacco and Other Drugs Council and the Commonwealth. The focus was on illicit drugs, 
and it was clear from Minutes of the meetings that tobacco had little priority. It was not until 
2008 that a suggestion was made that the Director of Public Health be invited to the 
committee. Typically despite being responsible for all tobacco control since 1996, the 
Director had been excluded for four years from the “principal advisory group” (IAWGD 
2008). 
The results of the complex internal processes are epitomised by the development of the 2006–
2010 Tasmanian Tobacco Action Plan (DHHS 2006), which took six years to develop in 
total. Some of the confusion about the development of the plan can be seen in internal e-mails 
between the ADS and the PEHS in 2003. 
 "I already forwarded the documents to [X ] on 4 June 2003, but here 
they are again." And “... whatever group had steered the process ... I 
don’t know which group that was …", and "We have no idea of who has 
the final documents” (Owen, D’Silva & McKeown 2003). 
The original national plan was approved by the federal and state ministers in 1999, but a 
Tasmanian Plan did not arrive in the minister’s office for approval until 2004, which was 
after the scheduled completion date of the original national plan. Even after the plan was 
approved by the minister it had to traverse more committees. A ministerial briefing indicated 
that the document had to be forwarded through a myriad of bureaucratic groups:  
“… for final endorsement via the Inter-Agency Policy Coordination 
Committee to the Cabinet Social Policy Sub Committee” and “… once 
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endorsed the Plan will be provided to the inter-governmental committee 
on Drugs (IGCD) and the Tobacco, Drug prevention and Youth Policy 
Section of the Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing” and 
“… will also be provided to the Healthy Lifestyles Interdepartmental 
Committee for noting” and “… is aligned with the Tasmania Together 
Healthy Lifestyle cluster group coordinated by the Population Health 
sub-division” (Bent, Brkic & Ramsay 2003). 
Similarly, the Implementation Plan, Target 16, of the Tobacco Action Plan 2006-2010 took 
three years to reach the ATODS and the health minister (in 2009 – a few months prior to the 
expiry of the main plan) for final approval (Tobacco Coalition 2009). However, these 
approval processes are mirrored in the national drug strategy policy processes, which have 
also been criticised for exceptional sluggishness (Siggins Miller 2009). Furthermore, the 
plethora of such Tasmanian preventative health strategic plans was criticised by the then 
Auditor-General, Mike Blake when he said: 
“It was very difficult to get a sense of what interventions and programs 
were being undertaken by the department or on what basis. The difficulty 
was largely due to the considerable number and volume of strategic 
planning documents, lack of clear linkages between and within 
documents and evaluation deficiencies” (Blake 2013).  
This seems to be an international problem, with the US Food and Drug Administration 
regulation of tobacco products also receiving similar criticism “… action is sometimes 
sacrificed to process” (Zeller 2012, p.2) 
Cultural Barriers 
Cultural barriers within the bureaucracy may be the prime reason for lack of progress in 
tobacco control in Tasmania. Key lead agencies on the IAWGD, namely the Police and ADS, 
deal with the “primacy of rescue”, i.e. immediate and visible public alarm, in particular 
public alcohol abuse and illicit drug use (McGinnis 2001). Their focus is not on long-term 
prevention (Hine 2010). Police have opposed the Tobacco Coalition having any public 
advocacy role, because of perceived potential conflict of interest:  
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 “Following concerns raised by (the Police Representative) … it was 
agreed that the Coalition would not make comment in the media or be 
used as a public advocacy group” (Tobacco Coalition 2004). 
As McGinnis wrote in his essay on evidence-based policy, strong evidence can still lead to 
weak preventative action (McGinnis 2001).  During 2009, mass media marketing for anti-
smoking campaigns “fell off” the agenda. For example, the “Future Service Directions for 
ATOD”, a five year plan from 2008/09 to 2012/13 mentions as the first initiative potential 
investment in media campaigns. However, in the subsequent 2009 project management 
reports to the Alcohol Tobacco and Other Drugs Steering Committee (ATODSC) this item 
had disappeared. Thus a potential key evidence-based mechanism for reducing smoking rates 
in Tasmania vanished from the agenda of the only committee that could make 
recommendations through the IAWGD to the health minister (ATODSC 2010). 
The second major cultural barrier has been the passive and active obstruction from agencies 
external to the DHHS. The fact that DHHS has been nominally the lead agency on tobacco 
control meant that it became, as described by Isett, “siloed” and consequently “elicit[ed] little 
aid in implementation from other agencies that may have a stake in the policy outcome” (Isett 
2013). Two central agencies, the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPAC) and 
Department of Treasury and Finance (DOTAF) played a vital coordinating role in 
government policy. Within DPAC, the (now defunct) Tasmania Together 2020 program, the 
Policy Division and the Social Inclusion Unit, would all be expected to be areas with an 
interest in tobacco control. However, there was no indication that reducing smoking rates was 
ever a priority for DPAC. The Ten Year Review of Tasmania Together blandly notes that 
smoking reduction targets were unlikely to be achieved (Tasmania Together Process Board 
2011). Yet a “will” to implement changes is fundamental for governments to achieve 
improvements in tobacco control (Mackenbach & McKee 2013). Similarly, the department 
with considerable influence over resource allocation, DOTAF, at no stage publicly evinced 
any concern about smoking rates in Tasmania (Lypka, Taylor et al. 2004). Mackenbach and 
McKee wrote 
“Substantial health gains can be achieved if all countries would follow 
best practice, but this probably requires the removal of barriers related to 
both the 'will' and the 'means' to implement health policies” (Mackenbach 
& McKee 2013).  
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A recent review reported similar problems of cultural resistance in Britain:  
“We encountered a deeply engrained culture of resistance to change and 
found this group was either unable or unwilling to set priorities” 
(Davoudi 2012).  
Thus, cultural barriers such as a pervasive apathy and disinterest in tobacco control 
demonstrate that key Tasmanian government agencies acted as barriers.  
Finally, within the DHHS itself there was indifference about tobacco control from key 
sections of the agency (Frohmader 2005). Significantly, there was a prevailing belief in the 
senior decision-making ranks that mass-media campaigns would not work to reduce smoking 
rates within low socio-economic status (SES) groups in Tasmania. Although completely 
contrary to international evidence, in March 2004 an influential senior official Peter Hoult, 
was reported to have said that the effectiveness of community education strategies “is 
overplayed” (Lypka, Taylor et al. 2004). The fact that this particular key official did not 
support this approach meant that it would have been doomed at any discussion of budget 
initiatives. Davoudi wrote that power determines what “counts as knowledge”, and power 
appears to have been overwhelmingly influential in this case (Davoudi 2012). The intrusion 
of the personal beliefs and values of powerful individuals into the bureaucratic and 
committee process influenced the extent that evidence was believed (McCaughey & Bruning 
2010). Court and Young have written that research is more influential in policy-making if it 
fits into the values and beliefs of the policy makers, is presented in such a way to be 
interesting to them, and there are shared networks, trust and good communication, noting that 
“these conditions are rarely met in practice” (Court & Young 2006, p. 89), which was 
certainly been true in Tasmania. 
Influence of the Tobacco Industry 
The Tasmanian government has continued to be influenced by the tobacco lobby, receiving 
services and money from a tobacco industry “front organisation”, refusing to provided details 
of meetings with the tobacco industry unless they were specifically requested under 
legislation, and stating that it was not obliged to observe the provisions of the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Pickin 2009; WHO 2005). The WHO 
condemns governmental association with tobacco industry front organisations (WHO 2014, 
p13), yet the Acting Director of Public Health, on behalf of the Premier, in May 2009 said 
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that the government considered Article 5.3 of the Convention; “… to be aimed more at 
improving transparency in third world countries rather than jurisdictions such as Tasmania 
where meetings with the tobacco industry are infrequent and [information is] obtainable 
under Freedom of Information” (Pickin 2009). In 2009, one of the Department of Primary 
Industries, Parks, Water and Environment’s sub-agencies received $29,000 from the Butt 
Littering Trust (BLT) and the Secretary of the Department naively explained in a briefing to 
the Environment Minister that the BLT although “… funding is largely donated by the 
tobacco industry, it operates as an independent entity” (Gadd 2009). Tasmania has a history 
of crony capitalism and corruption involving politicians, in relation to dealings with the 
tobacco industry in Chapter 5 (Barnsley 2011), but these examples indicate an inability of the 
supporting bureaucracy to understand and advise about international obligations and the need 
to maintain distance from the tobacco industry in order to effectively implement tobacco-
control reforms. 
Resource Constraints 
Funds within DHHS exist in separate specific “silos” and it has been perceived by staff as 
difficult to transfer unexpended funds from one area to another, or especially to access 
funding for new initiatives within the Population Health portfolio, as it has a very small 
budget compared to that for hospitals. There has been very little discretionary funding 
available (Blake 2013). In the 2000s there was only one officer in the DHHS responsible for 
tobacco-control policy and located in the Population Health Division. In 2006, a budget 
submission was prepared within the DHHS to address the question of pregnancy and 
smoking, but there was thought to be little likelihood of it being funded, despite known high 
smoking levels amongst pregnant women in Tasmania and the huge amount of money being 
spent on the health consequences. While this created concern, but there was no positive 
funding outcome (Tobacco Coalition 2007). However, four positions were created in ADS in 
2009 for nurses who were primarily concerned with clinical cessation services, but again no 
additional funding for mass-media campaigns occurred until 2010, and not sufficient 
evidence-based funding until 2013 (Chart 18).  
In a briefing to the Director of Population Health from the State Manager of the ADS, it was 
recommended that a review of Quit Tasmania (QT), the primary non-government smoking 
cessation organisation, be undertaken, and she said “... currently there are no surplus funds 
available ... to allocate to Quit Tasmania” (D’Silva & McKeown 2002). The ADS also 
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expressed concern about whether they were getting value for money from the Tobacco 
Coalition, and that 
“…general concensus (sic) is that we do not address the [tobacco control] 
problem well, the problems are fairly unique and complex. Certainly 
there is no coherent plan for managing the problem and nobody could 
identify a positive impact from the current investment” (Fjeldsoe et al. 
2005). 
Lack of funding for Quit over time was a definite constraint to deliver adequate programs and 
was a key barrier to effective tobacco control in Tasmania. The delays in evaluation and 
monitoring of Quit are linked to the inadequacy of its funding, and also some misdirection of 
funds, not dishonestly, but compounded by a lack of oversight by the DHHS (PHAIW 2009). 
 Chart 18 Funding for Quit Tasmania ($Aus-2010) 
 
Source: Quit Tasmania 
Evaluation Delayed 
Quit Tasmania (QT), the primary NGO delivery agency for cessation support, mass media 
and education campaigns, and advocacy, fully funded by DHHS was not evaluated at all 
during the period from its establishment in 1995 until 2009, although the ADS recommended 
such in 2002 and 2005.There were continuing misgivings amongst bureaucrats about the 
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operation of QT in the early 2000s, including concerns about it failing to fulfil its 
undertakings, some items of financial expenditure, failure to work effectively with the 
aboriginal community, and failure to undertake surveys (D’Silva & McKeown 2002). When 
the Review of QT was finally undertaken in 2009, very serious criticisms of the organisation 
emerged (Tobacco Coalition 2005). Conducted by Professor Mike Daube and the Public 
Health Advocacy Institute of Western Australia (PHAIWA 2009), the review recommended 
sweeping changes to the Quit service, including significant restructuring, developing 
effective partnerships with other key organisations, restructuring of the Board, establishing a 
health promotion plan and mass media program, ceasing of delivery of extraneous non-
evidence-based services, revising the strategic plan and redeveloping the Quit website.  
QT had also been reluctant to run effective media campaigns, for rather paradoxical and 
personal reasons. Meeting Minutes recorded, “… Quit Tasmania have not yet committed to 
running the [media] campaign [because of] the negative public reaction given that the images 
are deliberately hard hitting” (Tobacco Coalition 2005). The research evidence supports 
properly devised social marketing campaigns as being effective for low SES groups, although 
this group is otherwise difficult to engage (Niederdeppe et al. 2008). The 2009 review of QT 
makes mention of the fact that the emphasis on clinical cessation-support services by Quit 
was a detriment to media campaigns (PHAIWA 2009). The Reviewers said “There is a lack 
of evidence-based best practice across the range of services offered by Quit”. Similar 
observations had been made in the earlier 2007 independent review of cessation services in 
Tasmania. Recommendations were made in both reports that additional funding was needed 
for mass-media campaigns to trigger quit attempts. The effectiveness of media campaigns 
was acknowledged in internal government documents, but was not “encultured” in the 
system, and not translated into action or commitment of funds.  
The failure of QT to achieve a level of effectiveness was primarily the result of government 
ineptitude and poor oversight, not the workers within QT (Tobacco Coalition 2005). Indeed 
members of the government Steering Committee (ATODS) in 2009 considered that the 
DHHS “…should take some responsibility for the findings of the report” (ATODSC 2009).  
Limitations 
 For this section of the study, government documents were made available to the author 
through the Right to Information Act 2009 and its predecessor Act. Some of these documents 
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contained redacted sections, for example relating to the review of QT. Few ministerial 
briefings and no internal budget documents were provided. Many documents could not be 
coded because of their bulk or format but were sorted, read and analysed individually. 
Treasury refused to provide any documents at all. More requests were made over time to 
DHHS for more detail, for example as to whether there were any documents relevant to the 
budget process about tobacco control, but these were not provided. 
Conclusions4 
The process of establishing tobacco control as a major priority in Tasmania, (1997-2010) was 
subverted by various forces operating within the government bureaucracy. The transfer of 
knowledge or evidence to senior decision-makers, and parliament, was patchy and in some 
cases non-existent. Confused accountability, complex processes and excessive internal 
“consultation”, contributed to policy proposals for action being “jammed up”, and never 
reaching an outcome or authoritative decision. Cultural barriers included a close relationship 
between government, including elements of the bureaucracy, the executive and the tobacco 
industry, lack of “belief” in particular evidence-informed programs, primacy of the “rescue” 
culture, and passive and active obstruction from several key government agencies. 
Reviews conducted by expert external consultants highlighted the need for mass-media 
campaigns in Tasmania, and made strong recommendations about necessary funding, but 
these recommendations were not adequately implemented. Additional funding was provided, 
but allocated only to clinical services rather than more comprehensively including evidence-
based mass-media campaigns, as recommended internationally (Bala, Strzeszynski & Cahill 
2008; Wakefield & Chaloupka 2000; Farrelly et al. 2005; Biener et al. 2006; Wakefield et al. 
2008; Daube 2013; CDC 2007). The Evaluation of Quit Tasmania (PHAIWA 2009) found 
many problems and commented (although it was outside the terms of reference) that 
Tasmania should “reduce funding for personalised smoking cessation activity and devote as 
                                                 
4 Author’s note: Since 2010 a number of changes have occurred including: increased funding from the 
federal government for mass-media campaigns; changes in staffing at the Alcohol and Drug Service; 
restructure of Quit Tasmania and its merger with the Cancer Council Tasmania; acceptance that mass-
media campaigns are beneficial in reducing smoking rates; a change of government; and reform of 
national drug strategy processes. 
Barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania 
Kathryn Barnsley: doctoral thesis Page 237 
 
much of this funding as possible to media programs” (Tobacco Coalition 2005). Again this 
was ignored.  
Structural impediments, inducing cumbersome decision making for evidence-based tobacco 
control, are not confined to Tasmania, or other states in Australia. Australian structures have 
been identified as failing to deliver evidence-based tobacco control and “… advisory 
structures have been explicitly and intentionally structured to filter the information inputs, … 
(so) … research evidence receives less attention, in policy considerations, than it should” 
(McDonald 2011). The same impediment was found in local-level tobacco control in 
California. Satterlund et al. found that the “… bureaucracy … as well as the lengthy decision-
making processes, tended to slow down or hinder the policy campaigns of local projects” 
(Satterlund et al. 2010, p. 618). Zeller identified similar issues within the US FDA (Zeller 
2012). But all of these impediments have been especially prominent in Tasmania and a 
catalogue of errors in public policy-making characterised its tobacco-control activities, 
including failure to follow or transfer evidence, over-complex decision making structures, 
and a government-wide indifference to reducing smoking rates. No advice was given to 
Parliament about effective measures or instituting appropriate priorities. Passive and active 
obstruction from some government agencies, resource constraints and ongoing relationships 
with tobacco industry front organisations, all contributed to a failure to implement evidence-
based policy. 
In the late 1990s and most of the 2000s there was an absence of focus in government on 
mass-media campaigns as important for tobacco control in Tasmania. Individual bureaucrats 
worked to achieve sound results in legislative reforms and in later years in clinical cessation-
support services, but the “whole of government” commitment to funding for vital mass-media 
campaigns remained absent. There was a set of cultural beliefs operating within the 
bureaucracy that mass-media campaigns were specifically inadequate to assist low SES 
groups, despite evidence to the contrary. There was also a lack of clarity on governmental 
roles and accountability on tobacco issues. There was a lack of discretionary funding within 
the responsible government department, which impeded initiatives. The final major 
impediment to implementation of a comprehensive evidence-based strategy for tobacco 
control in Tasmania was a lack of bureaucratic engagement, monitoring, evaluation and 
support for the principal service delivery arm of anti-smoking services, Quit Tasmania. 
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In summary, Tasmania continued to have a disproportionately high smoking rate that was not 
falling in the 2000s at the same rate as the rest of Australia. Whilst there were many 
legislative reforms, there was a failure to provide adequate resources for mass media 
cessation programs and educational campaigns from 1997 to 2009. Knowledge transfer about 
evidence-based programs from the bureaucracy to government and Parliament and 
commitment to cessation-support services did not occur until the late 2000s. These failings 
can be attributed to structural and process problems; a set of cultural beliefs that did not 
accord with the evidence; unclear accountability; indifference to tobacco control from the 
senior echelons of government; and a lack of resources, support, monitoring and evaluation 
of the major cessation anti-smoking services. 
Implications 
There are a number of actions that could have been taken to ensure that Tasmania, and other 
jurisdictions, responded effectively to the smoking pandemic over the period from the 1960s 
to the 2000s – these would also have relevance for what should be done now. Firstly, the 
cabinet should have publicly endorsed reducing smoking rates as a priority for the 
government, allocated adequate funding, which may have required additional funds from the 
federal government for this purpose, and gained genuine commitment from ministers and 
departments across government. Secondly, elimination of iterative internal circular “over-
consultation” processes that have bogged down decision-making on tobacco control should 
have been essential; and policy processes either should have given equal weight to tobacco 
control or be structurally separated from illicit drugs and alcohol policy and machinery. 
Thirdly, small scale external evaluations and reviews of tobacco-control programs should 
occur frequently, including prioritisation of initiatives to achieve no more than three practical 
outcome-focussed and measurable targets. Such initiatives need to be fully funded and 
evaluated. Finally, closer relationships between the government, non-government 
organisations and research centres in Tasmania could be enhanced, as outlined in the previous 
Chapter at page 204. 
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Table 12 Summary of results  
Results and discussion - summary 
Structural barriers and 
accountability 
Responsibility split between the Alcohol and Drug Service (ADS) 
and Public and Environmental Health (PEH). Too many 
committees. Confused accountability. 
Priorities and skills in the 
Alcohol and Drug 
Service (ADS) 
No statewide expertise in clinical delivery of cessation services. No 
interest in tobacco control. Too many layers of management. Many 
staff were smokers. Decrease in services to the main hospital.  
Lack of “evidence 
transfer” 
Reports to Parliament did not mention the importance of mass-
media campaigns. Key senior officers did not believe that media 
campaigns were effective. 
Complex processes Complex and slow committee systems. Excessive internal iterative 
circular “consultation”.  
Cultural barriers “Primacy of rescue” dominated drug policies and committees; 
alcohol and illicits elicited priority action. “Siloed” Health agency 
received no support, and some active obstruction, from other key 
agencies. Indifference from other sections of health agency, such as 
mental health services. 
Influence of the tobacco 
industry 
Insufficient distancing from the tobacco industry, particularly from 
departments other than health. Some bureaucrats worked with 
“front” organisations. Lack of transparency – naïvely considered 
more a “third world” problem, not here. 
Resource constraints Difficulties in obtaining funds for tobacco control, because of 
resource “silo” effect. Tasmania has limited resources, due to a 
small tax base, and reliance on the federal government for its 
revenue. 
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Evaluation delays The principal service delivery arm, Quit Tasmania, was not 
evaluated from its establishment in 1995 until 2009. Many problems 
were found, but not implemented for another two years. 
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Chapter 8  
Non-government organisations (NGOs) 
Background and Context 
The third arm of the policy triangle in tobacco control is that of non-government 
organisations. In Tasmania this includes health organisations, unions, researchers, churches, 
professional organisations and advocacy groups. The tobacco industry is not considered an 
NGO in this context. The role of the tobacco industry is considered and interweaved within 
all the Chapters. The role of non-government organisations has long been important at an 
international level in tobacco control, and was particularly important for the development and 
implementation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (Lencucha, 
Kothari & Labonté 2001). In Australia the NGOs concerned with heart disease and cancer 
have been at the forefront of driving change and reform in tobacco control. The Cancer 
Council and the Heart Foundation have led the advocacy agenda, with other organisations 
taking a role from time to time on particular issues.  
In Tasmania the leading organisations influencing tobacco-control reforms have been the 
Cancer Council of Tasmania (CCT), the Heart Foundation (HF) and Quit Tasmania (QT). 
The Australian Medical Association (AMA), Asthma Foundation, Liquor Hospitality and 
Miscellaneous Union (LHMU – since 2011 known as United Voice), Seventh Day Adventist 
Church, Pharmaceutical Association, Australian Lung Foundation, Diabetes Tasmania, 
Menzies Institute, Kidney Foundation, Cystic Fibrosis Tasmania, Thoracic Society of 
Australia and New Zealand, and the Alcohol Tobacco and other Drugs Foundation (ATDC), 
Tasmanian Chronic Disease Prevention Alliance (TCDPA) have all played a key role at 
different times in tobacco control. Part-time volunteers run many of these smaller 
organisations, with professionals working off the side of their desk, or single paid staff 
working on their own, with a small board. The allocation of time by individuals and 
organisations seems to have been dependent on the appointment of particular staff, or the 
actions and interest of the CEOs, and has varied in commitment, according to the issue, in the 
period from the early 1990s to 2010.  
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SmokeFree Tasmania was established in 1996 as an advocacy group incorporating the major 
health organisations and individuals including doctors and public servants from the 
Department of Health. Whilst this was an awkward model at times, as public servants could 
not be quoted in minutes of meetings, it nevertheless functioned effectively from 1996 until 
2013, at which time it was reconstructed as an association of tobacco-control experts, rather 
than organisations.  
Cairney and Mamudu (2014) assert that the policy environment is just as important as the 
evidence and the policy instruments. They also say “… that medical and anti-smoking public 
health groups must be consulted, while ignoring tobacco interests” (Cairney & Mamudu 2014 
p.510). The importance of removing tobacco companies from the policy-making process is 
important, and has still not happened in Tasmania. Tobacco companies continue to be given 
hearings by the Parliament and the government on the latest initiatives for a tobacco free 
generation (Legislative Council 2015).  
Nationally, as mentioned in other Chapters, the AMA and ACOSH produced an annual Dirty 
Ashtray Award and a Clean Ashtray Award. Ministers were proud to receive Clean Ashtray 
awards and boasted about them in Parliament. For example, Health minister Judy Jackson 
acknowledged the role of NGOs when she proudly announced in 2001 on Tuesday 29 May, 
“I am delighted to advise the House that Tasmania has indeed won the 
national tobacco scoreboard, the Clean Ashtray Award for 2001. This 
prestigious award is an initiative of the national Australian Medical 
Association and the Western Australian Action on Smoking and Health, 
and is presented each year to the State with the best performance on 
tobacco-control issues. Tasmania jumped to the top position this year 
after finishing in fifth place last year. Tasmania's achievement in 
legislating the Tasmanian Public Health Amendments for Smoke-Free 
Areas Act 2001 to protect employees and the public from environmental 
tobacco smoke earned the State the award. 
“This legislation takes Tasmania to the forefront of tobacco control in 
Australia, and credit for the award goes to the many people who work 
tirelessly to ensure that the legislation passed through Parliament last 
month. This includes the staff of the Department of Health and Human 
Services and non-government organisations such as the Cancer Council, 
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Quit, Heart Foundation, SmokeFree Tasmania, AMA divisions of general 
practice, and the Liquor and Hospitality and Miscellaneous Employees 
Union. This kind of cooperative approach to sensitive public health 
issues such as tobacco is in itself a major achievement. To attain national 
recognition for it is indeed a bonus” (Hansard 2001). 
In 2004 AMA federal President Bill Glasson met with the Health Minister, David Llewellyn, 
“to push for a total smoking ban in public places”. Dr Glasson went on to say,  
“… the AMA would continue to campaign for an immediate and total 
ban on smoking in all public venues, and he urged politicians not to be 
swayed by industry groups and tobacco company donations. 
“It's the power of the hotel lobby groups, the cigarettes companies, it's 
the big-end-of-town dollars which are holding this up,'' he said. 
“If there was no money involved it would be changed overnight” 
(Whinnett 2014).  
Clearly NGOs are a major force in developing tobacco-control measures, a fact that is 
acknowledged by politicians basking in reflected glory 
Silencing Dissent  
Politicians were not universally enamoured with the actions of NGOs, and nationally efforts 
were made to silence the advocacy role of the not-for-profit sector under the Howard 
government. There were three mechanisms employed to achieve this: 
 “Gagging” organisations by preventing them from undertaking advocacy, which 
might be critical of government; 
 Defunding the organisation; 
 Attempting to remove the tax deductibility status of an organisation as a charity. 
In the period from the late 1990s to the late 2000s, under the Howard government, a shift in 
federal government attitudes to funded non-government organisations became apparent 
(Maddison, Denniss & Hamilton 2004). Government service agreements with funded 
organisations began to include paragraphs that precluded the organisation from public 
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comments or criticism of government. This trend was reversed by the Labor government and 
finally the Not-For-Profit Sector Freedom to Advocate Act 2013 was enacted in 2013, which 
prevented federal government agencies from inserting clauses in funding agreements that 
might restrict a non-government entity from “…commenting on, or advocating support or 
opposing a change to any matter established by law, policy or practice of the 
Commonwealth” (Seccombe 2014).  
However, removal of the “gag” clause option does not prevent the Commonwealth from de-
funding an organisation, or using other mechanisms to silence it, including attempts to 
remove its tax deductibility status and potentially criminalising it. For example advocating 
for boycotts of certain products might become unlawful, if the secondary boycott provisions 
of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, which exempt consumer and environment 
groups, were removed.  
In 2014 the Abbott government attempted to abolish the Australian Charities Commission 
and its associated legislation in the name of reducing “red tape” (Andrews 2014). 
The Tasmanian non-government health sector remained relatively protected from these 
national predations on their autonomy, because the Labor government in Tasmania did not 
apparently attempt to crush dissent by non-government organisations. Under the state Liberal 
government elected in 2013 it appears to have acted similarly in relation to health NGOs at 
least, although environmental NGOs may have not been treated as kindly. On the contrary, 
there is evidence of consultation with key leaders in public health, such as the appointment of 
Graeme Lynch CEO of the Heart Foundation to the Health Council and similarly Dr Tim 
Greenaway CEO of the AMA. Both of these leaders have supported the innovative tobacco 
free generation proposal. 
Lack of financial resources 
As referred to in Chapter 6 on Political Barriers, hypothecation of tobacco revenue did not 
occur in Tasmania, mainly because of the powerful oppositional role of the Secretary of 
Treasury, Don Challen, and the failure of politicians to challenge him on this issue. Mr 
Challen referred to “the hypothecation disease, or the hypothecation virus” (Hansard 1996). 
The importance of adequate funding is illustrated by the VicHealth Centre for Tobacco 
control, built on hypothecated funding and which has endured as a well-funded organisation 
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even after states lost the ability to retain tobacco excise revenue in 1997, after the High Court 
decision. “On 5 August 1997, the High Court of Australia brought down a combined decision 
in the cases of Walter Hammond and Associates v the State of NSW and others and Ha and 
anor v the State of NSW and others” (James 1997). Even though the cases heard related to the 
imposition of franchise fees on tobacco, the decision has effectively declared all current State 
business franchise fees to be constitutionally invalid. WA and SA have also retained funding 
arrangements beyond the 1997 court case. Tasmania, NSW, Qld and the Territories did not 
have hypothecated tobacco funding for tobacco-control measures. While it is almost 
impossible to explicate the funding detail provided by governments to the Victorian Cancer 
Council, nevertheless in 2012/2013 the figure provided on the organisation website was: 
“The Victorian Government has committed $59.6 million over the next 
four years through the Victorian Cancer Agency to fund research into 
cancer. This funding is recurrent with $14.9 million available each year 
after 2016/17” (Cancer Council Victoria 2014). 
Such funding is many orders of magnitude beyond that allocated by government to the 
Cancer Council Tasmania (CCT). The CCT says it is 90 per cent funded by public donations, 
and reported government grants of $1.4 million in 2013, however, this was mainly for Quit 
service delivery and mass-media campaigns (Cancer Council Tasmania 2014). The CCT lists 
35 staff in its 2012 Annual Review, and acknowledges its work on tobacco control and with 
SmokeFree Tasmania (Cancer Council Tasmania 2012a) and reported:  
“In March 2012, new legislation was introduced to further reduce 
smoking consumption in public places and imposes greater restrictions 
on the sale of tobacco products across the state. This move has positioned 
Tasmania at the forefront of Australian jurisdictions in its tobacco-
control agenda. The work of Cancer Council Tasmania, in conjunction 
with SmokeFree Tasmania, has been effective in driving and supporting 
change to address one of the most modifiable cancer risks in the 
community” (Cancer Council Tasmania 2012a, p. 8). 
Also in 2012 the Cancer Council made a detailed submission to government seeking 
additional funding for mass-media campaigns, and this submission was successful. This was 
the only submission amongst all the documents found in this study, that adequately put the 
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case for additional funding (Cancer Council Tasmania 2012b). The submission 
acknowledged past inadequacies: 
“The research is clear on a key determining factor in this failure to 
achieve change: Tasmania has not invested adequately in social 
marketing programs at a level that both evidence shows to be effective 
and the practical reality of other jurisdictions confirm. Similarly, 
Tasmania has not had the capacity to focus on low SES groups nor has it 
had the data to understand the population better and align efforts with the 
realities of the priority groups” (Cancer Council Tasmania 2012b, p6).  
However, by the following year, 2013, both the Heart Foundation and Cancer Council 
severed their links with SmokeFree Tasmania, and no longer gave advocacy in tobacco 
control a priority.  
The Heart Foundation received $3 million in 2013, mostly from donations and bequests, with 
a few grants for specific purposes were made by government (Heart Foundation 2013). 
According to their annual reports, this compares to around $10 million in Victoria and 
Queensland, $14 million in WA and $6 million in SA. 
In WA the Australian Council on Smoking and Health (ACOSH) receives around $238,000 
per annum (HealthWay Annual Report 2013/14) and has been funded for many decades, 
primarily as an advocacy organisation. The ACOSH website describes its history thus: 
“ACOSH was formed in 1965 in New South Wales by Dr Cotter Harvey, 
President of the Medical Board of NSW, and also President of the 
National Tuberculosis and Chest Association … Dr Harvey was a 
pioneer in the campaign against tobacco, having seen first-hand the 
growing incidence of lung cancer. In spite of a strong campaign by 
tobacco denying a causal link between smoking and disease, Dr Harvey 
persisted, persuading others to join the campaign. … Branches of 
ACOSH were established in other States including, in 1971, Western 
Australia. Dr Bob Elphick was elected the founding president of ACOSH 
in 1971 and remained a driving force in tobacco control and advocacy 
throughout his life. In 1978, the Sydney branch of ACOSH ceased to 
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exist, and the national direction of the organisation passed to WA” 
(ACOSH 2016). 
ACOSH is now solely located in Subiaco, WA, and is very influential in tobacco-control 
policy advocacy. There is no equivalent organisation to this remaining in Australia since the 
demise of ASH Australia, and certainly Tasmania has never had advocacy resources on this 
scale. 
The Asthma Foundation Tasmania only had eight staff, mostly part-time, in 2013 and most of 
its income came from donations and bequests (Asthma Foundation of Tasmania 2014).  
All of these Tasmanian organisations are dwarfed by the Victorian Health Promotion 
Foundation, which has a revenue base around $37 million. This is almost entirely due to the 
efforts of the early campaigners such as Dr Nigel Gray who built the organisation and its 
reputation for excellent research and health campaigns, and his successors Dr David Hill and 
Todd Harper. These policy entrepreneurs were able to maintain consistent government 
funding even after the hypothecation of tobacco taxation revenue ended in the 1990s. 
Tasmania has never managed to develop such a critical mass of NGO funding and expertise 
in tobacco control. 
Expertise and Research Skills – another missing link 
None of the Tasmanian NGOs had a dedicated tobacco-control research capacity, nor an 
officer working full-time on tobacco-control advocacy issues. This contrasts to organisations 
in other states like ACOSH in WA, ASH in NSW, QUIT in South Australia and the 
VicHealth Centre for Tobacco Control in Victoria, which all had resources available for 
lobbying, research and advocacy. Quit Tasmania had some resources, but was totally 
government funded and was therefore not in a position to criticise governments publicly nor 
to advocate strongly in a way that might jeopardise its funding. Quit had no research capacity 
or expertise, and relied on interstate counterparts, particularly in Victoria, for information. 
The results of this were that: 
 It was not until 2012 that the Tasmanian Cancer Council employed a full-time 
tobacco control expert as a researcher.  
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 None of the NGOs employed a health economist or person able to prepare 
professional or expert submissions to Treasury and government that could put a 
coherent case forward to acquire funds for tobacco-control measures, until 2012. 
 In relation to tobacco control, there was a research and economic expertise capacity 
vacuum in NGOs in Tasmania. 
Policy entrepreneurs – the key missing dynamic 
The missing driver in Tasmania for tobacco control was a lack of policy entrepreneurs. There 
were many advocates who worked at various times on particular issues, and all of them were 
associated with non-government organisations. However, there was no equivalent figure to 
Dr Nigel Gray, the key person who encouraged the Victorian Government to establish the 
Victorian Tobacco Act 1987.  
Dr Gray was a towering figure in the Australian tobacco control landscape. He was head of 
the Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria (ACCV) from 1968–1995), a medical practitioner, and a 
researcher.  
“The Victorian Tobacco Act was the first government instrument in the 
world to hypothecate a tax on tobacco products for funding health 
promotion activities. It did so through creating a new organisation, the 
Victorian Health Promotion Foundation (Vic Health), which has become 
an internationally important precedent as a model for promoting health” 
(Borland, Winstanley & Reading 2009, p. 1623).  
A window of opportunity had opened up in Victoria in 1987 when Nigel Gray was able to 
persuade the minister, who was in turn able to able to persuade the Treasurer, the Premier and 
Cabinet of the need to proceed with this course of action. Furthermore, the Opposition was 
also persuaded by Dr Gray to support the legislation and hypothecation. He also worked with 
the Age newspaper to run a series of articles on smoking, at the same time that Cabinet was 
considering the proposals. All of the stars were aligned and the Bill was given support 
(Borland, Winstanley & Reading 2009).  
As John Ballard said of Australia “Medical prestige was a significant force in mobilizing 
political support for anti-tobacco measures” (Ballard 2004, p. 96). Dr Nigel Gray, Dr Cotter 
Harvey and Dr Arthur Chesterfield Evans all played a significant role in reforms in Australia 
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(Ballard 2004). There was not an equivalent or comparable figure in Tasmania to Dr Gray. 
The CEO of the Cancer Council of Tasmania and the CEO of the Heart Foundation, whilst 
influential, and with media expertise, were not medical practitioners, nor closely aligned with 
political figures.  
The leaders of SmokeFree Tasmania and other organisations, whilst a few were medical 
practitioners, were not closely aligned with any political party, and there was little illegal 
direct action undertaken by doctors like the graffiti work undertaken by Dr Chesterfield 
Evans in defacing tobacco industry billboards. Some local medical practitioners privately 
admitted to the author to defacing tobacco billboards in the 1970s, but none would go on 
record, nor were prepared to be quoted in this study. Dr Richard Wood-Baker undertook to 
convene SmokeFree Tasmania in the 1990s and engaged in media campaigns. Lawson Ride 
CEO of the Cancer Council of Tasmania, was a leading advocate for smoke-free areas, and 
organised the “stunt” event, with Michael Wilson from Quit, with the “barman” in gas mask 
referred to in Photographs 4 and 5. The AMA and the Asthma Foundation were involved in 
the campaign for smoke-free cars with children. Other health professionals and advocates in 
Tasmania included union official David O’Byrne, who led SmokeFree Tasmania as efforts 
were being made to make hotels smoke-free, as his members were hospitality workers. Quit 
Tasmania, the Heart Foundation and the Cancer Council were the key members of 
SmokeFree Tasmania, as well as individuals from the Department of Health including Dr 
Martin Bicevskis and Kathryn Barnsley.  
Issues 
There was some success in a limited number of areas, when there were adequate numbers of 
people able to be rallied to engage in lobbying government. At times the planets aligned, and 
windows of opportunity opened, but only when there was a concerted effort on the part of 
NGOs. 
Smoke-free areas 
Non-government organisations were crucial in the drive to establish smoke-free indoor public 
places in Tasmania. This was one of the most important areas of reform for anti-smoking 
lobbyists. 
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Evidence about the detrimental effects of passive smoking was mounting in the 1980s, 
culminating in a report in Australia by the NHMRC in 1987 (NHMRC 1987). Much later, in 
1994: 
“… the Commonwealth, State and Territory ministers for health agreed 
to target the year 2000 for enclosed public places to become smokefree. 
They recommended that State and Territory governments introduce 
legislation to achieve this (CDHSH 1994)” (National Public Health 
Partnership and Legislative Reform Working Group 2000).  
Tasmania was the first state in Australia to ban smoking in all indoor public places, including 
bars in January 2006. The most influential and committed organisations in the campaigns for 
smoke-free areas in Tasmania, were SmokeFree Tasmania, Quit, the Heart Foundation, 
Cancer Council, Lung Foundation and the Public Health Association. There were essentially 
two campaigns and two sets of legislation, because the first legislation in 2001 only covered 
indoor workplaces, restaurants and limited areas of bars. It was not until 2006 that the 
complete eradication of smoking indoors in bars was achieved.  
The earliest serious impetus for smoke-free areas in Tasmania began in 1996 when the 
Government issued a discussion paper on the topic, associated with its exposure draft Public 
Health Bill. Liberal Health Minister Peter McKay, in a front-page Examiner story on June 20 
1996 (Rogers 1996) foreshadowed a complete ban on smoking in all public places including 
pubs and clubs. In the Mercury on December 24 1997 he said  
"‘If there are no real gains and a significant improvement in the way 
people do business [by July 2003] obviously Parliament would have to 
introduce legislation’" (Rogers, 1997, p. 3). 
SmokeFree Tasmania led the charge on reducing smoking in public places in the late 1990s, 
and was reported to have encouraged a voluntary arrangement in some restaurants for a 
smoke-free environment in 1998. A card was made for diners to give to restaurants to show 
their appreciation of such environments (Lamb 1998).  
Smoke-free areas legislation was in some ways an easier target for reform as it engaged 
public opinion. As there was more and more debate about the health effects of passive 
smoking, and information in the media from authoritative sources, such as the NHMRC and 
Surgeon General (Satcher 2000).  
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Funded by the Heart Foundation, the visit to Tasmania of Dr James Repace to Tasmania in 
1999 initiated intense media interest and debate on smoking in pubs and restaurants. This 
appears to have been a pivotal point in the anti-smoking campaigns for public places.  
The trade union that had the most members affected by smoking in bars was the Liquor 
Hospitality & Miscellaneous Workers Union (LHMU – now named United Voice), and its 
Secretary Darren Matthewson played an important role in influencing public opinion to 
support the first significant smoke-free areas legislation in 2001.  
Physicians joined forces with the NGOs to lobby for change. The Mercury newspaper 
reported in 2000 (Paine 2000): 
“TASMANIA'S most influential doctors have declared war on smoking 
in all enclosed public places, saying they aim to be a force in new state 
laws. 
“Yesterday doctors and health groups launched a push for smoke-free 
working conditions, particularly in the hospitality industry. 
“The alliance, Smokefree Tasmania, attacked the Australian Hotels 
Association for opposing a total ban on smoking in all restaurants and 
bars. 
“And it said an ``insidious'' tobacco industry was behind campaigns 
against bans. 
“The State Government will be drafting legislation governing smoking in 
public places in the next few weeks. 
“The doctors, representing Asthma Tasmania, the Cancer Council of 
Tasmania, the Australian Medical Association, general practitioners and 
the National Heart Foundation, backed last week's Liquor, Hospitality 
and Miscellaneous Workers Union call for smoking to be banned in all 
restaurants, bars, casinos and hotels. 
“Smokefree Tasmania said hospitality workers were suffering 
discrimination because they were forced to inhale environmental tobacco 
smoke, with lawsuits against employers inevitable. 
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“Professor Ray Lowenthal said the AHA's claims of economic losses 
were unfounded. 
“‘Studies around the world show an increase overall in the number of 
people attending restaurants and in income,’ Professor Lowenthal said. 
“‘It's irrelevant if the staff member is willing to work there, because an 
employer owes a duty of care to their staff.’ 
“He said no ventilation was good enough to prevent smoke moving 
through a building and many of the most lethal chemicals were colourless 
and odourless. 
“Dr Rob Walters said employers and owners should beware of the trend 
toward legal action over environmental tobacco smoke. 
“‘It will happen here. We have to have an all-or-nothing approach,’ Dr 
Walters said. 
“Dr Mike Loughhead said Tasmania had the highest rate of coronary 
heart disease in the country and smoking, or smoke, was a key factor. 
“‘If a non-smoker is married to a smoker, they are 25% more likely to 
have a heart attack,' Dr Loughhead said. 
“Also members of the alliance are Quit Tasmania, the Public Health 
Association of Australia, Adventist Health, the Australian Lung 
Foundation, the Association of Cystic Fibrosis and the Thoracic Society 
of Australia and New Zealand” (Paine 2000, p7).  
Accompanying this story were two pictures by Mercury photographer James Kerr, which 
depicted some of the most eminent and influential doctors in Tasmania.  
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Photo 4 Senior Tasmanian doctors supporting SmokeFree Tasmania 
 
Mercury: James Kerr – photographer September 2000 
Pictured left to right: John Davis (GP & AMA President), Michael Loughead (Cardiologist & 
Heart Foundation Board member), Ray Lowenthal (Oncologist & Cancer Council Board 
member), Collin Sherrington (Cystic Fibrosis - Respiratory Physician), Rob Walters (GP & 
Cancer Council President) – positions held September 2000. 
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Photo 5 The "barman" with gas mask  
Photo: Mercury (Kerr 2000).
 
Photo: Mercury (Kerr 2000). 
This picture (above) was set up to demonstrate the effects of tobacco smoke in a bar, and the 
“barman” is Quit CEO Michael Wilson and others pictured are members of SmokeFree 
Tasmania or employees of the Health Department. It elicited considerable publicity.  
Captions for photographs in the Mercury: “Serving up trouble: a barman pours drinks in a gas 
mask to dramatise the adverse health effects of a smoke-filled environment. Tasmanian 
doctors are campaigning for smoke-free workplaces” (Kerr 2000, Paine 2000). 
Pubs and clubs smoke-free – 2006 
The campaign for smoke-free pubs and clubs was the longest and hardest fought campaign by 
NGOs and was resisted strongly by the AHA. The AHA argued that country hotels in 
Tasmania would be hit hard by a total ban on smoking in public places (Mercury 2003). 
“General manager Daniel Hanna said yesterday a survey of AHA 
members revealed turnover at country and outer-suburban hotels would 
drop by about 34 per cent if more stringent smoking controls were 
introduced” (Mercury 2003, p. 9). 
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But Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union state secretary David O'Byrne 
accused the AHA of exaggerating: 
“The AHA has suggested there would be a fall in revenue and that jobs 
would go but what is more likely is that they would become family 
friendly venues and revenue would increase. About 2000 members of the 
union were affected by smoke and some had respiratory problems as a 
result” (Mercury 2003, p. 9). 
Premier Jim Bacon would not divulge the tenor of the previous day’s Cabinet discussion but 
said “… any decision would be made in the interest of all Tasmanians” (Mercury 2003). 
Sadly, Premier Bacon died of lung cancer within a year of this statement, and his cabinet 
colleagues acted on this issue soon after his death. 
The Royal Australasian College of Physicians President Luke Galligan pointed out that: 
“‘The inability of ventilation or separation to completely clear the air of 
second-hand tobacco smoke means non-smokers are also at risk … That 
exposure has been found to increase the risk of developing coronary 
artery disease by 25 per cent and lung cancer by 30 per cent” (Mercury 
2003). 
There were many newspaper stories similar to this one and the arguments raged back and 
forth. The NGOs and the unions continued to campaign strongly for reform, and the AHA 
continued its opposition, until smoke-free areas in pubs and clubs were finally implemented. 
Medical practitioners were strongly supportive of this campaign, and there were many 
different doctors involved in public advocacy at various points in time in the process.  
Removing Tobacco displays and advertising in shops – commenced 1998 – 
completed 2012 
Tasmania was the first place in the world to remove advertising from point-of-sale in shops 
(Ballard 2004). The campaign to undertake this was strongly assisted by Sydney-based 
Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), and ASH also provided a great deal of printed 
material for the campaign to eliminate tobacco displays in retail outlets. The key ASH 
workers were CEO Anne Jones and media expert Stafford Sanders. Anne Jones made many 
visits to Tasmania and assisted in lobbying politicians, with media and strategic planning.  
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Greens MP Peg Putt mentioned a letter from ASH on behalf of 60 Tasmanian and national 
NGOs in her speech on the Public Health Amendment Bill 2007: 
“I have had a letter from Action on Smoking and Health on behalf of a 
coalition of more than 60 Tasmanian and national organisations saying 
that while the proposed legislation contained some welcome features, 
including a proposed ban on smoking in cars carrying children, there 
were a number of shortcomings. Of greatest concern is the failure to 
completely ban retail display of tobacco products. Research they 
enclosed – and I will come to that – shows compelling evidence that 
retail display normalises tobacco to children and predisposes them 
towards smoking. If every child smoker is one too many, then every 
square metre of tobacco display is a square metre too much” (Hansard 
2007). 
Ten years earlier in 1997 the Heart Foundation and the Australian Medical Association 
managed to annoy the leader of the Opposition, Liberal Bob Cheek, as he declared, during the 
debate on the Public Health Bill 1997 (No. 106):  
“Then, of course, the orchestration was cranked up and once again I am not blaming the 
Health officers over here, but by the public relations department from the Department of 
Community and Health Services, and you had other people, Australian Medical Association 
and the National Heart Foundation, coming out and almost blaming us for the fact that we 
were in with the tobacco lobby and trying to stop this legislation going through. All we were 
trying to do was point out the impracticality of having one packet of cigarettes put there. Now 
we have got five and that is a lot better, that is all we were trying to do, and yet this whole 
campaign was cranked up as though we were in league with the so-called pedlars of death 
and the other fourteen retailers were and it was so stupid, as I said, and so far from the truth” 
(Hansard 1997b). 
Ban on sale of tobacco products to children under 18 years – 1996–1998 
The amendments to the Public Health Act in 1996 were the first substantive piece of tobacco-
control legislation in Tasmania and the forerunner to the Public Health Act 1997, which 
contained comprehensive anti-tobacco provisions.  
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The Public Health Act 1997 commenced in 1998 and included: bans on tobacco advertising, 
the sale of cigarettes to children under 18 years of age and self-service vending machines; 
and display restrictions in retail shops. Manufacturers and suppliers were also banned from 
providing false information to any person about tobacco-control legislation or the health 
effects of tobacco products. 
The ban on sale of cigarettes to children under 18 years of age was not driven by non-
government organisations, and appears to have had the support of the tobacco industry. 
However, restrictions on tobacco displays and other bans were supported and advocated for 
by non-government organisations including ASH Australia. 
Banning smoking in cars with children – 2008 
This initiative was pursued by SmokeFree Tasmania, the AMA and the Asthma Foundation, 
and encountered almost no resistance from anyone, with the exception of some initial 
reluctance by police to enforce it. The tobacco industry did not oppose this measure, 
presumably because it would not actually reduce smoking rates, and it would have harmed 
their public image to be seen to be advocating for children to be exposed to tobacco smoke.  
More outdoor smoking bans – 2012 to 2013 
Non-government organisations were interested in extending outdoor smoking bans but did 
not pursue these vigorously. Most of the initiative came from within the Department of 
Health who were interested in pursuing de-normalisation of smoking. NGOs supported these 
initiatives within the framework of the Tobacco coalition, but did not go out of their way to 
campaign publicly for such measures. 
The government moved to extend outdoor smoking bans from 2012, to playgrounds, patrolled 
beaches, pedestrian and bus malls, bus shelters, 100 per cent of outdoor dining areas, 
competition and seating areas at sporting events and other large public events. Carols by 
Candlelight events were required to be smoke-free. Selected markets, food and wine, and 
music festivals were required to be smoke-free or have designated areas for smoking. 
Agricultural shows organised by the Affiliated Societies of the Agricultural Show Council of 
Tasmania were required to be smoke-free or have designated smoking areas. 
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Conclusion 
There have been many successful campaigns for legislative reform in Tasmania in which 
NGOs, medical practitioners and unions have played a crucial role. These campaigns 
included smoke-free areas, removal of tobacco product displays and bans on smoking in cars 
with children. NGOs in Tasmania are not well funded in comparison to their mainland 
counterparts, and their capacity to undertake advocacy and lobbying has been limited by lack 
of resources, and in some cases, expertise. Many of the effective mainland organisations 
commenced in the 1970s or earlier. The Tasmanian Cancer Council was not established until 
the 1990s, although the Heart Foundation had existed for some years prior to this. Tasmania 
simply lacked a critical mass of NGOs with expertise in tobacco control, until the late 1990s, 
and even then there was little funding, and no staffing for tobacco advocacy roles. Quit was 
also established in the 1990s and was permitted some role in advocacy, but it was a creature 
of government, totally funded by the public purse, and therefore constrained from being more 
than mildly critical of governments. Similar to Victoria there were many physicians who 
campaigned at various times on particular issues, but apart from Dr James Markos in 
Launceston and Dr Richard Wood-Baker in Hobart, who consistently advocated for tobacco-
control measures for decades, most physicians only engaged intermittently in the public 
domain. Other individuals, such as Lawson Ride at the Cancer Council worked consistently 
for many years, but had no specifically allocated staffing to conduct advocacy, therefore the 
work had to be fitted in between fundraising, service delivery and other activities. 
Fundraising is particularly important for NGOs in Tasmania, and is a major time-consuming 
preoccupation of CEOs.  
The most significant area in which NGOs have been unable to galvanise support from 
government has been in the allocation of resources to mass-media campaigns and cessation-
support services, until very recently. It is probable that the lack of a health economist, or 
government budget process expert, available to these organisations has meant that the case 
for increased funding has not been adequately stated, until 2012. The only document that was 
provided, or was found in the process of undertaking this study, that delivered a 
comprehensive argument for increased resourcing, was produced by the Cancer Council in 
late 2012 for the 2013/14 budget consultation process. No other documentation has been 
found, or was made available.  
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In summary, NGOs have made valiant efforts over many years since the mid-1990s in 
Tasmania to push governments to take action on tobacco control, and have been very 
successful in many legislative reform areas. However, the lack of infrastructure and staffing 
resources for advocacy has hampered their efforts in comparison to their wealthier colleagues 
in other Australian states. Furthermore, there is no history or critical mass of community or 
other support for tobacco control from the 1970s onwards that enabled the building of NGO 
infrastructure as occurred in other jurisdictions. Legislative reform has consequently been 
easier to achieve than financial and resource allocation. This has been a contributing factor to 
the barriers to evidence-based tobacco control in Tasmania. 
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Chapter 9 Major findings and conclusion  
The major findings of this thesis are that tobacco industry interference, crony capitalism, 
complex bureaucratic systems, poor accountability, cultural beliefs, inadequate leadership, 
cognitive dissonance of smoking politicians, lack of commitment from ‘conservative white 
male’ leaders, lack of resources for non-government organisations, lack of grassroots 
dynamism and a dearth of strong independent policy entrepreneurs, all contributed to 
inadequate resourcing of tobacco control in Tasmania from the 1960s to the 2000s. No 
evidence was found of influence of political ideology by the major political parties having a 
substantial effect on tobacco control. Both major political parties were, at times over the 
years from the 1960s, led by males with close ties to the tobacco industry or front 
organisations. It appeared that the personalities of individual politicians were more influential 
than whether or not they belonged to a particular political party. Green Party politicians, 
some independents and a few backbenchers from both major political parties were persistent 
in questioning government about tobacco control, and many quoted research studies and 
demonstrated a sound understanding of the issues. Other politicians were not only sceptical 
and critical of tobacco reforms, but used abusive and insulting language to hector reformers.  
My research suggests that the most important barrier to evidence-based tobacco control was 
the activity and influence of the tobacco industry, together with crony capitalism of 
conservative white males. Tasmania’s decline in smoking rates lagged behind other states of 
Australia in the late 1990s and 2000s. It was clear that something was seriously wrong with 
tobacco-control measures in Tasmania, because all other states and territories were subject to 
the same taxation regimes and industry influences. The author and a number of other 
members of the scientific and health community were concerned about smoking rates thus it 
was decided to embark on this study, to see if it was possible to uncover the barriers to 
reform and implementation of evidence-based policy. A literature review and document 
analysis were conducted, with a view to conducting interviews at a later time. A large amount 
of data was collected from many sources including internal government documents, archival 
materials, newspaper reports, Hansard transcripts, reports and reviews, from which it became 
clear that it would be undesirable to conduct interviews. Firstly, because it was possible to 
triangulate data using a number of sources, to track events and to see what views had been 
expressed by the actors at the time events occurred. Secondly, because Tasmania is a small 
place and the author and a number of her supervisors, colleagues and co-authors were well 
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known, and indeed integrated into the Tasmanian tobacco control system and society. 
Potential interviewees included activists, commentators, researchers, and advisers to 
government, and therefore, it was considered impossible to conduct interviews that would 
have yielded unbiased responses. The respondents would have felt a need to justify 
themselves for various actions or inactions, reportage would have been coloured by 
personalities and perceptions, and recall bias would have been a problem due to the passage 
of time. Therefore, in order to achieve an accurate and rigorous approach to the research, it 
was decided to rely only on records of what people said and did, rather than what they 
thought they might have said and done.  
My research suggests that tobacco control in Tasmania has been characterised by a strong 
legislative reform agenda and weak commitment to resourcing community education, mass-
media campaigns and cessation-support services. The Tasmanian political landscape is 
plagued by crony capitalism, documented by other writers (Beresford, 2010, 2015) as well as 
in this thesis, and that is particularly acute in the operation of close relationships between 
influential politicians and the tobacco industry, their “front” organisations and industries 
closely associated with the industry. This close relationship was most notable in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Barnsley, 2011). The tobacco industry was so successful that in 1972 it managed 
to eliminate a Tasmanian government and have it thrown out of office (Barnsley, 2011).  In 
ensuing years through into the 1980s the industry established close relationships with Liberal 
politicians (Legacy Library 1993b), which ensured that Tasmania had no tobacco reforms, 
and no tobacco legislation to control the industry during that period. During the 1990s and 
2000s the tobacco industry was, through the hotels association, also able to gain a 
memorandum of understanding with a Labor government not to proceed with banning 
smoking in pubs (Dally 1998). Both Labor and Liberal governments were at fault. My 
research suggests that this close relationship with industry of crony capitalism was, and 
continues to be, a major contributor to preventing evidence-based tobacco control in 
Tasmania. 
A series of political blunders in the 1970s, and bureaucratic intransigence in the 1980s and 
1990s through failure to hypothecate tobacco taxes (sometimes titled business franchise fees) 
to tobacco-control measures., entrenched Tasmania in a long-lasting financial abyss relating 
to tobacco control, out of which it did not climb until recently. The states that allocated a 
portion of tobacco taxes to tobacco control in the 1980s and 1990s were cushioned, because 
their commitments to tobacco control were embedded, and too politically risky to unwind. 
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The 1997 High Court decisions deprived the states of the ability to collect this revenue, but 
Victoria, South Australia and West Australia had firm funding commitments to tobacco 
control, so adequate resourcing of tobacco-control measures continued even when 
hypothecation ceased. My research found that in contrast, Tasmanian public health officials 
scraped around for funding for tobacco control for decades, and that this was a moderately 
important factor in barriers to reform. Such lack of funding could have been overcome, and 
was eventually successfully allocated, by strong female political leaders who were concerned 
about tobacco control, and prepared to follow the evidence. 
Few case studies have managed to obtain such a comprehensive range of internal government 
documents, including memoranda, some ministerial briefings and emails. The availability of 
these documents in Tasmania ensured that it was possible to scrutinise in detail the policy 
processes underlying actions on tobacco control. My research suggests that flaws in the 
Tasmanian health bureaucracy which have been disclosed in various government and 
independent reviews, reports and audits, were important, but not the principal factors in 
preventing the adoption of key evidence based tobacco control measures. This study further 
exposes details of the tobacco-control policy-making shortcomings. In the 1960s bureaucrats 
assisted the tobacco industry, and were inextricably involved in perpetrating a criminal 
conspiracy to subvert land allocation laws. These bureaucrats almost certainly received no 
financial advantage from the tobacco industry, so they were not “corrupt”, but undoubtedly 
engaged in cronyism. Tobacco-industry initiated crony capitalism penetrated the bureaucracy, 
and this was the most outstanding example. In the 2000s the bureaucracy failed to adequately 
inform successive governments of the depth and extent of tobacco-control research evidence. 
Many politicians failed to grasp the enormity of the effects of tobacco smoking on the health 
of Tasmanians. Furthermore, those who did understand the catastrophic effects on health 
systems and the community, failed to implement effective interventions. Some government 
agencies were unhelpful, and even obstructed tobacco control efforts. These agencies were 
not brought into line by a whole-of-government approach to health measures. The distinctive 
silo effects operating within the health agency and within government overall, contributed to 
a lack of cooperation. Ironically the multiple government committees, which might have 
resolved these impediments, in fact made the whole system slower, less efficient and more 
complicated. 
My research found that there were many examples of individuals and health organisations 
advocating for tobacco reforms in Tasmania. However, there were no outstanding persistent 
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policy entrepreneurs of the eminence of leaders such as Victorian Dr Nigel Gray (Daube 
2015). Tasmanian non-government organisations (NGOs) are small by comparison to the 
larger states, and lacked policy development and advocacy resources. In most NGOs the CEO 
was the person who conducted public advocacy. Their main focus had to be on fundraising, 
management and implementation of the service-delivery aspects of the organisation, leaving 
little time for advocacy. Few medical practitioners and specialists could spare the time for 
public advocacy, as they were fully engaged in clinical and research work. Until the late 
2000s, none of these organisations had staff employed to undertake tobacco-control 
advocacy, policy research or the drafting of submissions or correspondence to government to 
seek additional resources for tobacco control. Quit Tasmania was able to undertake some of 
these tasks, but was not funded to employ a policy or research officer. A more effective 
advocacy role by NGOs and medical practitioners might have influenced government, 
however, my research found that this was a less important contributing factor to overall 
policy failure, than that of cronyism and tobacco industry interference, or bureaucratic 
inadequacies Furthermore, as noted by Chapman and Wakefield (Chapman& Wakefield, 
2001, p.279), “Advocacy in Australia has been driven by a relatively small group of people 
working from an even smaller group of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs).” Grassroots 
support was lacking in Tasmania, with the exception of reforms relating to smoke-free areas 
indoors and outdoors. This fits with the more general Australian experience, whereby, 
Chapman and Wakefield maintain that, 
“Tobacco control advocacy in Australia, then, did not emerge 
spontaneously out of the community except in some small, if important, 
instances. Rather, it has mostly been initiated by professional advocates 
who took the recommendations of the early expert reports on reducing 
the tobacco epidemic and the results of relevant local policy-relevant 
research and advocated for changes to be adopted. While today there are 
countless examples of citizens joining in this advocacy ….. the leading 
edge of contemporary advocacy for tobacco control …..is still being 
driven almost wholly by health NGOs and policy-oriented researchers.” 
(Chapman & Wakefield, 2001) 
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My research suggests that when they came to power at both a national and state level, a group 
of progressive female politicians were able to overcome all other impediments and allocate 
sufficient resources to tobacco control. None of these women were evidently engaged in 
cronyism with the tobacco industry. Federal minister Nicola Roxon was given international 
recognition and awards for her leadership on introducing plain packaging (Myers, 2015). The 
key factor appears to be that there must be a group of progressive women in all major 
leadership roles, because individual health ministers struggle to convince cabinet colleagues 
to undertake tobacco control measures (Mercury 2001, p. 16, Hansard, 2007a). When she was 
Health Minister, Lara Giddings MHR (Hansard, 2009) was seemingly unable to introduce 
adequate evidence-based measures, but once she became Treasurer and Premier, together 
with a progressive colleague Michelle O’Byrne as Health Minister, they worked with federal 
MPs Health Minister Tanya Plibersek and Prime Minister Julia Gillard to allocate resources 
for tobacco control in 2013 (Tobacco Coalition 2013, p. 6) 
Limitations 
The limitations of the study include: availability of all documentation; the involvement of the 
researcher and all supervisors in Tasmanian health, and some political interactions and 
processes; the lack of access to comparative data or records from other states; and a lack of 
in-depth study of the role of the media. Not all Tasmanian government documents were made 
available to the author, despite repeated requests. Treasury refused to supply any documents 
at all. A challenge to the Ombudsman may have overturned this refusal, however it was 
considered unproductive to spend time on such an endeavour, as there was an abundance of 
other documents and Hansard reports, which told the story of Treasury’s role.  
This is one interpretation of events, but this interpretation is justified given the breadth of 
data, documents and reports discovered and analysed. Externally reviewed articles emanating 
from this study were published in journals from three different academic disciplines, history, 
public health and politics. 
The limitation on the study in relation to the effect of the media is problematic. Although 
efforts were made to obtain electronic media reports, these were not available. It is possible 
that cuts to the ABC in regional areas of Australia, especially news and current affairs 
investigative programs, and the decline of regional newspapers and retrenchment of many 
print journalists, have contributed to a lack of scrutiny of crony capitalism in Tasmania in 
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recent years. Furthermore at least one Tasmanian newspaper editor had been listed as a 
consultant to the tobacco industry (Legacy Library 1975) and another former newspaper and 
media proprietor was jailed for political bribery and corruption (Darby 2002). The role of the 
media has been found to be important in other international tobacco control studies 
(Wakefield 2012), however, for reasons of inability to access sufficient material, this was not 
pursued. There may be other impediments to evidence-based tobacco-control policy which 
remain unidentified; however, the myriad of barriers identified in this study is indeed clearly 
sufficient to slow reform. 
Future action 
The engagement of community based organisations and grassroots support in addition to 
established non-government organisations would assist in moving tobacco control initiatives 
onto the public and political agenda. Tasmania has outstanding research capacities at the 
University of Tasmania including the Menzies Research Institute, School of Medicine, Health 
Sciences and School of Social Sciences. A greater advocacy role by medical practitioners and 
their associated colleges and organisations could improve knowledge translation and 
evidence-informed public policy making by focussing government attention on tobacco 
control. Involvement of the highly respected Tasmanian academic community would also 
assist. Tasmania could learn much from the Canadian efforts to engage these groups in a 
cooperative approach. 
Integrated knowledge translation (IKT) offers some potential for pursuing such processes, 
however, it must be well-defined, evaluated and reported Gagliardi et al were unable to 
“….identify thematic areas across the studies to recommend particular IKT strategies or ideal 
contextual conditions.” (Gagliardi et al, 2016, p11). A more promising approach is that of 
deliberative dialogues, “a group process that emphasizes transformative discussion, and may 
be informed by research evidence” (Boyko et al, 2012, p.1939), as it appears to be more 
precisely articulated and defined, supports capacity building, and could be operationalised in 
a small jurisdiction like Tasmania. This approach is more sophisticated, focussed and 
structured than the usual consultation processes undertaken by government. Furthermore, it 
provides opportunities for policy alternatives, capacity to advocate and engage in agenda-
setting, consistent with the major themes of this thesis, including emboldening policy 
entrepreneurs.  
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The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is relevant to this study and two 
important themes stand out. Firstly, the need for all governments, including Tasmania, to 
properly observe the provisions of Article 5.3, the Guidelines for which provides inter alia,  
“Recommendations  
2.1 Parties should interact with the tobacco industry only when and to the 
extent strictly necessary to enable them to effectively regulate the tobacco 
industry and tobacco products.  
2.2 Where interactions with the tobacco industry are necessary, Parties should 
ensure that such interactions are conducted transparently. Whenever possible, 
interactions should be conducted in public, for example through public 
hearings, public notice of interactions, disclosure of records of such 
interactions to the public.”  
Furthermore, the FCTC emphasises the importance of knowledge transfer, and has a strong 
emphasis on information sharing and exchange. Article 20 sets out the need to “….develop 
and promote national research and to coordinate research programmes at the regional and 
international levels in the field of tobacco control” (WHO 2003).This study points to the need 
for future research into the hypothesis revealed; that it is conceivable that governments led by 
a number of progressive females, might be more inclined than “conservative white males” to 
follow evidence-based public policy, and to act on appropriate recommendations. The events 
that signalled this theory occurred after the main collection of data and examination of 
documents took place, and therefore it was not examined in any depth, tested or compared 
with other jurisdictions. In the context of significant global policies such as climate change 
action and public health initiatives, this is a particularly salient concern. The construction of 
evidence-based policies implemented by groups of progressive female leaders, and whether 
there are gender and political orientation differences, should be studied in other countries, 
provinces and states. Commonwealth governments must take a greater interest in small states 
and territories such as Tasmania and the Northern Territory, which both have very high 
smoking rates. The small size of these jurisdictions means that they lack resources to 
undertake tobacco-control measures. Small jurisdictions lack research resources, well-funded 
independent advocacy organisations, and the bureaucratic infrastructure, including legal 
resources, to combat the tobacco industry. Australia should not leave small rural and remote 
jurisdictions in the wake of big cities, for their populations to suffer immensely greater health 
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problems than mainland capitals. Furthermore, small Pacific countries experience similar 
problems with tobacco control, tobacco industry interference, lack of resources, lack of 
support from non-health government agencies and lack of NGO support (Martin 2013); and 
larger more powerful and resource-rich neighbouring countries such as Australia should 
assist. Additional provision of resources, including infrastructure, to smaller states and 
territories must be a priority to ensure fairness of health outcome for all Australians. 
Perhaps the time is right for in-depth consideration of the role of ideas in tobacco-control 
policy, rather than relying entirely on the transfer of evidence. Smith found that evidence has 
limited traction in policy debates and, “… it is the ideas and concepts generated through 
public health research that travel into public health policy” (Smith, 2013). Smith says that 
politics has been portrayed as a barrier to rational decision making. This study certainly 
found that politicians have proved to be a barrier to evidence-based tobacco-control policy. 
Maybe “charismatic” and “chameleonic” ideas (Fafard 2015) such as the tobacco-free 
generation proposal (Berrick 2013; Walters 2015), which was endorsed by 2015 World 
Conference on Tobacco or Health (WCTOH 2015) might take centre stage in tobacco control 
in the future. It could be that such ideas take root and transform the tobacco-control 
environment, and engage the imaginations of politicians and the community, without 
abandoning the imperative for comprehensive evidence. New ideas have to be tried 
somewhere, then evaluated. Plain packaging had a very strong but limited evidence base 
before being introduced, because it had never actually been implemented. The reduced appeal 
and increased health warning effectiveness of plain packaging proved successful (Wakefield 
2015). The research on plain packaging led the push for its adoption. Therefore, the idea that 
sound research can act as a prompt to stimulate charismatic or new ideas is worth pursuing. 
Politicians must make an effort to seek out and act on the best advice, not just from 
bureaucrats, but from researchers and scientists. They must be prepared to listen to 
independent qualified experts, new ideas, and not be swayed by “junk science” provided by 
self-interested industry bodies (Samet 2001). Premiers and cabinet ministers must genuinely 
endorse healthy public policies within all government agencies, and not allow distractions of 
immediate crises and emergencies to divert them from such goals. Independent politicians 
and backbenchers should be encouraged by evidence that they can influence policy on 
tobacco control, as being persistent, asking pertinent questions, using research, and being 
involved in parliamentary committees has an effect (Hooker 2006). Bureaucrats must ensure 
that their systems are flexible, innovative, and flow smoothly without the constant speed-
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bumps of unwieldy committees. Consultation is necessary, but repeated iterative consultation 
processes should be curtailed. Well-funded national non-government organisations should 
recognise that their smaller state bodies cannot support or sustain significant research, 
advocacy and infrastructure, and must provide support and assistance in order to achieve 
nationally fair and equitable health outcomes for all Australians. 
It is vital in Tasmania to adopt healthy public policy, prevention measures and address the 
social determinants of health. However, such policy instruments will not be adopted unless 
the corporate vectors of disease, including the tobacco industry, are held at arm’s length from 
decision making, and venal industry agendas exposed, tackled and overthrown.  
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Glossary  Tasmanian Government committees and 
departments, and other acronyms  
Acronym Organisation or explanation 
ABS  Australian Bureau of Statistics. Collects Australian statistics on many topics. 
Differs from AIHW.  
ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework. A concept – not an organisation.  
ACOSH Australian Council on Smoking and Health (ACOSH). An independent, non-
government, not-for-profit tobacco-control advocacy coalition of prominent 
West Australian health, education, community, social service and research 
bodies. Mainly operating in Western Australia. 
ADS Alcohol and Drug Service 
AIHW Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. A national agency. Produces 
health and welfare information and statistics. Differs from ABS.  
AHA Australian Hotels Association 
ALP Australian Labor Party, also known as Labor.  
AMA Australian Medical Association. Also an acronym for the American Medical 
Association, however, this is differentiated in the text. 
ANCD Australian National Council on Drugs 
ASH Action on Smoking and Health, Australia. A major tobacco-control advocacy 
organisation. Based in Sydney and provided advocacy for the eastern states 
and NT. Now defunct. Provided much support to Tasmanian NGOs during 
the 1990s and 2000s until it was abolished in 2013. 
ATODC Alcohol Tobacco and other Drugs Council (a peak NGO funded by 
government with only one tobacco-control organisation member).  
ATODSC Alcohol Tobacco and other Drugs Steering Committee – a Department of 
Health and Human Services Committee, which dealt with all drugs issues 
including tobacco, alcohol and illicits and reported to the IAWGD.  
BATA British American Tobacco Australia. 
BLT Butt Littering Trust. Front organisation for the tobacco industry. Now 
defunct. 
BT British Tobacco. Also formerly part of or known as WD and HO Wills, 
Amatil.  
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Acronym Organisation or explanation 
CDC US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
DOTAF Department of Treasury and Finance, Tasmania 
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services, Tasmania.  
DOHA Department of Health and Ageing, Commonwealth. 
DPAC Department of Premier and Cabinet, Tasmania. 
DPEM Department of Police and Emergency Management. Structurally included the 
Fire Service and the Police Department. Tasmania. 
DPIWE/DPIPWE Department of Primary Industry Parks Water and Environment. This 
Department has changed its name and composition several times during the 
period examined by the thesis. Parks and Environment Divisions have been 
moved to and from other Departments. Tasmania. 
EBPH Evidence-based Public Health. 
ETS Environmental tobacco smoke. Also known as second-hand smoke (SHS); 
passive smoking; tobacco smoke pollution. 
FCTC Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. WHO Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) is the first international treaty negotiated 
under the auspices of WHO. It was adopted by the World Health Assembly 
on 21 May 2003 and entered into force on 27 February 2005. Australia 
ratified it in 2004. Article 5.3 is particularly relevant to this thesis, and 
concerns the protection of public health policies with respect to tobacco 
control from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry. 
FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 
HBI Healthy Buildings International, a tobacco industry front organisation. 
HLCG Healthy Lifestyle Cluster Group. A Tasmania Together Committee  
HLIDG Healthy Lifestyles Inter-Departmental Group. Not sure how this differs from 
similarly named groups. Mentioned in memo to Minister from Mary Bent 
10/12/2003 
HTA Health Technology Assessment 
IAPCC Inter-Agency Policy Co-ordination Committee 
IAWGD Inter-Agency Working Group on Drugs.  
IDHWCG Inter Departmental Health and Wellbeing Cluster Group – formerly the 
Healthy Lifestyle Cluster Group 
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Acronym Organisation or explanation 
IGCD  Inter-Governmental Committee on Drugs 
LHMU  Liquor and Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union, now United 
Voice. 
MCDS Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy 
MHA Member of the House of Assembly, Tasmania. The House of Assembly is 
the Lower House and provides the government for Tasmania. It is dominated 
by political parties, Labor, liberals, Greens. Legislation is initiated in this 
House.  
MLC Member of the Legislative Council. The Legislative Council is the Upper 
House, and mainly comprises independents and a few members of political 
parties. It primarily reviews government legislation emanating from the 
House of Assembly, and has been described as the most powerful Upper 
House in the world, as it can defeat money bills. Members can introduce 
their own legislation, Private Members’ Bills, but this is rare. Occasionally a 
government will appoint one of its members as a Minister.  
MP Member of Parliament. A non-specific term that means a member of any 
house of parliament in any jurisdiction in Australia.  
MTCP Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program (USA) 
NAA National Archives of Australia 
NDS  National Drug Strategy  
NGO Non-government organisation.  
NTS  National Tobacco Strategy  
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PHAIW  Public Health Advocacy Institute of Western Australia. Established in 2008. 
PHAIWA is an independent public health advocacy and research 
organisation based within Curtin University. 
PEHS Public and Environmental Health Service. Included in Population Health 
Services within DHHS. 
PHA Public Health Association  
PM Phillip Morris – tobacco company 
SES Socio-economic status 
SPU Social Policy Unit. Section of DPAC. 
TAP Tobacco Action Plan 
TC Tobacco Coalition. DHHS Committee, which includes stakeholders from 
health groups, and independent experts. Some other government agencies are 
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Acronym Organisation or explanation 
occasionally represented. It produces the Tobacco Action plan. Secretariat 
support is provided by an officer from PEHS. 
TCGG Tobacco Coalition Governance Group, sometimes just called the Governance 
Group – oversees the operation of the Tobacco Coalition 
UCSF University of San Francisco California. UCSF Library and Center for 
Knowledge Management host the Truth (also known as Legacy) Tobacco 
industry documents, an archive of 14 million documents created by tobacco 
companies about their advertising, manufacturing, marketing, scientific 
research and political activities. 
WHO World Health Organisation  
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